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Abstract 
This thesis contributes to an ongoing debate on the nature of Islam’s role in the 
emergence of nationalism in the Muslim world in general, and in Egypt in the years 
1879-1882.  While theories of nations and nationalism reveal a contested theoretical 
landscape, many scholars agree that Islam and nationalism are antithetical and 
expound divergent conceptions of community.  For their part, Middle East scholars, 
view the ‘Urabi Revolt 1879-1882, as a ‘protonationalist’ precursor to the ‘full-blown’ 
Egyptian nationalism of the early twentieth century.  Finally, ‘ulama participation in 
the ‘Urabi Revolt has been mainly ignored, most likely due to the dominant narrative 
– increasingly challenged – that ‘ulama were, to a great extent, marginalized over the 
nineteenth century in Egypt due to reforms that challenged their spheres of influence. 
On the theoretoical tension between Islam and nationalism and in asserting the 
nationalism of the ‘Urabi Revolt, I explore the case of Egypt, the ‘Urabi Revolt itself 
and the role of Islamic clerics, thinkers and activists.  These key actors put forward 
convincing views of how Islamic and nationalist notions of community were in fact 
reconcilable. Furthermore, I argue that Egypt represents an exception to the dominant 
scholarly view that sees many nationalisms of the Middle East emerging in the 
aftermath of the Ottoman defeat of 1918. 
I offer an alternative account of the ‘ulama’s fate during the nineteenth century and 
explore their role in the ‘Urabi Revolt.  While reforms did reduce the ‘ulama’s wealth, 
economic privileges and political influence this did not, I argue, result in complete 
marginality because ‘ulama monopoly of the religious and educational sphere 
remained largely unchallenged.  Legal reforms may have displaced ‘ulama from key 
positions but these were not as comprehensive as some scholars have suggested.   
In the emerging nationalism of 1879 – 1882 and the British invasion, I argue that 
‘ulama played a prominent role, both in the intellectual articulation of nationalism and 
within the poilitical and revolutionary events.  ‘Ulama both defined and were active 
participants in the nationalist movement’s relationship to contending political forces 
including the Ottoman Empire, the local Khedive and indeed the invading British 
forces, imbuing Egyptian nationalism with a distinct Islamic character.  
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Note on Transliteration 
In this thesis, all Arabic words and terms appear in English transliteration.  
Arabic words used frequently throughout this thesis, like ‘ulama, ‘umma, ‘Urabi, 
Sheikh, Shari’a and Quran will appear in normal standard text.  Less frequently used 
Arabic words like fellahin, Majlis, katatib, madrassa will be italicized.  
The ‘ is used to show the Arabic letter “ain”.  No symbol is used for the Arabic letter 
“hamza”.  Likewise no subscripts or superscripts are used in this thesis. 
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Glossary of Arabic Terms 
al-‘adl justice 
‘alim (sing.) ‘ulama (pl.) Islamic religious scholar/s 
Ameer al Mo’minoun Commander of the Faithful 
Caliph Leader of the Muslim community 
dar al-Harb abode of war 
dar al-Islam abode of Islam 
Diwan Administrative Council 
Diwan al-Wali Governing Councils 
Faqih (sing.); Fuqahah (pl.) Jurists 
fara’id al-mirath  inheritance laws 
fatwa (sing.); fatawa (pl.) Islamic legal opinion or ruling 
fellah (sing.); fellahin (pl.) peasant/s 
fiqh Islamic jurisprudence 
Hadith narratives of the Prophet Muhammad’s 
traditions 
Hanbali Islamic school of legal thought (madhhab) 
whose origins are attributed to Ahmed ibn 
Hanbal in ninth-century Baghdad. 
Hajj religious pilgrimage 
halqa circle of students 
Hanafi one of the four main doctrinal schools of 
Islamic law founded by ‘Abu Hanifa (d.765) 
al-hukuma Government 
hubb al-watan love of country 
al-hurriya liberty/freedom 
‘ilm knowledge 
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iltizam tax farm system 
Imam leader of the prayers 
ijaza permission to teach at Al-Azhar 
ijtihad independent reason 
istifta question or request for fatwa 
jahiliyya backwardness/ignorance 
jihad the Arabic verb ‘to struggle’ 
jins/jinsiyya citizen/citizenship 
kuttab (sing.); katatib (pl.) religious elementary/primary school/s 
Khatib sermon giver 
Khedive Viceroy, equivalent to a local ruling monarch 
la’iha al-Wataniyya National Declaration or Manifesto 
madhhab (sing.); madhaahib (pl.) School/s of Islamic legal interpretation 
madrassa (sing.); madaaris (pl.) school 
Majlis al-Ahkam Judicial Council 
Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab Consultative Assembly or Council of 
Deputies 
Maliki school of law attributed to Malik ibn Anas in 
the eighth century 
Mufti Islamic legal experts (givers of legal opinion) 
multazim tax farmers 
Naqib al-Ashraf Marshal of the Notables 
al-Thawra al-‘Urabiyya the Urabi Revolt 
Qadi (sing.); Quda (pl.) judge/s 
qadi ‘askar chief judge 
Rashidun Caliphs Rightly Guided Caliphs. The Prophet 
Muhammad’s first four immediate successors 
in Islam (AD 632–661) 
riwaq Dormitory 
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Shafi’i one of the four main doctrinal schools of 
Islamic law founded by Muhammed ibn 
Shafi’i 
Shahaadah Declaration of Islamic faith 
Shari’a Islamic law 
Sheikh al-Balad village headman 
Sunna actions and deeds of the Prophet Muhammed 
taqlid imitation-based learning 
tasawwuf Mysticism 
tawhid  Theology 
al-tarbiya upbringing/education 
‘umma the universal Islamic community of believers 
usul al-fiqh fundamental principles of jurisprudence 
Vali Governor 
Wahhabism Orthodox Sunni ideology following the 
teachings of the eighteenth-century orthodox 
Islamic reformer Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhab 
al-watan homeland/nation 
Wataniyya nationhood 
waqf (sing.); awqaf (pl) charitable endowment/s 
al-zulm injustice 
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Chapter One 
Islam and Nationalism: The Role of Islam and the ‘Ulama in the 
‘Urabi Revolt 1879-1882 
The Theoretical Tension: Islam and Nationalism 
Even a superficial glance at contemporary current affairs shows the importance of 
Islam and nationalism to understanding many of the political struggles around the 
world today.  For its part, nationalism continues to ignite political conflict and fierce 
political debate in every continent while Islam, according to Ernest Gellner writing in 
1979, the year of the Iranian Revolution, “has clearly the greatest political potential; 
potential for mobilisation and simultaneously for underwriting a social order, 
legitimising both socially radical and socially conservative regimes and 
establishments.”1  But for all the importance that can be attributed to these two 
powerful political forces and for all the explanatory literature that this importance has 
spawned, our understanding of how these two powerful political forces often converge 
and how they shape and influence these political movements remains an important 
area of research.   
In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of theoretical and 
historiographical research both on Islam and on nationalism.  Theoretical research has 
greatly furthered our understanding of the emergence of nations and nationalism while 
studies of Islamic societies have allowed greater insights into the ways in which these 
societies function and more importantly, the role of Islam and of religion within 
Muslim society.  This thesis arises out of the contention that the divide between the 
growing body of theoretical work explaining the rise of nations and nationalism and 
historiographical accounts and empirical studies of the emergence of particular 
‘nations’ and nationalisms in the Islamic world remains wide and inadequately 
covered. 
                                                 
1
 Ernest Gellner, ‘State and Revolution in Islam’, Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 8:3, 
December 1979, p.188. 
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Theories seeking to explain the rise of nations and nationalism have evolved and 
developed significantly since the 1960s advancing the field in new directions.  From 
here, four main theoretical approaches have emerged within nationalism studies giving 
rise to a substantial body of theoretical literature detailing the four main approaches 
which are the “modernist”, “ethno-symbolist”, “primordialist” and “perennialist” 
theories of the rise of nations and nationalism.  By far the most popular and indeed 
persuasive are the modernist and ethno-symbolist approaches (see chapter 2) although 
as Fred Halliday observes, many of the rhetorical arguments used to legitimise the 
Turkish nation, the Jewish nation or the Arab nation often rely on perennialist theories 
which maintain that nations have in fact “always existed, or at least for what is an 
(undefinedly) sufficient length of time.”2    But, despite an ever-growing body of theory 
surrounding nations and nationalism, there remain very few works of a theoretical 
nature that focus their analysis on the relationship between Islam and nationalism and 
the impact that Islam has had on the emergence of nations and nationalism across the 
Islamic world.  This represents a significant deficit in the overall theoretical 
understanding of nations and nationalism which this thesis will make a contribution 
towards addressing. 
As the nation-state has become the most dominant unit of political status, Islamic 
communities around the world have resolutely embraced the ideology of nationalism.  
If this is the case, where does this leave the ‘umma, the universal Islamic community 
for all Muslims regardless of nationality, with a single Caliph at its head as the 
‘Commander of the Faithful’ and supreme head, which was abolished by Mustapha 
Kemal ‘Attaturk’ with the emergence of the modern Turkish Republic in 1922.  It is 
clear that efforts to rejuvenate the Islamic ‘umma as a supra-national political unit have 
lost any meaningful impetus and are confined to a tiny minority of Islamists – mainly 
of a radical leaning – around the world who call for a return to the Caliphate and the 
                                                 
2
 Fred Halliday, The Formation of Yemeni Nationalism: Initial Reflections, in James Jankowski & Israel 
Gershoni (eds) Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1997, p27. 
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re-establishment of the ‘umma.  In the trial that led to the execution of Sayid Qutb, the 
modern ideologue of radical Islam, he declared: 
I believe that the bonds of ideology and belief are more sturdy than those of 
patriotism based upon region and that this false distinction among Muslims on 
a regional basis is but one consequence of crusading and Zionist imperialism 
which must be eradicated.3 
The re-emergence of the ‘umma as a political unit with a single Caliph at its head may 
be a distant prospect today but how has it been possible for the overwhelming majority 
of Muslims to abandon the idea of the ‘umma – an idea that is one of the central tenets 
of Islam – and pursue a type of community – the nation – that seems to be at odds with 
the type of community prescribed by Islam?  My argument begins in the theoretical 
realm of nations and nationalism, where I suggest that our understanding of the 
emergence of nations and nationalism in the Muslim world is based largely on a narrow 
comprehension of the concept of the Islamic ‘umma and its perceived universalising 
effects.  This has led many scholars of nationalism, to unnecessarily limit the scope of 
their theoretical analyses overlooking key characteristics of the ‘umma where 
similarities exist with the conceptual basis of the nation.  In this way, theorists have 
largely failed to examine adequately, specific cases of nationalisms from the Islamic 
world where Muslim nationalists often appeal to popular national sentiment and inject 
these appeals with Islamic meanings, memories and signifiers reconciling the nation 
with the ‘umma by articulating the centrality of Islam to  national identity and the 
national community. 
In the conceptual minefield of definitions of nations and nationalism, it is important to 
make clear from the outset, the definition I adopt in this thesis is one proposed by 
Anthony Smith, which, in the complex and multi-layered scholarly debates on nations 
and nationalism, combines a sufficiently broad platform with adequate scope in 
looking at the importance of history to the nation.   
                                                 
3
 Ibid., quoted from, Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam, London, Faber, 1982, 
p.271. 
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Smith defines the nation as: 
a named human population occupying a historic territory or homeland and 
sharing common myths and memories; a mass, public culture; a single economy; 
and common rights and duties for all members.4 
I will further use his definition of nationalism as: 
an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity 
and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to 
constitute an actual or potential “nation”.5 
With the exception of Anthony Smith, Ernest Gellner and John Armstrong, scholars 
of nationalism have paid little attention to the Arab Middle East and in particular to 
the increasing number of historiographical accounts and works on specific 
nationalisms in the Islamic world.  Most theories of nationalism take the view that 
Islam and nationalism advance very different – in fact diametrically opposed – notions 
of community.  On the one hand, nations are at their heart communities based on 
particular features that assert common elements of identity albeit based on a broad 
range of ‘national’ markers.  Of course, different nations will highlight some or all of 
these traits but essentially, nations are an assertion of the uniqueness of a group of 
people sharing some or all of these particularistic features, which define the nation by 
creating boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. 
The theoretical argument continues that in the Islamic tradition, none of these 
boundaries are recognised as the legitimate basis of community.  In stark contrast to 
the particularistic features of the nation, Islam puts forward the idea of the ‘umma, a 
universal community that transcends bonds of nationhood and places belief in Islam, 
its teachings and principles as the single and primary basis of the ‘umma.6  This is not 
                                                 
4
 Anthony D. Smith, The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and 
Nationalism, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000, p.3.  See also Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, 
London, Penguin Books, 1991, p.14. 
5
 Ibid. p.3. 
6
 Erwin I.J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern National State, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1965, p.3.  Rosenthal’s and indeed most other definitions of the ‘umma point towards it being the 
“universal Islamic community of believers”. The concept and institution of the ‘umma originates from 
the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the “original ‘umma of Medina”; after Muhammad’s death, 
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to say that people within the ‘umma do not possess particular features of nationhood 
as broadly outlined above.  The ‘umma has, throughout history spanned a vast 
geographical area and within this there exists a heterogeneous mix of languages, 
cultures, ethnic groups and homeland attachments.  But, the bond of belief and 
adherence to Islam, relegates these ‘national’ features to being mere examples of the 
diversity out of which Islam, with its universalistic principles of belief and 
‘brotherhood’, shapes and defines the community of believers.7 
Given the limited debate among theorists of nations and nationalism of Islam’s role 
and compatibility with the nation, the first aim of this thesis is to make a contribution 
in this respect.  To do this, I analyse the emergence of nationalism in Egypt during the 
late nineteenth century and in particular, the writings of four popular Egyptian-Islamic 
pro-nationalist thinkers of the nineteenth century to assess their views and opinions on 
nations and nationalism.  The analysis shows first, the importance of these thinkers to 
the theoretical debates on Islam’s relationship with nationalism because their work 
shows many of the salient features of the nation being present within conceptions of 
the ‘umma – specifically, the role of language, territory, a unique and continuous 
history and shared myths and memories.  The importance of these thinkers is also 
evident in situating the wider intellectual debates about the rise of nationalism in Egypt 
in the late nineteenth century, which these scholars were a central part of.  They were 
some of the first Islamic thinkers in the age of nationalism to articulate the utility of 
nationalism to national progress while at the same time, showing how nation and 
‘umma could coexist at a time when Egypt remained a part of the Ottoman Empire and 
the Islamic ‘umma.  When these thinkers talked of and debated nationalism, a political 
idea and ideal that they were all drawn to, they had to do so in terms that spoke to and 
appealed to their mainly Muslim constituents who they were aware remained deeply 
attached to the Ottoman Sultan and the idea of the Muslim ‘umma.  The views they 
put forward on nationalism and Islam suggest that they saw very little tension between 
                                                 
Caliphs led the ‘umma and were seen as “spiritual as well as temporal rulers”.  See also pp. ix–xx and 
pp. 3–11. 
7
 Sami Zubaida, ‘Islam and Nationalism: Continuities and Contradictions’, Nations and Nationalism, 
Vol. 10:4, 2004, p.407. 
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the two concepts.  On the contrary, these thinkers saw the nation as a vehicle for greater 
Islamic unity which in the end would contribute to strengthening the ‘umma. 
But if theories of nations and nationalism have failed in large part to keep pace and 
draw on the wealth of historiographical and empirical studies of nationalism around 
the Islamic world and Arab Middle East, the same can also be said of historiographical 
accounts of the Arab Middle East. Fred Halliday once again observes that if the 
theoretical dimensions of nationalism have advanced in relation to the recognised 
importance of the phenomenon, “much of the writing on specific nationalisms, and 
hence on “nations”, has remained innocent of it.”8  Halliday made this statement when 
writing on Yemeni nationalism but it is evident in much of the writing by scholars of 
the Middle East. The limited use of theories of nationalism against which to test the 
empirical evidence in the analyses of regional nationalisms and the absence of 
empirical case studies in theoretical works was observed by Paul Lalor in a review 
article where he argued that “the new writing on nationalism has largely ignored the 
Arab Middle East”9 and he continued that “area studies scholars working on Arab 
nationalism have been slow to make use of the new [theoretical] material,”10 although 
he also observed that this was changing. 
I do not argue in this thesis that scholars of the Middle East and the Islamic world have 
not explored the rise of nationalisms and the role of Islam in these movements.  Neither 
do I argue that these scholars have ignored Islam’s role or have not ascribed sufficient 
importance to it when exploring the rise of nationalism. Rather, this thesis attempts to 
engage with theoretical perspectives of nations and nationalism while at the same time 
grounding this in a particular case study – namely the emergence of nationalism in 
Egypt in the late nineteenth century and in particular, the events and experiences in 
Egypt in the years 1879–1882. 
                                                 
8
 Halliday, op. cit. The Formation of Yemeni Nationalism,  p26. 
9
 Paul Lalor, ‘Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East’, Nations and Nationalism, Vol 5:2, 
1999, p303 
10
 Ibid. p303 
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During this short period, a native nationalist movement emerged to limit the 
dominance of the local Turco-Circassian elite, restrict European penetration in Egypt, 
dispel the imperial intentions of a British invasion, and reject the power and authority 
of the Khedive (Viceroy, equivalent to a local ruling monarch) through opposition and 
later an attempt to depose him from rule.  Furthermore, Egypt was also nominally part 
of the Ottoman Empire with the Ottoman Sultan the de facto Caliph and head of the 
Islamic ‘umma.  The nationalist movement drew a distinction between Egypt’s Islamic 
ties and loyalty to the ‘umma and the Ottoman Sultan on the one hand, and political 
independence on the other.  With the help of the pro-nationalist Islamic intellectual 
elite, the nationalist movement sought to further distance Egypt from the political and 
legal authority of the Ottoman Empire and institute greater political independence, 
while at the same time, seeking to assert and indeed strengthen its religious ties and 
status as part of the ‘umma with the Ottoman Sultan at its head.  
Egypt first expressed nationalist tendencies in the late nineteenth century before any 
other majority national group within the Ottoman Empire.  While there was 
undoubtedly unrest in many parts of the Empire throughout the nineteenth century, 
Egypt was the first overwhelmingly Islamic territory to express a desire to be 
politically independent from the Ottoman Empire.  The timing of Egypt’s nationalist 
expression in the years 1879-1882 sets Egypt aside from other later nationalisms 
around the Muslim world because it was an attempt to gain political independence 
from an Islamic ruler – the Ottoman Sultan – during the lifetime of the Empire and not 
in the aftermath of its collapse.11  From the 1860s and 1870s, a new educated Egyptian 
elite emerged which gave rise to and was responsible for stimulating nationalist 
sentiment during the last three decades of the nineteenth century. This period was also 
accompanied by greater strains on Egypt’s economy through its mounting foreign debt, 
the establishment of new emerging political institutions and strained relationships with 
both the Ottoman Empire and the European powers.  Most scholars of Egyptian 
nationalism agree that this period resulted in the emergence of a local oppositional 
movement lead by the Egyptian Colonel Ahmed ‘Urabi which challenged the local 
                                                 
11
 Jacob M. Landau, Parliaments and Parties in Egypt, Tel Aviv, Israel Publishing House, 1953, p.1. 
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ruling elite and the role of the European powers in Egypt.  But interestingly, scholars 
stop short of attributing these events and this period as one where ‘full-blown’ 
nationalism was evident in Egypt, seeing it instead as an early embryonic phase of 
nationalism where national sentiment and a distinct national consciousness was in its 
infancy and formative process. 
For Albert Hourani, Islam’s contribution to Egyptian nationalism is clear but in its 
nineteenth century stage, the relationship between the two was, he argues, complicated 
as “the idea of the Egyptian nation, entitled to a separate political existence, involved 
not only the denial of a single Islamic political community, but also the assertion that 
there could be a virtuous community based on something other than a common religion 
and a revealed law.”12 Other formidable scholars of Egypt including Israel Gershoni 
and James Jankowski begin their analysis of Egyptian nationalism from the beginning 
of the twentieth century paying little attention to the ‘Urabi Revolt although they 
concede that “the first significant speculation over the issue of national identity in 
modern Egypt occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”13   
Gershoni and Jankowski recognise the importance of Egypt’s transformation over the 
nineteenth century with the emergence of a new native educated elite, the development 
of Egypt’s printing press, integration into the world economy and the political 
developments of the 1860’s and 1870s.  These processes led to greater public 
discussion in Egypt about its political and religious affiliations, and the nature of 
Egyptian national identity but according to Gershoni and Jankowski, the political 
movement of the ‘Urabists that emerged between the years 1879-1882 was never able 
to divorce itself fully from its allegiance to the Ottoman state and Sultan.  They see the 
political demands of the Urabists as falling short of independence due to Egypt’s 
religious affiliation being part of the ‘umma under the leadership of the Ottoman 
Sultan.  Gershoni and Jankowski note that the political leaders of the ‘Urabi movement 
                                                 
12
 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, p193. 
13
 Ibid. p4. 
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“repeatedly expressed their loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan…and declared their struggle 
as being one of maintaining Islamic unity in the face of the threat of European 
domination.”14 But importantly, this leads Gershoni and Jankowski to see the ‘Urabi 
Revolt not as a movement seeking Egyptian independence and therefore as “full-
blown” nationalism but as a movement which stimulated a greater sense of national 
consciousness and raised important questions about the nature of Egyptian national 
identity but nevertheless sought to remain within the political and religious structure 
of the Ottoman Empire and therefore the Muslim ‘umma.   
There is no question that the idea of the nation was seen with suspicion as a threat to 
Egypt’s status within the ‘umma by many Muslims at the time.  Despite increasing 
levels of political autonomy for Egypt from the Ottoman Empire over the course of 
the nineteenth century,15 Egyptians mostly remained loyal to the Ottoman Sultan 
precisely because of his role as the head of the Islamic ‘umma.  I maintain in this thesis 
that ‘Urabi’s nationalist movement sought Egypt’s political independence from the 
Ottoman Empire but that nationalist demands were pitched cautiously by asserting first 
the desire to remain loyal to the Ottoman Sultan and to continue to be part of the 
Muslim ‘umma but alongside this, they demanded political independence.  They did 
this by drawing a distinction between loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan and remaining part 
of the religious community of the ‘umma and Egypt’s right to be politically 
independent and run its own affairs of state.  Asserting their desire to remain within 
the ‘umma, albeit with greater political independence by expressions of loyalty to the 
Sultan were necessary steps in securing his support in their opposition to Khedive 
Tawfiq, allaying popular fears about a break with Islamic tradition and attracting 
popular support for their struggle.  The political calculations were further complicated 
by the role of the British, and the nationalists considered the support of the Ottoman 
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Sultan vital if they were to avoid a British invasion knowing that the British and the 
Ottoman Empire would want to avoid a direct confrontation. 
In this thesis, I argue that the ‘Urabi Revolt of 1879-1882 was a nationalist revolt 
composed of Egyptians who believed themselves to constitute a nation.  Their aims 
were multiple, and in chapter 6, I show that their first aim was to make clear to the 
Ottoman Empire their loyalty to it in Islamic terms but their insistence on political 
independence from it.   The second aim was to limit the power of the local ruling 
Khedive and to arrest control of the government and state and when this seemed 
impossible, the nationalists attempted to depose him on the grounds that he had 
abandoned Egypt and allied himself with the British (see chapter 7).  The third aim of 
the nationalists was to appeal to the British for support and understanding of their 
desire to limit the power of the Khedive, and in the course of this, to offer assurances 
to the European powers and the Dual Control to honour Egyptian debts to its European 
creditors.  When these attempts failed and it became clear that Britain would use force 
to maintain Khedive Tawfiq in power, the nationalist position towards the British 
changed and their nationalist movement was directed at resistance against British 
occupation of Egypt.   
My thesis argues that all three aims were framed within an Islamic and nationalist 
context.  The nationalist paradigm appealed to an established sense of Egyptian 
national identity and consciousness.  It emphasised the need for Egyptians to 
participate in the struggle to defend the Egyptian nation in the face of external threats 
and to turn against a ruler who had been seen to have abandoned the nation and its 
people. Its ideology was patently nationalist urging national unity and national 
sacrifice seeing Egyptians as possessing an historical continuity, a particular and 
unique Egyptian Arabic, an established and recognisable territory and a glorious past 
which incorporated pharaonic myths of descent and a central position within Islamic 
civilisation (see chapters 4 and 5).  From an Islamic perspective, the movement saw 
the protection of the nation as also protection of Egypt’s Islamic status and identity.  
The imposition of external rule by Britain or other European powers suggested to the 
nationalists, a departure for Egypt as part of the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim 
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‘umma and in calling for the deposition of the Khedive, the nationalists claimed this 
to be an Islamic act incumbent on Muslims because of the Khedive’s alliance with the 
British in the final months before the British invasion of Egypt in 1882.   
In much of the historiography of the ‘Urabi Revolt, the role of the Islamic intellectual 
elite or ‘ulama (plural of ‘alim) I argue has been overlooked and I further argue that 
‘ulama were in fact, at the forefront of debates about Egyptian nationalism and its 
implications for Egypt’s position within the ‘umma and loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan 
during the years 1879-1882.  While many ‘ulama supported the nationalist movement 
and added their voice to arguments which saw no contradiction between Egyptian 
political nationalism and Egypt’s desire to remain part of the Muslim ‘umma, many 
other powerful ‘ulama firmly rejected this claim.  ‘Ulama views and opinions on this 
subject became a crucial part of the political battleground for all the sides in the 
confrontation and control of al-Azhar, Egypt’s influential mosque-seminary became 
part of the wider political struggle. Two key confrontations are highlighted in chapter 
6 which represent important events in the struggle for Islamic legitimacy.  The first 
confrontation was an attempt by ‘Urabi and the nationalists to replace the Sheikh al-
Azhar, who they perceived to be opposed to their nationalist aims, with someone 
supportive and the second confrontation was an attempt, by ‘Urabi himself, most likely 
backed by pro-nationalist ‘ulama to secure a fatwa (religious legal ruling) questioning 
and indeed criticising the Khedive’s Islamic credentials.  Both attempts were partly 
successful but their outcomes were not as the nationalists had hoped. 
The ‘ulama are broadly defined as religious scholars “who acquired their formal 
religious training and credentials in established madrasas [schools: sing. madrassa; pl. 
madaaris] and religious colleges [and act as] teachers, preachers, judges and 
administrators in the state religious system”.16  Meir Hatina rightly points out that not 
only do ‘ulama exist within the state system but others “were unaffiliated scholars who 
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adopted a more critical and activist stance and often clashed with official ‘ulama and 
the political authorities over religious and socio-political issues”.17  
Hatina’s definition requires clarification in three important ways.  Firstly, it is 
important to recognise the diversity of professions ‘ulama entered as well as the 
unorthodox channels by which many became ‘ulama or men of religious importance 
and part of the Islamic intellectual elite.  For instance, as the printing press emerged in 
Egypt in the nineteenth century and as newspapers proliferated, many ‘formally’ 
trained ‘ulama pursued careers in journalism or became writers or literary figures. 
Indeed, two of the ‘ulama I focus upon in this thesis – Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rifa’a 
Rafi’ al-Tahtawi spent considerable amounts of their professional life outside the 
professions Hatina mentions and instead were prolific writers and journalists. It is also 
important to mention that these two important ‘ulama also spent considerable time as 
part of the ‘formal’ ‘ulama corp.  Tahtawi, an outstanding young scholar was brought 
to the attention of Muhammad ‘Ali and was appointed the Imam for one of the first 
Egyptian student missions despatched to France and ‘Abduh assuming the role of 
Grand Mufti, the highest Islamic legal position in the country.  Another of the Islamic 
thinkers that I focus upon – Abdallah al-Nadim – never completed his formal religious 
training choosing a literary and journalistic career path which his parents disapproved 
of.  Despite this, Nadim’s reputation as a man of learning and knowledge meant that 
he was a regular lecturer at al-Azhar University and his contribution to the emergence 
of religious nationalism in Egypt and his influential role in the ‘Urabi Revolt cannot 
be ignored.   
Secondly, ‘ulama who were part of the state religious system must not only be seen as 
merely underpinning and legitimising the state authorities but they also exerted 
pressure on and influenced the state and wider political authorities from within to act 
in certain ways, which meant sometimes opposing the political authorities in power.  
Finally, both ‘types’ of ‘ulama – those affiliated to the state and those not – were highly 
influential amongst the people and were held in high esteem, as a result of their social 
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and religious functions as teachers, preachers, jurists and guardians of orthodoxy and 
faith.  Seen through this broader prism and taking into consideration that the title of 
‘alim was entirely honorific, the ‘ulama’s importance is evident not just as passive 
‘underwriters’ of the existing social orders but more broadly as active mediators and 
agitators through formal and informal channels in the relationship between state and 
society.  
Through focusing on the role of the Egyptian ‘ulama in the years 1879–1882 and in 
particular the above four thinkers, I analyse a variety of both primary and secondary 
sources which provide insights into the views and opinions of the four ‘ulama on four 
major political issues of that period which generated a wide-ranging and highly 
contentious debate within ‘ulama circles.  These issues included: 1) the rise of a native 
nationalist movement under the leadership of Ahmed ‘Urabi; 2) the growing 
opposition to and criticism of Egypt’s local ruling Khedival monarchy; 3) Egypt’s 
links to the Ottoman Empire and 4) Britain’s invasion of Egypt, culminating in its 
occupation of Egypt in September 1882.  In debating these issues, the ‘ulama put 
forward a variety of responses which bring into question traditional notions of the 
views of conservative and reformist ‘ulama.  There was no monolithic ‘ulama view of 
the issues mentioned above with differences arising even within conservative and 
reformist ‘ulama ‘camps’.  The debates I focus upon in this thesis demonstrate that 
pro-nationalist ‘ulama held both conservative and reformist outlooks and were a key 
component in the nationalist movement where they reassessed Egypt’s links to the 
Ottoman Empire and its position within the ‘umma and brought into sharp focus ideas 
of community, progress and modernisation.   
The ‘ulama of the nineteenth century in Egypt have been seen by many contemporary 
scholars as having been largely marginalised by the reforms of Muhammad ‘Ali and 
his successors.  Over the course of the nineteenth century, a combination of reforms in 
land ownership, law and educational provision coupled with the dislocating effects of 
state centralisation, the increasing modernisation of the state and society, the 
emergence of a new educated elite and the ‘ulama’s own overriding conservatism and 
opposition to reform, led scholars of the Egyptian ‘ulama to see them as no longer 
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occupying central positions of power within government and the state bureaucracy but 
relegated very much to the political periphery.  Due to reforms of these sectors that 
‘ulama had previously exercised a monopoly over, and the confiscation of much of 
their land which was an important independent source of wealth, the ‘ulama were 
viewed as having lost many of the elements of their social status and position that had 
once imbued them with significant political influence and power which they often used 
to impact on matters of government and politics.  The analysis I offer in this thesis 
reassesses the conventional view of the impact of reforms on the ‘ulama’s ability to 
act and influence political, social and cultural affairs.  The view I put forward is one 
that shows the impact of reforms of the nineteenth century were not as damaging as 
the conventional wisdom on this matter suggests because ‘ulama were either able to 
retain or insulate significant areas of their status and functions from the reform process 
or that the reforms themselves were insufficient and not fully implemented.  My 
analysis also questions the view of the ‘ulama – a view that is gradually being revised 
by other scholars in the field – that see them as deeply conservative, entrenched within 
a dogmatic view of community narrowly defined by Islamic principles of ‘umma and 
orthodoxy.  On the contrary, while evidence suggests that many ‘ulama held a 
conservative outlook, my analysis demonstrates that many reformist and conservative 
‘ulama were in fact much more outward looking than scholars have previously 
suggested and many were willing to embrace the ideas of modernity and the modern 
nation-state and were able to articulate its compatibility with Egypt’s Islamic heritage 
and to Islamic principles of community and progress.   
Egypt’s Islamic Background 
Egypt’s Islamic history begins when it was conquered in 641 AD18 by the Arab 
General ‘Amr ibn al-Ass during the reign of the Caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (r.634–
644) and brought under Islamic rule.19  Islam has since then occupied a prominent 
place within the Islamic world, and an un-broken Islamic history from this date: while 
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Egypt has always had a number of minority confessional communities, including 
Coptic Christians and Jews, it is, and has been overwhelmingly Muslim since its 
seventh century invasion by Muslim Arabs.  The first two centuries of Arab rule were 
characterised by numerous local revolts against rule by the ‘Umayyad dynasty (664–
749)20 and the high levels of taxation imposed by Damascus.  Arabic became the 
language of government in 706 and remained the national language until the present 
day, despite a strong Turkish linguistic influence in Egypt for a significant period 
during some of the time of Egypt’s Ottoman history (1517–1922).  By the tenth century 
(969), Egypt had become part of the Fatimid dynasty and it is during this time that 
Cairo (al-Qahira, meaning ‘the victorious’) was built, replacing the ancient city of 
Fustat as the capital.21  It was also during the Fatimid period that the university/mosque 
complex of al-Azhar was built, which was to quickly emerge as a prominent centre of 
learning and instruction in Egypt and indeed throughout the Muslim world.22 
Al-Azhar was founded in 969 and was opened for prayers in 972 during the reign of 
the Fatimid Caliph al-Mu’izz.23  The prominence of al-Azhar raised Egypt’s 
importance in the Islamic world and, although initially a centre of learning under Shi’a 
Islam, al-Azhar became one of the most important centres of learning within the Sunni 
tradition of Islam, offering instruction in all four of the main schools (sing. madhhab; 
pl. madhaahib) of Islamic legal interpretation after the Ayyubid dynasty assumed 
control of Egypt in 1171.24  Students from all over the Islamic world aspired to gain 
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an education from al-Azhar and al-Azhar ‘ulama quickly gained widespread 
recognition for their Islamic knowledge, piety and pedagogical function.25 
After the Fatimid period, Egypt fell into ‘Ayyubid hands (1171–1250) and this period 
is also characterised by being governed by an empire with its capital in Damascus.  
The ‘Ayyubids incorporated Mamluk slave soldiers into their army but by 1250, the 
Mamluks had overthrown the ‘Ayyubid dynasty in Egypt and became rulers of Egypt 
themselves.  Mamluks were of Circassian origin, recruited as slaves, and were to 
remain prominent in Egypt right up to the modern period when, in the late 1870’s, 
Turco-Circassian dominance of the Egyptian army was to play a vital role in the 
emergence of a native nationalist movement.  By 1517, Mamluk rule in Egypt had 
collapsed and Egypt entered its Ottoman phase, which was to last until the British 
invasion in 1882.  But, although Egypt became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1517, 
the Mamluks continued to nominally rule Egypt, mainly because of the weakness of 
Ottoman control.26  Nevertheless, Egypt remained an Ottoman province until British 
occupation and, while it enjoyed considerable autonomy from Istanbul for much of 
this period, it remained an important territory of the Empire and therefore at the heart 
of the Islamic ‘umma.  Egypt’s Islamic history is thus an important characteristic of 
modern Egyptian identity, demonstrating a long and continuous association with Islam 
and being one of the major sources of Egyptian cultural identity. 
The Establishment of the ‘Ulama  
From around the end of the ‘Umayyad dynasty, a significant body of Islamic 
knowledge began to develop around the study and exegesis of the Quran and the 
narratives of the Prophet Muhammad’s traditions (Hadith) which were seen as the 
sacred sources of Islamic law (Shari’a).  Nikki Keddie tells us that “[w]hile the first 
hereditary dynasty of Caliphs, the ‘Ummayyads (661–749AD), often ignored the 
growing body of educated religious leaders, these men achieved a firmer status under 
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the ‘Abbasid dynasty (749–1258AD)”.27  The increasing importance of these educated 
religious scholars was due, in part, to the passing of the era where the Muslim 
community was led by Muhammad and his immediate successors, referred to as the 
Rashidun (Rightly Guided) Caliphs.28  They are termed Rashidun Caliphs because they 
are acknowledged by Muslims to have been sufficiently close to the Prophet 
Muhammad and therefore to possess unique qualities in interpreting the Quran and the 
Prophet’s actions and deeds (Sunna) as the moral and ethical guide for Muslims and 
their behaviour.  But, with the death of these Caliphs and the passing of the Caliphate 
to Damascus and the ‘Ummayyads, a need arose for men to be specifically trained and 
versed in the accepted ways in which to interpret the sacred sources of the Shari’a, 
which would ensure orthodoxy in Islamic practice and the implementation of God’s 
will among Muslims.   
Towards the end of the ‘Umayyad dynasty, in the early ‘Abbasid era, as Islam 
expanded and absorbed wider territory into its domain, it also encountered greater 
numbers of non-Muslim populations with alternative religious practices, divergent 
social and cultural understandings and who communicated in languages other than 
Arabic.  Consequently, in an effort to retain the ‘authenticity’ of Islam, greater 
significance was given to the emerging body of educated religious scholars and “the 
formation of an identifiable corps of ‘ulama – scholars, jurists and teachers learned in 
the Islamic sciences – is a product of the early ‘Abbasid period”.29 
Like most nouns in the Arabic language, the word ‘ulama derives from a three letter 
verbal root (ain laam meem).30  The verbal root is the verb ‘to know’ and as a noun, 
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the word ‘ulama means ‘the ones possessed with knowledge’ or the possessors of 
knowledge.  Fulfilling a variety of key religio-legal and pedagogical functions, these 
‘possessors of knowledge’ – ‘ulama – have been a crucial part of Islamic societies 
since their emergence.  Through performing these functions, ‘ulama also came to 
possess considerable influence and moral authority among the ordinary people, which 
stemmed from their core ‘ilm (Islamic knowledge) and ability to interpret the sacred 
texts of Islam.  However, at the political level, seeing the importance and political 
utility of the ‘ulama’s influence among the masses, Caliphs and rulers have all sought 
in varying degrees, to use this influence for political ends, which has ensured that the 
‘ulama have nearly always been close to their society’s political centre and, at times, 
wielded considerable political influence. 
Two important factors have remained more or less constant in the functioning of the 
‘ulama since their emergence during the eighth century.  The first of these pertains to 
their particular functions, which incorporate the religious, the legal and the educational 
spheres of society.  So for instance, ‘ulama have nearly always been associated with 
performing religious duties, the main ones being leading the mosque congregation in 
prayer (as Imam), the functioning of the mosque and the delivery of the Friday sermon 
(as Khatib).  Another important element of their functions has been to interpret the 
sacred sources of Shari’a law, being the Quran and Hadith and to adjudicate in legal 
disputes as judges (Quda), jurists (Fuqaha, pl.; Faqih, sing.) and as Islamic givers of 
legal opinion (Mufti).  These judgements were mainly given through the official court 
system or through the issuing of legal opinions (fatwa).  Finally, ‘ulama have nearly 
always been responsible for the provision of education and have determined the 
subjects taught and the manner of the teaching; it is the ‘ulama who have, in the main, 
delivered this teaching.  In Islamic societies, religious knowledge and knowledge of 
Islam’s sacred sources came to dominate education so the ‘ulama became “the 
gatekeepers of Islamic learning.”31  
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The second enduring feature of the ‘ulama has been the type and ways in which they 
have received their own education.  In the main, they studied in madaaris and received 
an entirely Islamic education studying subjects such as ‘Hadith or Prophetic 
Traditions’, ‘Interpretation of and Commentary on the Quran’, ‘Fundamentals and 
Sources of Shari’a’, ‘Islamic Theology’, ‘Fiqh or Islamic Jurisprudence’, ‘Arabic 
Language and Grammar, Verbal Expressions of Concepts and Content and Logic’.32  
Although many ‘ulama may have begun their learning at a young age at home, in order 
to achieve the status of ‘ulama, it was necessary to study at a madrassa under a 
reputable ‘alim or group of ‘ulama.  But ironically, although ‘ulama training often took 
many years, “no one was ever employed as an ‘alim nor granted a degree as one.  The 
title was honorific.”33 
Islamic teaching and instruction took place in the mosque, which was used not only as 
a place of worship but also as a place of learning.  Later, around the eleventh century 
the development of the madrassa34 meant that dedicated centres of learning were 
established in order to teach a growing number of ‘ulama that were required by an 
expanding state bureaucracy.  These madaaris were run entirely by ‘ulama and funded 
through charitable endowments (awqaf) and donations, which were also managed by 
‘ulama.  These two factors meant that education provision remained largely 
independent from political authorities and equally important was the ‘ulama’s 
monopoly over education and learning until the early nineteenth century. 
Through their integral functions as Islamic legal scholars, teachers and preachers, 
‘ulama became powerful and respected men.  At the local village level, ‘ulama were 
important social functionaries fulfilling these and other related duties while at the 
political level, senior ‘ulama – or ‘elite’ ‘ulama – occupying positions at the higher 
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levels of the overall ‘ulama structure were often attached to the Caliph’s imperial court, 
the Houses of certain rulers and powerful tribal chiefs.  Aside from the ‘ulama’s purely 
educational and religio-legal role, their close relations with the political rulers also 
enabled them to fulfil an important political role of sanctioning the rule and policies 
of the particular ruler.  They often advised rulers on whether a law, a war or a tax was 
justified on Islamic grounds.  Of course, these ‘ulama were not independent of the 
pressure exerted on them from being part of the House of the ruler and so Islam was 
often reconciled with the actions of the ruler rather than the other way round.35  
Nevertheless, by “1500 ‘ulama had evolved into a powerful body of men, highly 
respected in society with considerable sources of personal and corporate wealth and a 
large influence in the shaping of Muslim societies.”36 
Modernisation and Reform in Nineteenth Century Egypt 
The nineteenth century was a period of great change in Egypt, when the country 
experienced significant transformation and modernisation in many spheres, including 
its economy, its political structure and system of rule, the nature of the state and its 
institutions, its relationship with the Ottoman Empire as well as its wider regional and 
international relationships.37  Egypt’s transformation and modernisation during the 
course of the nineteenth century was initiated by Muhammad ‘Ali (r.1805–1848), the 
Ottoman General in Egypt who, after the French evacuation in 1801, was elevated to 
the position of Vali (Governor) on the insistence of, and as a result of, significant 
political pressure exerted by the Egyptian ‘ulama.   
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During the reign of Muhammad ‘Ali and his successors in the nineteenth century, 
Egypt gradually distanced itself further from the Ottoman Empire while, at the same 
time, Egypt’s ties to Europe grew ever closer through the financing and development 
of the Suez Canal, regular educational missions of Egyptian students and teachers 
being despatched to Europe, the appointment of European architects, designers and 
engineers to redesign and modernise Egypt’s cities, districts and wider infrastructure 
and the large numbers of European technocrats flocking to Egypt as advisors to the 
Egyptian ministries, or as teachers, doctors, lawyers, bankers and travellers in search 
of fortune and adventure.38  In matters of trade and finance too, Egypt grew 
increasingly dependent on Europe, with much of Egypt’s economic transformation 
based on an increasing cotton yield and its sale to the cotton mills of northern 
England.39 
These and other measures were part of a larger and more penetrating process of 
modernisation that Egypt underwent from the beginning of Muhammad ‘Ali’s rule to 
the end of Isma’il’s rule in (r.1863–1879).  It began with developing Egypt’s military 
in order that it could defend itself from imperial encroachment either from Britain or 
France, or from the threat of the Ottoman Empire exerting greater control over Egypt. 
In order to fuel the growth and modernisation of Egypt’s military, much of Egypt’s 
land was placed under direct state ownership, a new technical school system in Egypt 
was developed and regular student missions despatched to Europe that aimed to feed 
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the army and the growing state with skilled manpower and bureaucrats tasked with the 
management of wide-scale reform and modernisation (see Chapter 3).40 
These policies continued apace under Khedive Isma’il after a respite under Abbas I 
(r.1848–1854) and Said I (r.1854–1863), both of whom favoured a slower pace or 
outright rejection of reformist policies.41  Under Isma’il, greater efforts were put into 
developing Egypt’s education system from the primary level up, its economy in terms 
of trade; Egypt’s cities and districts were rebuilt to resemble those of European capitals 
and other famous cities.  Even its political institutions underwent significant reform, 
with Egypt’s parliamentary system originating from Isma’il’s period with the 
establishment of the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab in November 1866.42 
The ‘Ulama and Nineteenth Century Reforms 
The ideas put forward by Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot and Daniel Crecelius on the 
changing role and power of the ‘ulama during the nineteenth century43 represent the 
dominant view in much of the literature on the ‘ulama in nineteenth century Egypt.  
Both see the ‘ulama’s power and influence in society as declining significantly after 
the elevation of Muhammad ‘Ali to power, particularly after 1809.  For al-Sayyid, the 
major reason behind the ‘ulama’s decline was not merely that Muhammad ‘Ali had 
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stripped them of power and their economic independence and privileges: it lay in “the 
introduction of westernising influences,”44 which, she says, came in the form of 
importing European advisors to help reorganise “his administration on Western lines, 
introduce a Western-style system of education, [and develop] an efficient army 
modelled on European lines”.45  For al-Sayyid, these factors are crucial in triggering 
the fundamental changes Egyptian society experiences whereby “the traditional social 
pattern of groups having a cohesive force and an internal organisation of their own that 
was independent of a central authority”46 is gradually eroded and a new pattern is put 
in its place that gives rise to new social elites. 
Crecelius, on the other hand, takes a slightly different view and looks at the ways in 
which the ‘ulama reacted to the onset of modernisation and its associated processes.  
He argues that they displayed two initial responses to the modernising reforms, 
responses that were “instinctively defensive, [and] characterised by a strong desire for 
self-preservation”.47  Contrary to al-Sayyid, Crecelius attributes the ‘ulama with taking 
action to resist reforms, arguing that the ‘ulama were “able to obstruct, delay or 
undermine new programs”.48  But these responses failed to achieve their aims and, 
when the modernising reforms continued apace, the ‘ulama’s response changed from 
opposition to withdrawal.  When opposition to the reforms failed, due to the growing 
strength of the state implementing the reforms and the ‘ulama’s own declining ability 
to exert political influence to shape the nature of reform, the ‘ulama withdrew into 
those realms that they continued to control and preside over “in an effort to preserve 
them from contamination through contact with the modernising elements in society”.49   
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While Crecelius and al-Sayyid broadly agree on the effects of Egypt’s modernising 
reforms as triggering a virtually total fall from power of the ‘ulama, it is worth 
explaining briefly how their approaches differ.  Putting aside the loss of economic 
independence and their exclusion from the core of government, which they both agree 
upon, for al-Sayyid, the most important aspect to the ‘ulama’s decline during the 
nineteenth century was the gradual establishment of a new westernised social elite, 
“that was eventually to displace the ‘ulama as the intellectual elite of the land”.50  
Crecelius, by contrast, places greater importance on what he sees as the separation and 
isolation of the ‘ulama from the modernising groups.  For Crecelius, modernising 
reforms did not seek “to destroy the institutions of the old order but rather to create a 
new order alongside the old”.51  As the ‘ulama increasingly failed to stop the reforms, 
they found that many of the reforms left their traditional spheres of authority 
untouched and so were able to retreat within them and isolate themselves from the 
wider reform project.   
The reason why the ‘ulama’s traditional spheres of influence remained insulated from 
the modernising reforms was that, according to Crecelius, Muhammad ‘Ali was 
“[u]nwilling to offend the religious prejudices of the ‘ulama and the overwhelming 
majority of tradition-bound Egyptians or to tamper with a sacred revealed law”.52  
Likewise, in al-Sayyid’s view, although modernisation had created a new social elite 
composed of civil servants and administrators who had replaced the ‘ulama as the ‘men 
of the pen’ and upset the traditional balance of Muslim society, she nevertheless 
concedes that Muhammad ‘Ali “could not totally ignore tradition, for after all he was 
a Muslim ruler”.53  However, despite making these significant claims about the way in 
which the nineteenth century reforms enabled the ‘ulama to continue in their traditional 
spheres of authority practically unaffected, no attempt is made to examine what these 
traditional spheres of authority actually were and, indeed, what this might mean for 
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the status, power and influence the ‘ulama may have continued to possess despite the 
disorienting reform process in Egypt during the nineteenth century.  In fact, despite 
the reforms of Muhammad ‘Ali and his successors throughout the nineteenth century, 
religion, and particularly Islam, continued to play a considerable role in the everyday 
lives of people and it is precisely here that the ‘ulama, retreating from the modernising 
process, found themselves connected to the community of Muslims and where they 
continued to enjoy great moral authority among the masses.54  Amidst great change, 
dislocation from previously recognised social structures and modernisation, religion 
may have represented an important stabilising mechanism for a population that 
remained highly religious.  Indeed, more recent work has challenged the reductionist 
view and argued that “the loss of its [the ‘ulama’s] monopoly over educational and 
intellectual life did not result in marginality.”55 
In assessing the role of the ‘ulama in the ‘Urabi Revolt, it is important to point out that 
Muhammad ‘Ali’s reforms, and indeed the process of modernisation that began under 
his leadership and continued through much of the nineteenth century, was largely 
confined to restricting the ‘ulama’s direct relationship and influence to the political 
centre in Egypt.  As Crecelius concedes, “[h]aving eliminated the interference of the 
‘ulama in his government, Muhammad ‘Ali left them virtually alone, to teach, think, 
write, or practice whatever they wanted so long as they did not undermine his programs 
within the sphere of government”.56  If this was the case, and the ‘ulama’s spheres of 
authority, aside from their direct engagement with the political authorities, remained 
largely untouched, the extent to which the ‘ulama became politically disabled and 
powerless must surely be questioned. 
For instance, part of the ‘ulama’s political strength was the ability to rouse or restrain 
the masses which stemmed from their moral standing amongst the people.  The 
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particular social functions that the ‘ulama had carried out for generations – their roles 
as teachers, preachers, judges and experts on Islamic law, theology and practice – 
remained largely, but not wholly untouched, and through these functions, the ‘ulama’s 
moral standing and ability to influence the masses remained, I argue, for the most part 
unchanged.  Moreover, while it is true that Muhammad ‘Ali’s attempts at state 
centralisation and modernisation may have warranted the exclusion of the ‘ulama from 
his government because of their mainly conservative outlook and potential opposition 
to reforms, the reforms themselves were not entirely successful in removing all of the 
‘ulama’s sources of social and political power which in fact derived from their 
religious, pedagogical and to a lesser extent their legal functions within a society that 
remained highly attached to Islam and Islamic practice.  Indeed, by looking at the 
importance of Islam to Egyptian national identity and the ability of ‘ulama to lend 
Islamic legitimacy to, and mobilise support for political movements, I suggest that 
‘Urabi and the nationalists had sufficient cause to bring the ‘ulama back to the centre 
of the political sphere later in the nineteenth century.  Indeed, in the more recent 
scholarly work that reconsiders the dominant notion of the ‘ulama’s decline during the 
nineteenth century, Hatina observes that “bending to the authority of the state did not 
mean the total submission of the religious establishment”.57 There have also been other 
important revisions to our understanding of the ‘ulama in the nineteenth century, none 
more so than the work of Indira Falk Gesink who shows, among other things that 
conservative ‘ulama as well as those reform minded ‘modernist’ ‘ulama were also 
supportive of ‘Urabi’s nationalist movement.  These important contributions have 
shown that our understanding of the role of the ‘ulama in political movements and the 
ways in which they remain important political actors requires further research and 
exploration. 
‘Urabi and the Emergence of Egyptian Nationalism 
By the 1870s during the reign of Khedive Ismail (r.1863–1879), a movement for 
greater constitutional safeguards against Khedival rule emerged, led by the prominent 
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Turco-Circassian Muhammad Sharif Pasha (1826–1887).  The movement sought to 
limit the powers of the Khedive by developing an Egyptian constitution and 
establishing an elected parliament that would take responsibility for governing Egypt.  
Although in part successful, the movement never really accumulated mass popular 
appeal probably because it operated on a level of abstraction from the mass of the 
population, who were suffering from unprecedented levels of economic hardship due 
to the high levels of taxation imposed by Khedive Ismail.  These harsh measures were 
inflicted on Egypt by the Dual Control established in November 1876 by Britain and 
France in order to manage Egypt’s bankrupt economy and pay for the substantial level 
of debt Egypt found itself in due to the Khedive’s excessive borrowing to fund the 
country’s modernisation and renewal.  Muhammad Sharif Pasha’s movement, largely 
dominated by the elite Turco-Circassians, failed to address how the constitutionalist 
aims were linked to the very real problems of poverty and social dislocation and was 
not able to stimulate mass popular support for the constitutionalist movement.  The 
association of the Turco-Circassians with Egypt’s nobility and elite class by many 
ordinary Egyptians may also have led to the movement’s limited success in attracting 
popular support.  However, the mere fact that visible attempts were being made at a 
separation of powers between the monarch and the parliament was an unprecedented 
and important step.58 
Much more popular was the movement led by Ahmed ‘Urabi, an officer in the 
Egyptian army.  Initially a protest movement against the Khedive’s favouritism 
towards the Turco-Circassian army officers as against the low status and position of 
native Egyptian officers, the movement quickly developed wider and more nationalist 
aims.59  The Dual Control, coupled with unrestricted European dominance inside 
Egypt, was both crippling to the Egyptian economy and at the same time deeply 
humiliating to Egyptians generally.  Many Egyptians believed Khedive Isma’il was 
responsible for their subservience to the European powers and, when he was forced to 
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abdicate, his son and successor, Khedive Tawfiq was widely considered a feeble 
monarch under the control of Britain and France.60   
In the years 1879–1881, a series of confrontations between Khedive Tawfiq and ‘Urabi 
and the nationalists elevated ‘Urabi’s status as leader of the nationalists and from its 
beginnings as a military protest movement, the movement’s demands extended wider 
and incorporated greater socio-economic and political demands.  As a result, the 
movement came to be seen as representing the concerns of many social groups in 
Egypt, including the rural population, urban guilds and the broad groups that 
comprised the intelligentsia, including “medium and lower-level clerks, middle 
management in state and provincial bureaucracies, the graduates of the modern civil 
schools, the officer corps and cadets, journalists, and the Muslim and Coptic clergy”.61   
These social groups were opposed not only to the privileged position of the Turco-
Circassian nobility and elite, they were also united against the growing presence and 
influence of the European powers in Egypt.  According to the nationalists, Egypt “was 
under Turkish and European domination and not ruled by Egyptians themselves and 
the country’s wealth was being disposed in debt payments to Europe”.62  The 
modernising reforms of the nineteenth century had led to the emergence of a new 
intelligentsia through the expansion of the state and its provincial and central 
bureaucracies, an emerging press and greater possibilities for social mobility due to 
the partial reform of the education system.  This was the grouping that came to see 
Turco-Circassian and European domination of Egypt as hindering the nation’s 
progress and limiting their own opportunities.  On the other hand, other groups that 
coalesced around ‘Urabi’s nationalist movement had suffered considerably as a result 
of the modernising reforms, such as the ‘ulama losing many privileges and much 
wealth through the confiscation of land, property and their roles in the management of 
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the awqaf (charitable endowments) over the course of the nineteenth century, and the 
rural population who were aggressively taxed to service debt payments to the European 
governments.  By 1880–1881, these groups were “unified by a sense of ethnic 
solidarity involving an (Arabic) linguistic revivalism, Egyptian regional patriotism and 
Islamic nationalism”.63 
The nationalist movement came to make increasing demands for national 
independence and sovereignty in opposition to the local Khedive, the British and in 
the end the Ottoman Empire.  Suspicious of ‘Urabi and alarmed by the popular support 
‘Urabi appeared to enjoy, the Khedive, backed by the British, looked to first appease 
his movement with concessions such as replacing the Khedival government with one 
appointed by the ‘Urabists in September 1881.  But this and other measures served 
only to heighten ‘Urabi’s domestic popularity and further weaken the Khedive’s 
position and authority.  While relations between the Khedive and the British, on the 
one hand, and ‘Urabi, on the other, became fractured beyond repair, the Ottoman 
Sultan used the uncertainty to try and increase Ottoman control over Egypt by courting 
both the Khedive and ‘Urabi without making any outright public commitments to any 
of the parties.  When under British pressure, the Ottoman Sultan was forced to 
repudiate ‘Urabi and the nationalist movement and, with ‘Urabi defying the Khedive’s 
orders to resign, the British moved their fleet within range of Egypt’s northern 
coastline close to Alexandria and made plans to invade in order to uphold Khedival 
authority in Egypt and protect its interests in the Suez canal and the financial debt 
Egypt still owed.64 
In the early period of the rise of ‘Urabi’s movement, the ‘ulama’s role was not always 
prominent although many ‘ulama did sign a National Party manifesto calling for 
greater national independence.  However, as the ‘Urabi movement evolved into a broad 
coalition of social groups whose aims became more nationalist, the ‘ulama not only 
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supported the movement in greater numbers but also became increasingly influential 
within it.  ‘Urabi and the nationalist movement saw Islam as a central feature of 
Egyptian national identity and, from this perspective, the ‘ulama, who were still seen 
as the guardians of the faith, became central to the appeal of the nationalist movement.  
The overtly Islamic nature of the movement did sometimes clash with the Coptic 
clergy’s view of Egyptian nationalism, which conceived of a civic nation under which 
religious diversity was accommodated. But when these differences came to the fore, 
the nationalists including the pro-nationalist ‘ulama agreed that Copts were also an 
integral part of the nation and could not be excluded on the basis of their religion.  
Whether the inclusion of Copts was to ensure that Europe did not see their movement 
as anti-Christian or genuinely nationalist in its aims is uncertain.  What is certain is 
that the movement, while making claims for greater independence and sovereignty, 
framed these demands within the context of a desire to retain Egypt’s Islamic links to 
the Ottoman Sultan and the wider ‘umma and the ‘ulama became important in this 
strategy.  At the same time, ‘Urabi’s nationalists pointed towards Britain as a greater 
‘infidel’ enemy.  Making the claim for greater independence in the face of the threat 
of British rule, they were able to portray themselves and their nationalism as 
imperative for the protection of Egypt’s Islamic identity.  Having significant members 
of the ‘ulama among their ranks, sharing the same views, conferred greater Islamic 
legitimacy on the nationalist movement and provided an assurance to the Ottoman 
Sultan of Egypt’s desire to remain within the ‘umma.  (See Chapter 6.) 
The ‘ulama became an important constituency for the nationalist movement also in 
relation to its opposition to Khedival rule.  While Egypt enjoyed considerable 
autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, the Khedive remained the Sultan’s representative 
ruler in Egypt and his authority and rule stemmed from the Sultan’s approval.  In the 
same manner in which Khedive Isma’il had been forced to abdicate in early 1879 on 
the command of the Sultan, so Khedive Tawfiq ruled under a similar shadow.  Of 
course, the European powers had a hand in Isma’il’s abdication, forcing the Sultan in 
order to prevent a wider crisis, but the European powers were also aware that they 
could not act in complete discord with the Ottoman Sultan.  Understanding the 
relationship between the local rule of the Khedive and the power and authority of the 
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Sultan, ‘Urabi and the nationalists made concerted efforts to further de-legitimize the 
rule of Khedive Tawfiq.  Portraying Tawfiq as subservient to the British, they accused 
him of not serving the country’s interests.  Then, when he sought the protection of the 
British, they accused him of laying the ground for British rule in Egypt and thus 
Egypt’s Muslims potentially being ruled by non-Muslims.  Representing Tawfiq as 
personally responsible for this, ‘Urabi and the nationalists accused him of apostasy 
and pro-nationalist ‘ulama issued a fatwa denouncing his rule, quickly followed by a 
deposition order drawn up by a revolutionary council.  Once again, ‘ulama played a 
key role in nationalist opposition to the Khedive (See Chapters 6 and 7). 
Beyond Modernism: Towards Islam and the Nation 
The ‘ulama quickly became an important constituency for the nationalist movement, 
lending it legitimacy, widening its appeal and tapping into the ‘ulama’s nation-wide 
networks of support and patronage.  But in the intellectual debates and at the level of 
ideas, it was clear that pro-nationalist members of the ‘ulama had begun to articulate 
the importance of Islam to Egyptian nationalism and its central position as a 
constituent part of Egyptian national identity.  With greater European penetration of 
Egypt over the course of the nineteenth century came the realisation of Egypt’s relative 
decline.  When Egypt’s rulers began, in the early and mid-nineteenth century to 
modernise Egypt and embarked on wide-scale reform and transformation, the ‘ulama 
responded in various different ways.  Most conservative ‘ulama rejected modernisation 
as blind imitation of an alien European model, which would result in the decline of 
religion and its importance in society as it had done in Europe.  But others, albeit a 
small minority of reform minded ‘ulama, put forward a much more nuanced and 
complex set of ideas that sought to identify some aspects of European Enlightenment 
rationalism that they believed were an integral and fundamental part of an authentic 
Islamic tradition.  At the heart of the debate was the issue of education and reformist 
‘ulama criticised their conservative counterparts for wanting to retain outdated 
teaching methods and a system restricted to a narrow understanding of knowledge 
based almost entirely on the Islamic ‘transmitted’ sciences.  Reformist ‘ulama urged 
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their conservative colleagues “to teach modern sciences that would aid the cause of 
progress and allow Muslims to combat European subjugation”.65 
The debates around education provision and reform in Egypt had wider implications 
in other areas of Egyptian society.  If a modern education was meant to equip 
Egyptians with the relevant and appropriate skills to drive progress and arrest decline, 
then the nation, as the political unit, was put forward as the vehicle by which to drive 
national progress.  ‘Ulama who advocated educational reform did so in terms of 
national progress and here the aims of conservative and reformist ‘ulama found a point 
of convergence.  Conservative ‘ulama were largely attracted to ‘Urabi and the 
nationalist movement because of its opposition to Khedival rule and European 
penetration and influence in Egypt and the ways in which they associated both these 
to a further loss and decline of Egypt’s Islamic identity and heritage.  On the other 
hand, reformist ‘ulama saw the nationalist movement as one that would usher in a new 
period of reform and renewal consistent with Islamic modernism and regeneration and 
beginning with educational reform.  This is not to say that reformist ‘ulama did not 
reject Khedival rule and European dominance, but they sought to articulate a 
compatibility between the ideas of educational reform and modernisation being vital 
the elevation of the nation, which together would provide the basis for the regeneration 
of an ‘authentic’ Islam.  (See Chapter 4).    
In this respect, my thesis examines mainly the work of four prominent figures whose 
lives span the nineteenth century: Rifa’a al-Tahtawi d.1873; Husayn al-Marsafi 
d.1890; ‘Abdallah al-Nadim d.1895 and Muhammad ‘Abduh d.1905 and their 
intellectual contributions to the idea of the Egyptian nation (see Chapters 4 and 5).  Al-
Tahtawi began his career in the religious sphere teaching at al-Azhar and acting as 
Imam (prayer leader) to the first Egyptian student mission to France in 1826 but later 
pursued a career in journalism and translation alongside his teaching and religious 
duties.  During his time in France, he learnt French and studied extensively the works 
of European Enlightenment philosophers and, on his return to Egypt, translated many 
                                                 
65
 Gesink, op. cit. Islamic Reform, p.3. 
Chapter 1/ Islam and Nationalism: The Role of Islam and the ‘Ulama in the ‘Urabi Revolt 1879–1882 
45 
 
of these works in Arabic exposing an Arabic reading public to these ideas for the first 
time.  His work as head of the Egyptian State Translation Department was monumental 
in its output and his own writings had a significant influence on Egyptian intellectual 
life in the realms of educational reform, politics and social commentary.  Although he 
died in 1873 and did not participate in the ‘Urabi movement, his writings and 
translations are widely considered to have been the intellectual precursors to Egypt’s 
reform movement, and indeed in framing the importance of Islam to the Egyptian 
nation which I outline in chapter four.   
Husayn al-Marsafi remained a teacher, first within the formal al-Azhar ‘ulama corps 
and then, from 1872, as part of the reformist group of ‘ulama at the new teaching 
college, Dar al-‘Ulum, until the end of his career.  Considered a brilliant scholar of the 
Arabic language and literature, al-Marsafi was not a prominent political writer like the 
other three scholars I examine.  His Risalat al-Kalam al-Thaman (Treatise on Eight 
Words) is the most overtly political of his works but, even here, he merely “hints at 
sympathy for the ‘Urabist cause”.66  The definitions and explanations he gives in his 
Risalat on terms that he described as being in increasing use around the late nineteenth 
century – the eight words – were highly influential within ‘ulama circles and serve to 
illustrate well some of the ways in which words and concepts such as ‘umma and watan 
(homeland) had evolved by the time of the ‘Urabi Revolt.  Indeed my analysis of his 
definitions of these concepts demonstrates similarities and overlapping features with 
ideas integral to the modern nation.  I consider these important: they show how the 
definitions and criteria constitutive of modern nations may also be applied to the 
‘umma and I explore his definitions in chapter 4. 
After graduating from al-Azhar, Muhammad ‘Abduh spent much of his early career as 
a journalist and editor of the government mouthpiece newspaper Waka’i al-Misriyya 
(Egyptian Events).  Later in ‘Abduh’s career, he entered the formal ‘ulama corps and 
assumed the high position of Grand Mufti of Egypt until his death.  Between these 
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phases of his career, he was a leading member of the ‘Urabi movement even though 
he was its harshest critic in its early years, 1879–1880.  Widely considered to be the 
most important thinker on Islamic modernism and reform, ‘Abduh wrote and published 
extensively on a wide range of subjects including educational and legal reform, 
politics, moral philosophy and theology to name only a few.67  
In respect to the modernisation and reform of Islamic societies he insisted that reform 
must come from Muslims themselves rather than be imposed from outside.  He also 
warned against unquestioning imitation of the west, arguing that this would lead to the 
abandonment of Islam and greater moral, social and economic decay.  To this end, he 
argued that the foundation for reform must be the wholesale reconstitution of the 
provision of education in Muslim countries.  According to ‘Abduh, Muslim education 
was outdated and restrictive, based as it was primarily on religion and in particular on 
the Islamic ‘transmitted’ sciences, and whose techniques of instruction consisted 
principally of imitation and duplication, thus stifling intellectual rigour and critical 
thought and enquiry.  By providing a broad-based education which not only 
incorporated a religious basis but opened up non-religious fields of enquiry, Muslims 
would be able to master aspects of the world that would equip them with the necessary 
tools to embrace the modern world and to understand Islam’s compatibility to it as 
well as its relevance and indeed role within it.68  His political activity was aimed at 
limiting and ultimately ending European dominance of Muslim countries and he 
believed that, in Egypt, greater European control would lead to greater injustice for 
Egyptians and a greater gap between them and an ‘authentic’ Islam.  Advocating in 
the first instance broadening the scope of education, ‘Abduh also came to see the need 
for greater political agitation against European dominance, a lesson he most likely took 
from his mentor, the Islamic philosopher and moderniser Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 
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(d.1897).69  Jamal al-Din saw the emergence of the printing press in Egypt as a 
fundamental tool of political agitation to be utilised by Egyptian intellectuals, ‘ulama 
and political groups in order to disseminate ideas of nationalism, liberation and anti-
occupation amongst the Egyptian masses and make them aware of the ills of European 
interference.  It is from here that ‘Abduh most likely embarked on a career in 
journalism in his early professional life.  In chapter 4, I explore ‘Abduh’s intellectual 
contributions to the ideas of educational reform, Islamic modernism and their 
relevance to Egyptian nationalism.  In chapter 5, I focus on his role in the ‘Urabi Revolt 
and his opposition to it in its early years and how he then supported it becoming an 
integral strategist of the Revolt. 
Out of the four thinkers, ‘Abdallah al-Nadim is the only figure not to have spent time 
as part of the formal ‘ulama corps but often lectured at al-Azhar and other mosques 
and seminaries all over Egypt.  While al-Nadim would not be considered a member of 
the formal ‘ulama corps, his status as an Islamic intellectual and role in the ‘Urabi 
Revolt as one of its intellectual leaders necessitates his inclusion in this study.  His 
contribution to the intellectual articulation of Egyptian nationalism and particularly to 
the relationship between language, education and nationalism is significant.  He argued 
that language and mass communication were important agents of national cohesion, 
enabling common cultural understandings between people of the nation and the 
sharing and exchanging of views and opinions.  But his nationalism also depended on 
a national education because, according to al-Nadim, the dissemination and sharing of 
‘national’ ideas and opinions depended on literacy.  But in late nineteenth century 
Egypt, he recognised the low literacy rates in Egypt and so began looking at other ways 
by which to communicate his ideas to the nation.  In his journals, he used colloquial 
language, which made his ideas more accessible to ordinary Egyptians, and also began 
writing plays and dialogues in which he put forward his ideas on nationalism, 
modernisation, education and the reform of society.  He was a robust and articulate 
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debater and was considered the rhetorical voice of the nationalist movement.  The 
importance he attached to educational reform and renewal was reflected in his efforts, 
largely unattained, to establish a nationwide network of modern schools. 
As Islamic modernisers and reformers during the nineteenth century, all four thinkers 
experienced the effects of European penetration in Egypt and all four drew very similar 
conclusions.  These included: the recognition of Egyptian society as being in decline 
relative to European society; that economic progress in Egypt lagged far behind that 
of other European countries; that the power of Europe was far greater than that of 
Egypt and other Muslim countries and allowed for their colonial subjugation; and that 
what led to Europe’s position of strength was its embracing of new forms of 
knowledge, learning, scientific enquiry and innovation along with its representative 
government institutions and the national basis of its community.  All four thinkers are 
in broad agreement on these matters and clearly saw Egypt’s weaknesses in these 
terms.  But despite recognising Egypt’s difficulties, they all agreed that Egypt’s area 
of strength relative to Europe lay in its possession of Islam and its Islamic character.  
As a result, all four thinkers attempt to address Egypt’s weaknesses while at the same 
time retaining the importance of Islam to Egyptian society.  
Although the intellectual and literary contributions of these prominent ‘ulama has been 
– to varying degrees – examined previously,70 this thesis attempts to understand their 
views and opinions on nationalism and Islam and their roles in the ‘Urabi Revolt 
through the theoretical lens of nations and nationalism.  Much of the previous research 
that has focused on the Islamic thinkers mentioned above has made valuable 
contributions to building an understanding of the intellectual history of nineteenth 
century Egypt.  Many aspects of their thought have been analysed by scholars of the 
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Middle East including their ideas on reform, modernisation, politics, Muslim society, 
literature, the press and the rise of nationalism.  But although previous research has, in 
a limited way explored these thinkers views and opinions on nationalism and even 
their role in the ‘Urabi Revolt, the fact that most scholars still consider the ‘Urabi 
Revolt as a ‘proto-nationalist’ movement suggested to me, when looking at the 
literature on these four thinkers, that their writings on nationalism required greater 
scrutiny against the backdrop of an ever-increasing sophisticated body of theoretical 
explorations of the rise of nations and nationalism.   
I began my research wanting to look into a much wider range of ‘ulama opinions and 
views of nationalism in Egypt and, in particular, views and opinions they expressed on 
the emergence of ‘Urabi and the nationalist movement.  My initial impression was that 
the ‘ulama were a highly politicised group, given the closeness of religion and politics 
in traditional Islamic societies through history.  The emergence of a native nationalist 
movement in the late nineteenth century and its political confrontation with British and 
Ottoman imperialism and the local ruling Khedive and elite were the major political 
issues of the time.  Given the ‘ulama’s political nature, the assumption behind my 
research at the early stage was that ‘ulama would have been actively engaged in these 
debates, which my research was to focus upon.   
While I have tried to remain as close to my initial impressions, assumptions and 
research plan, I have nevertheless had to make some changes due to practical 
considerations.  First, the ‘ulama are a geographically dispersed group, occupying 
positions in not only the religious institutions of the country, which were vast, but also 
in the judiciary, the schools and universities, the state bureaucracy and other 
associations like guilds and sufi orders.  Unable to cover the large breadth of ‘ulama 
in society, I made the choice to focus on those ulama whom I term ‘elite’ ‘ulama.  The 
institution of the ‘ulama is hierarchical, with the Sheikh al-Azhar, Grand Mufti and the 
Muftis of the four main madhaahib occupying prominent positions within the overall 
hierarchy.  There are also on the same level of seniority, the leaders of the sufi orders 
being the Sheikh al-Bakr and Sheikh al-Sadat, both hereditary positions with myths of 
descent from the Prophet Muhammad.  Under these were some of the most renowned 
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preachers, teachers mainly at al-Azhar, and Islamic legal experts attached to the courts 
and wider judiciary.  The hierarchical structure of the institution of the ‘ulama meant 
that elite ‘ulama had large followings of lower ranked ‘ulama and were rarely 
contradicted by their colleagues, giving elite ulama great influence amongst the rest of 
the ‘ulama below them.  I consider the views, opinions and disagreements amongst the 
elite ulama as being broadly representative of the debates in wider ‘ulama circles. 
Another practical consideration that led me to focus on elite ‘ulama, was the fact that 
many of the lower rank ‘ulama, while crucial to the overall structure and dissemination 
of messages to the ‘faithful’, seldom wrote their views and opinions on paper or were 
published.  In most cases, these ‘ulama used the spoken word, arguably more important 
in Islam given its historical emphasis on memorisation of the Quran as a way to 
preserve the authenticity of the Revelation.  In contrast, elite ulama, not often but 
occasionally, wrote books, articles in newspapers, and commentaries on legal texts and 
had their fatawa collected into large volumes.  While the written material the elite 
‘ulama contributed to debates is, I think, yet to be fully discovered and still remains 
limited, the literature written by the elite ulama remains much more easily accessible 
as a resource and is more readily available for analysis. 
Finally, the question of time was also of prime importance.  The fieldwork for my 
research was conducted in Cairo, Egypt in 2007.  Prior to my research, I had very little 
knowledge of Arabic except being able to read without understanding the text and 
spent time in 2002 and 2007 on language training.  Analysing texts written by the 
‘ulama at the end of the nineteenth century presented its own set of linguistic problems, 
for the ‘ulama wrote using complex grammatical structures derived from classical 
Arabic mainly out of use today.  Arabic study courses mainly offered training in 
colloquial Arabic (spoken) or Modern Standard Arabic (fusha, pronounced fus ha) 
which is used in the newspapers and as the printed/written form.  As well, the archives 
and libraries I visited remain highly disorganised, with manual card systems still 
largely in place.  Where materials have been electronically catalogued, the 
organisation and storage of these materials is erratic, with many publications either 
‘not available for inspection’, under restoration or simply not in their designated place.  
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The organisation, conditions of storage and retrieval of materials unfortunately poses 
significant obstacles for researchers of this period of Egyptian history and despite a 
huge array of relevant archival material, these remain untapped and largely 
undiscovered. 
In this thesis, I have therefore relied mainly, but by no means entirely, on material that 
was available and more readily retrievable and has in part been examined in previous 
research.  My thesis offers an alternative reading of primary texts available in that I 
examine the ideas and opinions of ‘ulama and how these were tied to political events 
and, more particularly, the implications of their views as interpreted from their writings 
on nation formation in Egypt and the emergence of nationalism.  In analysing the 
‘ulama’s views and opinions on nations and nationalism, I situate these debates within 
a broader context concerning the nature and basis of community and the ‘umma and a 
wider theoretical debate concerning the relationship between Islam and nationalism.  
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 Chapter Two 
Islam and Nationalism: Theoretical Reflections and 
the Case of Egypt 
There is no part of the modern world where the impact of nationalism and the desire 
for ‘nations’ to be organised within their own nation-states has not been felt.  The 
global appetite for nationalism has been complemented by increasing numbers of 
scholars exploring the phenomena in ever greater depth resulting in the development 
of a substantial body of theoretical literature which has sought to explain how nations 
and nationalism emerge under varying sociological and historical conditions.  At the 
same time, the growing body of theoretical literature has been accompanied by an 
equally vast amount of empirical and historiographical studies on particular nations 
and nationalist movements around the world.   Theoretical accounts of the emergence 
of nations and nationalism have developed into four main theoretical approaches 
which are the “modernist”, “ethno-symbolist”, “perennialist” and “primordialist” 
accounts of the rise of nations and nationalism.  These theoretical approaches advance 
models and identify patterns in the rise of nations and nationalism and have been 
crucial in furthering our understanding of the subject both from a theoretical 
perspective and by the availability of greater numbers of empirical case studies of 
nationalisms from around the world against which theories can be tested and empirical 
studies can be further refined. 
However, in relation to the Arab Middle East and in particular for the purposes of this 
thesis, historiographical accounts of the emergence of nationalism in Egypt, have to a 
large extent, neglected to include in their analysis a sufficiently comprehensive 
theoretical framework within which their empirical findings can be situated. In 
analysing Egyptian nationalism scholars have paid scant attention to the ‘Urabi Revolt 
and its nationalist tendencies, instead seeing it mostly as a local protest movement 
against Khedival authority, Turco-Circassian elitism and European influence and 
British Occupation.  The central aspect of nationalism to the movement has been lost 
on most scholars, while only a handful have attributed it with “proto-nationalist” 
tendencies and a forerunner to the nationalism in Egypt of the early twentieth century.  
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For their part, most scholars of nationalism often disregard the historiographical 
accounts of Egypt and the emergence of nationalism in the Muslim world, in general 
an omission which has equally important consequences for the theoretical study of 
nationalism as well as the study of the rise of nationalism in Egypt.  Without 
integrating into their work the ways in which scholars of Egypt have pointed towards 
Islam’s importance to Egyptian nationalism (in the early twentieth century), scholars 
of nationalism have given very little attention to this important theoretical question.   
Where they have addressed this question, theories of nationalism have pointed towards 
the idea that, while nationalism emphasises the differences between national 
communities in areas of language, ethnicity, culture and traditions, Islam appears to 
transcend these differences by placing the ‘umma and belief in Islam as the primary 
and most legitimate markers of Muslim group identity.  Sami Zubaida notes that to 
“some western commentators, including Ernest Gellner, the Islamic idea of the 
community as the political unit is incompatible with the territorial nation-state”.1 
In this chapter, I look at how theorists of nations and nationalism have contributed to 
our understanding of the relationship between Islam and nationalism and the ideas of 
community that are central to both Islam and the nation.  I highlight theoretical deficits 
and propose ways in which these deficits might be overcome by greater engagement 
with empirical evidence.  My second aim in this chapter is to assess the way in which 
Middle East scholars and in particular scholars of Egyptian and Arab nationalism have, 
only in a partial manner, employed the increasingly wide ranging theoretical literature 
to test their empirical findings and conclusions on the rise of nationalism in Egypt.  
Despite many scholars recognising the importance of Islam to Egyptian nationalism, I 
find that historiographical accounts of Egyptian nationalism begin in the early decades 
of the twentieth century and not with the ‘Urabi revolt of 1879-1882 which is largely 
ignored as an expression of nationalism albeit a failed one. 
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Nationalism and Religion 
It is surprisingly true that despite an eruption in interest in nationalism studies and the 
multiplying numbers of academic journals and books devoted to the subject, the field 
has witnessed a general decline in the importance scholars have attributed to the role 
of religion in modern nationalism.2  In his book The Construction of Nationhood,3 
Adrian Hastings goes some way in addressing this deficit and attempts to show the 
interaction between religion, language, ethnicity and the nation in the construction of 
nationhood.  For Hastings, ‘modernist’ theories of nations and nationalism are 
mistaken for two major reasons.  First is their insistence on the emergence of nations 
in the modern period (i.e. late eighteenth century).  The second reason is their 
“omission of the impact of religion in general and of the Bible in particular on the 
emergence of nations and nationalism”.4  More specifically, although modernist 
theorists are correct in asserting that “the rapid spread of nationalist ideology and 
nation-creating movements [dates] from the late eighteenth century”,5 crucially, their 
“denial of the first half of the story has inevitably skewed the whole.”6  The ‘first half 
of the story’ for Hastings is the story of religion, language and ethnicity and their 
crucial interplay in the pre modern period.  He argues that ethnicities in the pre modern 
era become nations only with the help of a distinct vernacular literature, his central 
example being the introduction of the Bible into the ethnic group.  Of course not all 
ethnicities become fully fledged nations but those that make the leap successfully are 
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almost always those ethnic groups whose vernacular evolves into a written language 
and who develop a “living literature”.7 
It is at this point that religion is introduced into the analysis, more specifically, the 
Bible.  In the first part of his account, Hastings focuses on England, on the multitude 
of ethnic groups and on the introduction of English translations of the Bible from the 
Vulgate.  He argues that the spread of Christianity was also the spread of the Old as 
well as New Testament Bibles.  The pivotal role of religion hinges on the fact that, as 
Christianity spread, the Bible had to be translated from the Vulgate into local 
vernaculars.  Ethnic groups who had the Bible translated into their own vernacular then 
often developed living literatures and transformed their language from oral to a written 
language.  Ethnic groups whose vernaculars went unnoticed may have persisted but 
almost never made the great leap from ethnic group to nation.  For Hastings, then, the 
introduction of Christianity and the Bible to ethnic groups enabled their language to 
evolve and provide a sufficient resource for that group to coalesce around and increase 
the span of ‘imagination,’ as Benedict Anderson argues,8 through the proliferation of 
a ‘living’ written language. 
One more point worth mentioning here in Hastings’ analysis is that, for him, there is a 
definite “continuity in usage across more than six hundred years in the [English] 
language, that in the fourteenth century, the sense of ‘nation’ was already related 
explicitly to a distinct language group, and that it drew in large part on biblical and 
Vulgate roots”.9  As far back as 1350, Hastings detects the term ‘nacioun’ in a verse 
in the Book of Revelation (5.9).  Even more, he argues that in fact there is 
“overwhelming evidence that ‘natio’ was regularly used in the Middle Ages in the 
Vulgate sense of a people distinct by ‘language, laws, habits, modes of judgement and 
customs’”.10  For Hastings then, this continuity highlights the very modern sense in 
which the word ‘nation’ was used and its theological and more specifically Christian 
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underpinnings.  Confining these continuities to the Christian world, Hastings’ analysis 
becomes too narrow.  The present day Israeli nation-state, as well as the wider Jewish 
nation, have their origins in the Old Testament and therefore point to a much longer 
continuity.  It could be argued that in fact Hastings understates the case of Christianity 
and its continuity, if one sees the Jewish nation being the basis of the Christian political 
model. 
Turning his attention to Islam, Hastings argues that the same reasoning cannot be 
applied to the Muslim world because, although a multitude of ethnic groups does 
indeed exist, the language of the Quran was Arabic and the “Muslim attitude to it made 
translation almost impossible.  For the religious person it has to be read, recited out 
loud five times a day, or listened to in Arabic”.11  Unlike Christianity, Islam was, from 
the start, opposed to a multitude of nation-states because of its emphasis on a world 
empire – the universal ‘umma based not on ethnic or national differences but on a 
community of believers.  Moreover, the diversity of vernaculars to which Christianity 
was so suited, was not the same in Islam.  On the contrary, Islam and the universal 
‘umma were based on the possession of a single and genuinely sacred language – 
Arabic: the language of God and of the Arabs.  Asserting the difference between Islam 
and Christianity in the process of nation formation, Hastings concludes that, “in 
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consequence the whole cultural impact of Islam is necessarily to Arabise, to draw 
peoples into a single world community of language and government”.12 
Although Hastings’ analysis is persuasive on the formation of nation-states in Western 
Europe and England in particular, the same cannot be said of his treatment of Islam.  
According to him, Islam as a religion plays little or no part at all in the formation of 
nation-states in the Islamic world.  Yet a cursory glance at a handful of ‘successful’ 
nationalisms around the Muslim world reveals the limits of this assertion and in my 
later review of some of the literature on Arab and Egyptian nationalism, I show that 
region scholars put forward a very different view.  Leaving Egypt aside for now, in the 
Arab world, the formation of the Saudi state and its nationalist ideology is difficult to 
dissociate from the orthodox Sunni ideology of Wahhabism.  Beginning with the mid 
eighteenth century alliance between Muhammad ibn al-Saud and the orthodox Islamic 
reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab to the formation of the unified Saudi state 
1932–1934, Islam played a pivotal role.13  Indeed, Joseph Nevo argues – with a little 
exaggeration in my view and without taking into consideration the ‘ulama of Egypt – 
that “the bond that developed between Wahhabi Islamic clerics (‘ulama) and the family 
of al-Saud marks the modern inception of the use of religion as an instrument for both 
consolidating a collective identity and legitimising the ruling family”.14  Other 
nationalisms in the Muslim world further cast doubt over Hastings’ claim, including 
the case of Egypt, which I highlight in this thesis, but also the cases of Iran (1979) and 
Pakistan (1947), two very significant non-Arab examples.  Interestingly, even the case 
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of Arab nationalism raises critical questions of Hastings’ theory as even Christian 
Arabs struggled to articulate a clear distinction between Arabism and Islam.15  These 
and other cases not only force us to question Hastings’ claim but also illustrate clearly 
areas where further research is acutely necessary. 
Furthermore, Hastings’ claim that Islam has had a tendency to unify Muslims or even 
to Arabise them must also be unravelled. First, there was little agreement amongst 
Muslims over the succession of Muhammad, which in turn created the perennial 
difference between the followers of ‘Ali and Shi’ism and those of Abu Bakr and the 
more mainstream Sunni Islam.  But, more than this, as Islam expanded, so various 
dynasties erupted, challenging in many cases the legitimacy of the existing Caliph and 
dynasty.  As Albert Hourani expertly demonstrates: 
in certain regions, there were movements of opposition and separation in the 
name of some dissident form of Islam.  Such movements resulted in the creation 
of separate political units, but at the same time they helped the spread of Islam 
by giving it a form which did not disturb the social order.16   
Histories play a crucial role in John Armstrong’s in-depth analysis of Islamic and 
Christian civilizations in his Nations before Nationalism.17  Armstrong’s approach is 
to examine group identity over long periods of time and “present those aspects of 
European and Middle Eastern history that [he] considers being most important in the 
overall historical development of ethnicity”.18  One of these aspects is the difference 
in lifestyle between nomadic and sedentary populations.  Armstrong draws a 
distinction between these different ways of life, arguing that for sedentary agricultural 
populations, attachment to specific territories constituted a major marker for group 
identity.  In contrast, for nomadic peoples genealogical myths of descent were central 
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to their perception of group identity.  Armstrong asserts that “the impact of Islam, 
though ambiguous as to doctrine, has been extremely important as a historical force 
for adoption of nomad identity.”19   
With the nomadic emphasis on nostalgia and myths of descent, he continues, the 
earliest Islamic empires, contrary to doctrinal Islamic egalitarianism, believed that the 
founders of Islam – the Arabs – were superior and that other groups were inferior.  
These three factors – Islam, Arab identity and nomadic desert conditions – coalesced 
in formulating myths of descent and were therefore “very important reinforcing 
mechanisms and genealogical myths”.20  This, however, did not mean that, as Islam 
expanded, so did the drive to Arabise.  Eurasian steppe nomads such as Turks, 
Mongols and Seljuks who converted to Islam did keep their ethnic identity, which 
suited the conquering Arabs, who retained a superior notion of their group identity as 
Arabs.  This idea continued into the age of nationalism where the Turkish leadership 
of the ‘umma was a constant source of dissatisfaction amongst Arabs. 
For the purposes of my argument, Armstrong’s analysis is useful because it shows the 
way in which “important as the legitimizing effect of Islam has been, nomadic 
nostalgia as a persistent identifying myth can exist independently”.21  Moreover, 
contrary to orthodox opinion, Islam while in the process of expansion did in many 
cases significantly contribute to a sense of ethnic identity as in the case of its Persian 
expansion and its expansion into Turkey.  Furthermore, Armstrong argues that in fact 
BC Christianity, with its Abrahamic tradition and the Exodus of the Ancient Israelites 
to the ‘Promised Land’, sharpened and focused ethnicity by conferring on them the 
status of ‘chosen people’.  These same myths exist among Arabs where they have their 
own myths of ethnic election.  For instance, a great source of pride among Arab 
Muslims is the belief that Muhammad, the holiest of prophets in Islam, was in fact 
Arab, and that God’s chosen language of divine revelation through the Quran was the 
Arabic language.  In the case of Egyptian nationalism in the late nineteenth century 
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during the ‘Urabi Revolt, the idea of a common linguistic identity in the shape of a 
specific Egyptian Arabic, and Egypt’s historical genealogy and sense of continuity 
with the Pharoanic tradition and later with Islam were strong currents within the 
nationalist movement. In particular, some pro-nationalist ‘ulama, sought to make a 
distinction between Arab Islam and Turkish Islam attributing Islam’s decline to the 
Turkish leadership of the faith. 
Modernist Theories of Nationalism and Islam 
Modernist theories of the emergence of nations and nationalism take an altogether 
different perspective from those explored by Hastings and Armstrong.  However, 
“whatever their [the modernists’] views about the relationship of nationalism to pre-
modern ethnic sentiments, most scholars agree that nationalism, the global political 
movement that we know today, is a peculiarly modern phenomenon”22 that dates from 
around the time of the French Revolution in 1789.   
Modernist theories emphasise nationalism’s rise in the modern period due to a number 
of processes including most importantly industrialization and urbanisation.  From this 
broad premise and its associated insistence of the modernity of nations and 
nationalism, modernist scholars claim among other things that history plays a minor 
role in the development of nationalism as nation formation and its associated ideology 
are modern phenomena.  In fact modernists and in particular Eric Hobsbawm23 view 
the historical arguments of nationalists suspiciously arguing that histories are often 
“invented traditions” as are historical attachments to territory or ideas about common 
cultural understandings and historical group attachments and that an over-emphasis on 
historical genealogies often blurs or makes dubious the claims of nationalist. 
Ernest Gellner’s theory of nationalism is one such modernist view, which asserts that 
nations and nationalism are profoundly modern constructs inevitably resulting from 
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the transformation of society from agro-literate societies to industrial societies.  This 
process of modernisation necessarily erodes traditional structures as people move from 
rural societies to the new emerging urban centres.  Traditional structures in rural 
societies are often those of low folk culture; religion and the Church and are replaced 
when people arrive in the cities by high culture supported by a state.  Thus, Gellner 
states, “in the industrial world high cultures prevail, but they need a state not a church, 
and they need a state each.  That is one way of summing up the emergence of the 
nationalist age”.24 
With the transformation of populations from rural to urban society mainly in search of 
work, Gellner argues, the industrial age requires a mobile and culturally homogeneous 
society.  For him, this is where the state and the education system play a crucial role.  
The new urban industrialised societies require their inhabitants to receive a standard 
form of education because of the technologically advanced nature of work that is 
carried out in the industrial age.  Communication becomes “important because of 
complexity, interdependence and mobility of productive life, within which far more 
numerous, complex, precise and context-free messages need to be transmitted than had 
ever been the case before”.25  The size of the new urban centres makes them 
anonymous, contrary to rural societies where people are acquainted with one another 
and often through many generations.  The new urban dwellers, having arrived, find 
themselves at the bottom of the social ladder, often living in slums and undertaking 
the worst jobs.  Culturally, they are also discriminated against because of their low 
culture, strange dialect and obscure religious practices.  At this miserable juncture, 
there are, as Gellner sees it, two avenues open to them.  First, they may assimilate over 
time into the dominant group by educating themselves or their children and eventually 
climbing the social ladder.  Or, they develop an intelligentsia and this intellectual elite 
begins to articulate and establish aspects of group identity and a nationalist struggle 
for secession begins.  Gellner draws the picture for us in his now famous passage on 
Ruritania: 
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As backward rustics speaking an obscure and seldom written or taught 
language, they had a particularly rough deal in the towns to whose slums they 
had moved. At the same time some ‘Ruritanian’ lads destined for the church, and 
educated in both the court and the liturgical languages, became influenced by 
the new liberal ideas in the course of their secondary schooling, and shifted to a 
secular training at the university, ending not as priests but as journalists, 
teachers and professors.  They received encouragement from a few foreign, non-
Ruritanian ethnographers, musicologists and historians who had come to 
explore Ruritania.  The continuing labour migration, increasingly widespread 
elementary education and conscription provided these Ruritanian awakeners 
with a growing audience.26 
In Gellner’s theory then, low culture and high culture come into contact with each 
another due to modernisation and the process of industrialisation.  Low culture consists 
of a language that is little more than a regional dialect with no ‘living literature’, to use 
Hastings’ term, and consists of folk tales and songs known only to its users, who are 
likely to be peasants from the countryside.  When the adherents of this low culture 
come into contact with the high culture of the dominant group in the urban centres, 
this sparks the nationalist flame. For Gellner, in the modern industrial world, the “low 
or folk variant can be and is disavowed, as a corruption, exploited if not actually 
invented or instigated by the alien colonialist enemy, while the high variant becomes 
the culture around which a new nationalism can crystallise”.27 
Islam, however, Gellner tells us,  “was internally divided into a high and low culture, 
the two flowing into each other, of course, and intimately related and intertwined, but 
also periodically erupting into conflict”,28 although not fundamentally altering society.  
Folk Islam was tribal, and thus “sub-ethnic and sub-political”, centred on mysticism, 
saints, shrines and what Gellner describes as the low-culture variant of Islam.  The 
cities of the imperial court and the formal mosques and the formal clergy (‘ulama) are 
the high-culture variant of Islam and, when modernization occurs in Islamic society, 
the disavowing process which marks an important point in Gellner’s theory does occur 
within Islamic society and the orthodox practices of high-culture Islam are adopted 
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with ease, not producing the fissures and tensions created elsewhere.  Because of the 
dualism within Islam where the high culture and low culture “flow into each other”, 
Islam for Gellner is much better equipped for dealing with reform; indeed, Gellner 
portrays Islam as “ever Reformation-prone (Islam could indeed be described as 
Permanent Reformation)”.29 
There are two main criticisms of Gellner’s theoretical approach to nations and 
nationalism that I will focus on here.  The first is that it is not easily applied to the 
numerous societies that experienced nationalism without experiencing the 
unquestionably dislocating processes of modernisation and industrialisation.  Peter van 
der Veer remarks that:  
when one abandons the necessity of direct connection between a particular 
modern state formation and nationalism, this opens up a realm of possible forms 
of nationalism, one of which not only delinks nationalism from state formation 
but also from modernity itself.30   
This approach is particularly fruitful when considering case studies that did not 
experience the process of modernization Gellner lays out. In Egypt over the nineteenth 
century, state formation, which in fact meant greater state centralization, did not lead 
to modernity in the way Gellner describes.  In fact, the state used its greater power and 
capacity to drive up agricultural production and make this more efficient.  It introduced 
land reform in the countryside to limit the power of large land-owning elites and gave 
peasants greater opportunity to own land and make greater profits, measures that did 
not induce a large demographic shift from rural to urban but, on the contrary, rewarded 
those who remained in the countryside on the land.31  Education, so central a feature 
of Gellner’s theory, hardly changed in Egypt between 1805 and1879, remaining 
overwhelmingly Islamic in nature and far from being able to generate the highly skilled 
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workforce of Gellner’s modern industrial society.  Where modern skills were needed, 
a handful of schools were established or bright students were sent abroad to complete 
their studies which, as I will show later in this thesis, often had a far greater impact on 
the emergence of nationalism.  Indeed very modest attempts were made at 
industrialisation during this period32 and so, while some aspects of state modernization 
occurred, these were not targeted at building the type of society Gellner sees as critical 
for the emergence of nationalism.  
The second main criticism is that it attempts to tell only half the story of the emergence 
of nations and nationalism.  Gellner’s modernism stems from his concern with social 
processes that occur in society after the late eighteenth century and the French 
revolution, the starting point for him of the history of nationalism.  The collision of 
culture, secularization, modernization and the effects of profound social 
transformation with great shifts of people moving from rural to the new urban centres 
are the overriding features that concern Gellner.  These are the aspects leading to the 
rise of nationalism that for him answer the question of why and how nationalism 
emerges.  But, as Gellner takes his theory one step further and sets out what happens 
to those ‘Ruritanian’ new urban dwellers at the universities where they learn their new 
skills, are then exploited in the new industrial age and are influenced by “the foreign 
… ethnographers, musicologists and historians”,33 he pays little attention to the aspects 
of group identity that these new soon-to-be-nationalists coalesce around.  
Interpretations of history, group identity markers that had existed in the pre-modern 
communities before the onset of modernity and historical attachments to territory, 
cultural traditions including language and religion are the features that resonate and 
around which nationalist movements form.  These historical aspects become important 
in shaping, forming and indeed defining the nationalist struggle and the nation that 
comes into existence.34 
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Despite Gellner’s modernism and his insistence on processes and social transformation 
in the modern era giving rise to nationalism, the importance he attaches to histories 
appears insignificant, at least on the surface of his work.  Rogers Brubaker argues that 
“[r]eligion is less obviously central to Gellner’s theory of nationalism [than 
language]”.35  This point is particularly true of Gellner’s view, outlined above on Islam 
and its relationship to nationalism.  While Gellner may argue that the idea of 
community in the form of the ‘umma is incompatible with the nation, his theory and 
views on Islam’s ability to reform itself and adapt to modernization illustrate a 
different view.  Because of the dominance in Islam of the ‘scripturalist, egalitarian 
high culture aspect of Islam’ and the ability of the mystical low-culture variant to relate 
and be disavowed by its high-culture counterpart, Islam becomes crucial in ensuring 
that the high-culture remains unchallenged by the low-culture during modernization 
and reformation.  Indeed, Brubaker argues that “culture and communication”36 play a 
far more important role in Gellner’s theory than language, and religion as an element 
of culture also becomes more central to his theory.37  Indeed, Brubaker argues that 
according to Gellner’s theory, the high culture of Islam is “deeply compatible with 
nationalism and indeed often fused with nationalism”.38  
At the centre of the ever-increasing literature and interest in nationalism studies is the 
prominence of nationalist struggles and conflicts witnessed around the world, with the 
nation and its ideology showing the ability to mobilise people to sacrifice their lives in 
the name or defence of the nation.  Many theorists, while recognising the power of 
nationalist ideology in mobilising the masses, are also sceptical of nationalism.  Elie 
Kedourie, both in his book entitled Nationalism39 and his later introduction to 
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Nationalism in Asia and Africa,40 puts forward this sceptical view of nationalism.  He 
argues that it is “quite apparent that this ideological obsession could provide no remedy 
for the ills of alienation and oppression for which it purported to provide a cure”.41  To 
highlight his point, Kedourie states that: 
a nationalist ideology is clearly not ipso facto a guarantee of prosperity or of 
good and honest government.  Thirty years of FLN rule in Algeria, or the record 
of successive Iraqi, Syrian or Egyptian nationalist regimes … are a few examples 
which may serve as an illustration.42 
As well as displaying his scepticism of nationalism as an ideology, Kedourie is 
concerned with the origins of nationalism and, for him, these origins can be found in 
the Kantian notion of the “good will, which is the free will, [being] also the 
autonomous will”.43  Put simply, if men were to be obedient to that which makes them 
free, it should not come from any external force in the shape of a divine command but 
from man himself.  To be ‘good’, man must be free and freedom comes not from divine 
will but from an autonomous will – a will that conjures up freedom within itself free 
of external pressure.  While the Kantian notion sees the individual acting 
independently, the work of Johann Gottlieb Fichte was, according to Kedourie, “the 
Kantian doctrine properly understood”.44  Fichte argued in The Foundations of Natural 
Law that “the individual cannot be considered on his own.  He forms part of, and 
derives meaning from the whole”.45  Here Fichte sees a relationship between state and 
individual where the state is an “artistic institution and its purpose is culture.  Culture 
is the process whereby man becomes really man, realizing himself in utmost plenitude, 
and it is this realization which is the perfect freedom”.46  Importantly, Fichte’s notion 
of freedom is intricately tied to the notion of a community with a shared culture. 
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For Kedourie, the emergence and appeal of nationalism points to religion no longer 
taking centre stage in social organization or as offering salvation but being overtaken 
by politics as the engine by which ‘salvation’ can be achieved. Fichte’s doctrine of the 
culture state and the individual’s place within the whole are merged with Herder’s 
doctrines arguing the existence of natural language differences within humanity which 
then make the “nation a homogeneous linguistic mass which acts as a magnet for 
groups speaking the same language outside its boundaries”.47  Kedourie sees this 
process emerging in Europe where politics replaces religion but retains the aspect of 
salvation so powerful in religion, making nationalism a millennial movement asserting 
that salvation can be achieved only through membership of the nation.   
These same ideas appear in Asia and Africa but utilise religion in a more explicit way.  
In his lengthy introduction to Nationalism in Asia and Africa, Kedourie shows how 
“religion and its venerable sacraments and familiar hymns can be used to mobilize the 
masses for political ends”.48  Religion is a crucial resource for nationalist mobilization 
in that “nationalists can utilize the powerful and tenacious loyalties which a faith held 
in common for centuries creates”.49  Kedourie recognizes the durability and indeed 
flexibility of religion, which enables it to lend itself to nationalism even when those 
religions “have nothing to do with nationalist theory, and which may even be opposed 
to it”.50  It is this tendency of nationalism, and indeed religion and more specifically 
Islam, that Kedourie brings to our attention.   
However, the emphasis for Kedourie is the manipulation of popular religion in order 
to shape the political project of the nation.  Kedourie argues that central to the nation 
is a ‘past’ and in the Islamic world, the past chronicled in the Quran, Hadith, other 
texts and in the sermons of religious leaders.  Similarly, Kedourie cites the Arab 
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nationalist Shakib Arslan (1869–1946) who in turn employs and urges Arabs to 
emulate the Zionist example where “the Bible becomes a product of the Jewish 
national genius and useful in fostering and perpetuating this genius”.51  This 
reproduction of history “comes to be seen as that which gives coherence and 
significance to actions, documents, institutions which had hitherto been accepted as 
forming an uncomplicated and perhaps timeless tradition”.52  Timeless though it may 
be, the actions of prophets, the holy texts of the Quran and Hadith are seen as a “store 
of lessons and warnings illustrating the workings of God’s justice”.53  And when, as in 
Islam, ‘God’s justice’ is first pronounced by an Arab, to Arabs and in the language of 
the Arabs, this has important ramifications for ‘national’ identity and nation building. 
First, according to Kedourie, from being confined to his religious importance, the 
Prophet Muhammad is transformed into a ‘national’ Arab hero.  Muhammad, who has 
been chosen as the first and faithful recipients of God’s word, becomes the 
embodiment of the Arab nation.  As the link between God and His people, Muhammad 
becomes the hero of the Arab people for it is his pristine character and being that have 
been chosen as the messenger of God’s Words.  Battles fought by Muhammad in early 
Islamic history are seen in terms of his status as national hero for, without Muhammad, 
these battles would not have been won.  Moreover, the Prophet Muhammad is seen as 
hero for guiding and directing ‘his’ people to truth and glory and in order to fulfil their 
destiny as God’s chosen people.  Second, Kedourie links Islam to Arabism and argues 
that “Islam begins to be regarded by Muslims not so much a Revelation and an 
immutable truth [but] as a ‘civilisation,’ a ‘culture’ or even a product of the Arab 
national genius”.54  Kedourie tells us that this is nothing new – “Islam, Christianity, 
and Judaism have proved equally pliable and adaptable to political uses”.55  Of course, 
religion must mean something particular to the community and in the case of Islam, 
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Kedourie argues, that it was seen as a “manifestation of the Arab genius … and 
represented the ascent of Arabism towards unity, power and progress”.56 
Kedourie’s emphasis is much more on ideas than Gellner’s analysis of sociological 
processes and indeed necessity.  Kedourie, while a modernist in the sense that he 
accepts the emergence of nations and nationalism in the modern era, does, however, 
see religion and older communal ties as crucial to nationalists and the formation of 
nation-states. Nationalism and ideology play an altogether more active role for 
Kedourie and religion is infused into both, even though its role is perhaps implicit at 
times.  As the role of ideology and religion are paramount, so too is the extent to which 
these are manipulated. The manipulation of religion for political ends is demonstrated 
by Kedourie when he argues that in the third chapter of Exodus, when Moses goes to 
investigate the burning bush, “this shook Moses to the depth of his being [and] is now 
[the burning bush] symbolized by a sculpture standing at the gate of the Chamber of 
Deputies in Jerusalem: the noumenal has been degraded into the political”.57  Similar 
examples are numerous when looking at Islam and its nationalist manipulation in the 
Middle East and wider Islamic world.  The ‘national’ flag of Saudi Arabia is inscribed 
in Arabic with the fundamental and primary Muslim proclamation shahaadah 
(declaration): “There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is his messenger.”58  
Furthermore, many of the flags of Islamic states have the star and crescent emblem on 
them, which is one of the most potent and easily recognisable symbols of Islam.  
Muslim holy sites like the Al-Aqsa Mosque, Karbala, Mecca and Medina are imbued 
with fervent political significance, which has meant that their possession and indeed 
protection have become explicitly ‘national’ political issues. According to Kedourie, 
then, religion is important to nationalists because it engenders a “feeling of solidarity 
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and community which is essential if they are to be made to look upon themselves as a 
nation”.59 
The departure point for Kedourie in his analysis of nationalism is the emphasis he 
places and the central position he accords medieval Christian millennialism and its 
religious drive for salvation. Kedourie believes that the “millennial hope is of the 
inauguration and institution of a totally new order where love reigns and all men are 
brothers, where all distinctions and divisions, all selfishness and self-regard are 
abolished”.60  For him, the origins of millennialism are to be found in the Book of 
Revelation when it talks of the coming millennium in terms such as “Blessed and holy 
is he that hath part in the first resurrection: on such the second death hath no power, 
but they shall be priests of God and of Christ, and shall reign with him a thousand 
years (20:6)” or “And I saw a new heaven and a new earth (21:1)”.61  
In the post-Enlightenment era and the advent of nationalism however, the religious 
aspect of millennialism was lost and nationalism took up the mantle and became what 
Kedourie terms a ‘secular millennialism’.  Kedourie further argues that, while 
nationalism retained the zeal and fanaticism of earlier millennial movements, it 
substituted the theological basis with a ‘rational’ one – nationalism – the political drive 
for national salvation.  Through the process of colonial expansion and indeed 
subjugation, Asia and Africa became exposed and then influenced by the ideas of this 
secular millennialism where the “vision of a purified society in which all things are 
made new … and the hope that men can somehow put an end to all oppression and 
injustice was immediately attractive”.62  
The parallels Kedourie draws between the Christian millennialist tradition and that of 
modern nationalism can indeed be given some credence.  However, his application of 
this parallel to the Islamic world is not so convincing.  The explicitly Christian element 
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to medieval millennialism has to a large extent been transposed by the particular 
metaphysics of nationalism.  Nationalisms in the Islamic world, however, still have 
the religious aspect at the centre of their metaphysical structure.  Islam has not been 
replaced by a secular tradition merely retaining the earlier zeal.  It is the explicitly 
Islamic nature of the nationalism that gives it such power and passion.  The second 
point worth mentioning here is that Kedourie’s theory relies too heavily on elites either 
in the religious sphere or the sphere of the state manipulating popular consciousness.  
It pays none or very little attention to an approach that sees nationalism as a two-way 
process of popular mass mobilisation as well as elite manipulation.  Popular discontent 
and the mass mobilisation, such as those experienced in Algeria and India against the 
imperial powers, were equally responsible for the success of those anti-colonial 
independence struggles.  Similarly, the abuse and ignorance of Islamic customs and 
traditions in Iran were in part responsible for the Islamic/nationalist revolution there 
in 1979.   
The Ethno-Symbolic Approach  
Anthony D. Smith63 is the major proponent of this approach to analysing the 
emergence of nations and nationalism.  He claims that “historical ethno-symbolism 
emerges from the theoretical critique of modernist approaches, as well as a different 
reading of the historical record”.64  For Smith, modernist theories “fail to accord any 
weight to the pre-existing cultures and ethnic ties of the nations that emerged in the 
modern epoch, thereby precluding any understanding of the popular roots and 
widespread appeal of nationalism”.65  The contention is that most nations are formed 
around an ethnic core which Smith calls ethnie or ethnic community.  The defining 
elements of an ethnie according to Smith is that it is a “named human population with 
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myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common 
elements of culture, including an association with a homeland, and some degree of 
solidarity, at least among the elites”.66 
The ethnic traits of communities have provided the cultural resources around which 
most modern nations are formed. The argument continues that the historical 
genealogies of these traits are fundamental if we are to realise not only the reasons for 
the emergence of nations and nationalism but also the powerful mobilising capabilities 
of nationalism.  Smith argues that “for ethno-symbolists, what gives nationalism its 
power are the myths, memories, traditions and symbols of ethnic heritage and the ways 
in which a popular living past has been, and can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by 
modern nationalist intelligentsias”.  He continues that “it is from these elements of 
myth, memory, symbol, and tradition that modern national identities are reconstituted 
in each generation, as the nation becomes more inclusive and as its members cope with 
new challenges”.67 
For Smith, an important component of the ethnic past is religion and here he agrees 
with Kedourie when he argues that “religion is rarely divorced from particular ethnic 
traditions”.68  However, because of Smith’s contention that nations are formed around 
an ethnic core, he identifies an important continuity where ‘pre-modern’ religious 
traditions become linked with ethnic groups and, later, modern nations.  Thus he argues 
that “religious traditions, and especially beliefs about the sacred, underpin and suffuse 
to a greater or lesser degree the national identities of populations”.69   
Although there is some agreement between Kedourie and Smith with regard to the 
importance of religion, Smith differs markedly in that he does not argue that its 
introduction is in the shape of a ‘secularizing political religion’.  On the contrary, 
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Smith demonstrates the ways in which religion is transformed and becomes politicized, 
using the same myths, memories, traditions and examples of the past for present day 
‘national political’ purposes.  Concerning the Islamic Middle East, he argues that 
“traditional prophets and sages like Moses [and] Muhammad … are metamorphosed 
into national heroes, while religious revelations are turned into national shrines such 
as Mecca … and holy scriptures like the Koran … are reinterpreted as national 
epics”.70  Smith’s ethno-symbolic approach argues that the continuities over time and 
space of groups of people is important for the study of nations and nationalism because 
it is these enduring traits that become the central tenets of the nation and the defining 
features of the nationalist movement.  A comparable approach was examined above in 
the theories of John Armstrong in his Nations Before Nationalism but, crucially, Smith 
is concerned (where Armstrong is not) with revealing the mechanisms for the 
emergence of modern nations.   
For my specific purpose of looking at the relationship between Islam and nationalism, 
this approach is instructive because my contention is that many of the features of the 
emergence of Egyptian nationalism in the nineteenth century were indeed based on 
Egypt’s Islamic identity, which had endured over long periods of time.  Moreover, the 
actual nationalist movement in Egypt in the years 1879–1882 explicitly used and 
employed Islamic traditions, teachings and narratives to define a large element of its 
own politico-cultural struggle.  Fundamental to the emergence of nationalism in Egypt 
was the powerful institution of the ‘ulama.  The ‘ulama’s central importance in Islamic 
societies derived from their religio-legal and pedagogical role, which allowed them to 
be the sole interpreters of Islamic sacred texts and narratives of the example of the 
Prophet Muhammad. 
In interpreting these key narratives, ‘ulama act as intermediaries between the people 
and the texts and amassed great moral authority both amongst rulers and ruled. Their 
elite position, and near monopoly on religious matters and texts, enabled them to take 
on a political role legitimizing regimes and political movements.  In the case of Egypt, 
when the native nationalist movement emerged and looked to incorporate Islamic 
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motifs into their conceptions of Egyptian nationalism, the ‘ulama became an important 
constituency and were able to articulate authoritatively the ways in which Islam could 
be reconciled with – and indeed was a central feature of – the Egyptian nation.  
According to ethno-symbolist approaches to nations and nationalism, the ‘ulama, 
through their religious roles, possess the cultural resources of the nation’s past by 
interpreting and indeed embodying the myths, narratives, and examples of a glorious 
and righteous past and ensuring the resonance of these features within the modern 
nation.  Equally, in Gellner’s theory as explained above, the ‘ulama have a vital role 
as those within the high-culture variant of Islam who legitimize it in the face of 
challenges from its low-culture variant. 
Islam and Nationalism in Comparative Perspective 
If scholars of nationalism have not fully recognised the importance and indeed the 
contribution that Islam makes towards nationalism in the Arab Middle East, the same 
cannot be said of scholars of the region.  Historiographical accounts of nationalisms 
across the region, have long since explored the precise nature and ways in which Islam 
lends itself to the nationalist cause and have focused on particular cases of nationalism 
from country cases to the broader case of Arab nationalism drawing a varied set of 
conclusions. In this section, I explore some of these accounts by region scholars, 
highlighting the ways in which these are instructive for my own research in the 
linkages as well as the incompatibilities they put forward between Arabism, 
Ottomanism, Islam and nationalism. 
The vast literature on the subject of Arab nationalism has developed despite the fact 
that according to Rashid Khalidi, “its decline as a political force”71 owes much to “the 
growing significance of nation-state nationalism and the re-emergence of Islamic 
ideologies in the Middle East”.72  Khalidi offers a summary definition of Arab 
nationalism as “the idea that the Arabs are a people linked by special bonds of language 
and history (and, some would add, religion), and that their political organisation should 
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in some way reflect this reality”.73  Khalidi’s words in brackets are perhaps the most 
important given that the place of religion has in many ways been one of the most 
contentious issue regarding the origins and nature of Arab nationalism. 
For many years the most authoritative text on the subject of Arab nationalism was 
George Antonius’ “The Arab Awakening”,74 which argued that the beginnings of Arab 
nationalism could be traced to the first half of the nineteenth century and the activities 
of a literary and scientific society composed mainly of Christian Arabs who had been 
schooled and were a product of the Christian schools in Beirut established by Christian 
missionaries.75 The view Antonius put forward in his insistence of this version of the 
origins of Arab nationalism was that it was largely secular and liberal in its origins and 
in fact a response to “tyrannical Ottoman rule that catalysed this nationalist 
awakening”.76 
Historiographical accounts from the 1960’s and 70, disagreed with the liberal, secular 
and mainly Christian antecedents of Arab nationalism that Antonius put forward.  The 
critiques of this version argued that in fact Islam had played a central role in the 
development of Arab consciousness and identity.77  It is important to underline that 
scholars drew a distinction between Arabism and Arab nationalism which is often not 
clear in their writings as they use Arabism and Arab nationalism interchangeably.  I 
take both to be distinct concepts in their work.  Arabism denotes a consciousness that 
developed very much from the mid-nineteenth century and into the early years of the 
twentieth century that considered Arabs as a distinct and superior people within the 
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Islamic ‘umma and was the precursor to the political movement of Arab nationalism 
which emerged in the aftermath of the Ottoman defeat in 1918 and the collapse of the 
Empire.   C. Ernest Dawn agrees with the location of Arab nationalism from 191878 
and the Ottoman defeat and he sees the emergence of Arab nationalism as the 
culmination of increased contact with the West and with the idea of nationality, 
nationhood and their prevalence as political principles.  Making the distinction I 
believe between Arabism and Arab nationalism, Dawn argues that “by the end of the 
nineteenth century, a few Ottoman Arab intellectuals put forward theories which 
denied the right of Turks to rule Arabs.”79  Dawn continues, the ideology of Arabism 
was created and after nearly a millennium, “Arab national consciousness was 
reactivated."80  In fact, contrary to Antonius, Dawn and many of the scholars writing 
in the 60’s and 70s including Albert Hourani, Sylvia Haim and Zeine N. Zeine saw 
Islam as a central feature of Arabism and in particular Dawn and others argued that 
this “new Arabism was an outgrowth of ‘Abduh’s Islamic modernism and 
revivalism”.81   
Indeed, Muhammad Abduh showed considerable partiality towards Arab Islam.  
Abduh argued that Islam while under the leadership of the Arabs, had expanded and 
been worthy of emulation by the West while Islam under the Turks, had declined and 
lost its past glory.  In a passage from his Islam wa ‘l-nasraniyya (Islam and 
Christianity)82 Abduh declares that the decline of Islam can be traced to the time when 
the Abbasid Caliph al-Mu‘tasim (d.842), suspecting the loyalty of the Arab troops of 
his household, made use of Turkish and Dailamite mercenaries who later inaugurated 
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a military despotism.”  Abduh continues that “under these barbarians, the intellectual 
civilisation of Islam withered and wilted.”83   
Dawn’s theory is unquestionably located among those region scholars who see the rise 
of Arabism in the nineteenth century, importantly during the time of the Ottoman 
Empire as the precursor of Arab nationalism.  This process for Dawn occurred as a 
result of three important factors.  First, the idea of ‘nationhood’ and patriotism reached 
the Arabs via the Ottoman Empire and its increased contact with the West.  Second, 
the observation and indeed promotion of these ideas by the Ottomans as prescriptions 
for progress.  And finally, the realisation of Muslim decline.  Thus Dawn argues that 
“the theory of Arab nationalism grew out of the modernist diagnosis of Muslim decline 
and prescription for Muslim revival.”84 Ethnic politics, for Dawn, played little or no 
part in the formation of Arabism.  As he argues, “[t]he ethnic sentiment of the Arabs 
is of little help as a clue, for despite the obvious value of Arabist theory in bolstering 
Arab pride, most Arabs remained Ottomanists until 1918.”85 
Sylvia Haim86, draws similar conclusions regarding the origins of Arab nationalism. 
She argues that Ottomanism and the collapse of the Empire, coupled with the decline 
of Islam was sufficient cause for nationalism to enter the realm of politics in the Islamic 
Middle East.  However, in the introduction to her anthology, there appears to be more 
of an emphasis placed on Islamic scholars seeing Arabism and Islam as having a 
unique and special bond.  Thus her introduction has a common theme running through 
it where she sees Arabs of all religious affiliation placing Islam at the centre of the rise 
of Arab consciousness and the later Arab nationalist cause.  From Muhammad Abduh 
through to Michel Aflaq, the Syrian Christian founder of the Ba ‘ath Party, the 
‘greatness’ of the Arabs is attributed to Islam. 
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While Islam represents a significant component of Arabism for Sylvia Haim, she is 
careful to point out that this by no means made Islamic modernist scholars into outright 
Arab nationalists struggling against Ottoman rule.  Muhammad Abduh’s partiality to 
Arab Islam is noted by Haim but she argues that this “did not betoken an interest in or 
encouragement of Arab nationalism.”87  ‘Abduh and other Arab Islamic scholars may 
have shown a partiality towards Arab Islam but this must be seen in light of their 
attempts to revitalise Islam and reinstate its former glories and arrest what they saw as 
its decline relative to the West but not in the desire to replace the Ottoman Empire.  
Both Dawn’s and Haim’s assertion on the distinction between Arabism, Ottomanism 
and Islamic modernism remain correct some three decades later.  Hasan Kayali notes 
that “Islamic modernism was formulated as a response to imperialist encroachments 
and as such stressed Islamic unity against Europe.  Therefore, while Islamic modernist 
ideas led to enhanced Arab consciousness, this consciousness did not translate into a 
political agenda that undermined the legitimacy of the Ottoman state.”88  
For Islamic modernist scholars, Arabism for them meant the Arab peoples being the 
‘chosen people’ by Allah as the peoples to bring Islam to the world and for the holiest 
of Prophets to have come from the Arab people.  Likewise, the fact that the language 
of the Revelation was Arabic, pointed to them to the fact that the language of Allah 
was also that of the Arab people.  In these respects, Arabism was to them the belief 
and indeed the insistence that Arabs occupied a unique and primary position among 
Muslims and that only Arab leadership of the universal ‘umma of Muslims would once 
again enable Islam to flourish as it had done in its ‘golden age’. 
It is this consciousness of Arab identity that Dawn talks about, which emerged in the 
mid to late nineteenth century and that led to the emergence of the ideology of Arab 
nationalism in the early twentieth century after the Ottoman defeat.  The notion of 
Arab superiority and the idea of a ‘chosen people’ central to John Armstrong’s theory 
of the existence of nations before nationalism where genealogical myths of descent are 
often those elements around which nations coalesce, is noticeably relevant to the case 
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of Arabism and later articulations of Arab nationalism that assert Arab-Islamic 
identity.  But if Ottoman Arab Islamic modernist scholars conceptualised their position 
within the ‘umma as superior in relation to Turks and other non-Arab Ottomans, this 
did not mean that they wished to see an end to the Ottoman Empire.  Prior to the British 
Occupation of Egypt in 1882 and from 1879, I argue that Egyptian ‘ulama both 
modernists and some conservatives had an Arabist and Ottomanist tendency which 
saw the Arabs as superior but they also recognised the importance of the Ottoman 
Empire as the structure that was the guarantor of the ‘umma which both Arab and non-
Arab ‘ulama were determined to retain.  Khalidi asserts the same point when he argues 
“Arabists could also be believers in the Ottoman ideal, and before World War 1 most 
were”.89 
On the distinction between Arabism and Arab nationalism, some scholars have 
ascribed Eric Hobsbawm’s notion of “protonationalism” as a useful analytical tool by 
which to view this earlier ‘phases’ of Arab nationalism.  But the concept of 
protonationalism which according to Hobsbawm, must have as its basis “belonging to 
a lasting political entity”90 remains unclear.  Is Hobsbawm referring to the bonds and 
markers around which group identity is formed and which, in the age of nationalism 
go on to be important in the formation of nations or does he mean a defined ‘national’ 
political entity that is somehow the first basis of a political movement that later goes 
on to be a nationalist movement seeking a state for itself?  On the first possibility of 
what Hobsbawm may mean by the concept of “proto-national,” Anthony Smith shows 
that Hobsbawm himself rejects this because in Hobsbawn’s insistence of the modernity 
of nations and nationalism, he argues that “these proto-national” bonds are irrelevant 
to the subsequent modern political movement of nationalism.”91 On the second 
possibility of the meaning of “proto-national”, the distinction between a national 
political entity and a nationalist movement is blurred given that there is broad multi-
perspective agreement among scholars of nations and nationalism on the definition of 
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nationalism as the nation’s political ideology. In the case of Arabism, Hasan Kayali 
rightly points out that “Arabism…nourished political agendas that fit in with broader 
imperial patterns of political contestation, though it did not engender a coherent 
exclusionary or separatist Arab nationalist program.”92 As a modernist historian of 
nationalism, Hobsbawm, uses the idea of protonationalism to account for the 
importance of historical bonds and ties and older ethnic identities which do become 
important to later nationalist movements.  But as a modernist, the “proto” phase in his 
analysis, which distinguishes between being a political entity and having a statist 
agenda, is an analytical category of the rise of nationalism whose usefulness, apart 
from reconciling modernist theories of nationalism with the acceptance of pre-modern 
ties and bonds, is questionable.93  
Nikkie Keddie also uses the term protonationalism in her essay where she looks at the 
idea of pan-Islam as being a protonationalist phase.  Writing in the late 1960s, she 
contends that throughout the Muslim world, there has been a “transfer of popular 
loyalty…from a primary identification with Islam to one with the modern nation”.94  
For Keddie, the emergence of nationalism in the Muslim world went through an 
important phase where pan-Islamic loyalty was somehow a protonational phase and 
she argues that from its “heyday in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
[pan-Islam] was an important step in the transition from Islamic to national 
loyalties”.95  This heyday and the strength of pan-Islamic feeling was for Keddie very 
much linked to the encroachments of Western and Russian imperial powers in the 
Islamic world.  Although the Ottoman Sultan’s claim to be the Caliph were premised 
on dubious grounds on account of him not being of Arab descent, he was nevertheless 
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“the most powerful remaining Muslim ruler”,96 and requests for his assistance came 
from Muslims in India and throughout Central Asia. 
As well as a strong anti-imperialist dimension to greater calls for Islamic unity and 
pan-Islamism which Keddie rightly associates with tendencies of many nationalist 
movements, the emphasis of her argument where she sees important elements of pan-
Islamism as analogous to modern nationalist movements involves “aggressive cultural 
defensiveness…[and] a call for the revival of the best features of a distant past”.97  Pan-
Islamism does this by proclaiming the superiority of Muslims to others including most 
importantly within an anti-imperialist context, the Christian West and by recalling the 
‘golden age’ of Islam as an era to be emulated by Muslims in the present and future.  
These features of pan-Islamism, Keddie identifies in the thought and writings of Jamal 
al-Din al-Afghani who she calls “the leading ideological representative of the Pan-
Islamic trend in the late nineteenth century.”98  
The elements of Pan-Islamism Keddie highlights are clearly analogous to nationalist 
movements and she rightly identifies the importance of history and historical group 
attachment, ideas of cultural uniqueness and “golden ages” and anti-imperialism as 
being common features of many nationalist movements.  These were also noticeable 
elements within the thought of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani but while these are analogous, 
Keddie never demonstrates adequately, whether the view is that pan-Islamism 
represents the first stage of nationalism or is the precursor to nationalism?  
Furthermore, it is unclear what sort of nationalism emerges from Pan-Islamism.  
Would it be the individual nationalisms that emerged after the Ottoman defeat or is it 
the precursor to the broader Pan-Arab movement and its concomitant Arab nationalist 
movement?  Indeed, was Pan-Islamism a necessary pre-condition to nationalism in the 
Muslim world or did nationalisms simply adopt some of the elements of Pan-Islamism 
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which they thought would be useful and relevant characteristics of their own 
movement? 
On the case of Egypt, Keddie points out that “Egyptian nationalists, who prior to 1882 
had begun to speak of “Egypt for the Egyptians,” [after 1882 and British Occupation] 
became increasingly loyal to the Ottoman Sultan as the best feasible alternative to, and 
protection against, continued British Occupation.”99  She singles out Egypt’s 
relationship with the Ottoman Empire prior to 1882 as one where nationalism had 
already taken root but reverted back to Ottoman loyalty after its defeat by the British 
invasion of Egypt.  This view supports my argument which sees Pan-Islamic loyalties, 
in the Egyptian case, as existing side by side with the desire to be politically and 
nationally independent.  Pan-Islamism does not appear to be a prototype of nationalism 
neither does it seem to be a precursor to nationalism.  On the contrary, it existed 
alongside nationalism merged into the discourse of nationalist politics and provided 
elements to Egypt’s nationalist movement which for them represented powerful 
features of an Egyptian national identity and consciousness.  It is, as a final remark on 
Keddie’s article, worth pointing out that she concentrates on the work and thought of 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and shows how he “was able to switch back and forth from 
appeals to a single nation to appeals to the entire Islamic community without feeling 
any apparent contradiction.”100  While I agree with this perspective and indeed the 
compatibility of Islam and nationalism, Keddie demonstrates this on the basis of 
research on one religious scholar whereas my own research, attempts to make a similar 
case for Egypt by looking at a number of ‘ulama and their writings and debates.  
William L. Cleveland, assigns an equally important role in the Pan-Islamic movement 
to the Lebanese Druze writer, activist, politician and diplomat Amir Shakib Arslan 
(1869-1946),101 as Keddie does to al-Afghani.  Arslan met al-Afghani and later, 
according to Cleveland, “began a sustained personal relationship with the Egyptian 
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reformer Muhammad ‘Abduh.”102 The relationship with ‘Abduh and the example of 
al-Afghani, coupled with Arslan’s own experience of European penetration of Islamic 
territories in Egypt (1882), Algeria (1830), Tunisia (1881), Morocco (1912) and Libya 
(1911) and the prospect of a declining and diminishing Ottoman Empire sustaining 
losses of Ottoman territory in the Balkans, were decisive influences in making him 
into a “dedicated exponent of Islamic solidarity and an uncompromising Ottoman 
loyalist.”103  Like al-Afghani, Arslan saw the importance of Pan-Islamism and Islamic 
solidarity as the best response to European dominance of Islamic territories and he saw 
the Ottoman Empire as being the best vehicle by which to forge this Islamic unity. 
Cleveland notes that “Ottomanism is a difficult concept to define, but it was basically 
an attempt to generate feelings of Ottoman patriotism which could be embraced by all 
the subject peoples of the multinational Empire.”104  Arslan’s Ottomanism was 
primarily based on his desire for Islamic unity and he saw the Ottoman Empire as a 
politico-religious community attaching to it religious importance for Muslims but also 
seeing its political purpose as a political unit for Muslim territories.  In contrast to al-
Afghani’s Pan-Islamism which saw no contradiction between appealing for Islamic 
unity at the ‘national’or the Ottoman Pan-Islamic level, Arslan, prior to the Ottoman 
defeat in 1918 vehemently rejected the “nationalist organisation of society”105 and was 
critical of Arab separatist trends within the Empire.  For the purposes of this thesis, 
contrasting the views of the likes of al-Afghani, Arslan and ‘Abduh demonstrates what 
Dawn saw as the “the fluidity of opinions possible between the poles of his “ideal 
types of Ottomanism and Arabism”106  The fluidity that Dawn suggests meant that 
Arabism, Ottomanism and indeed nationalism could conceivably and often did overlap 
as facets of identity and loyalty.  So for instance, while ‘Abduh’s Arabism is striking 
– the idea that Arabs held a primary and superior bond with Islam – this did not 
necessarily conflict with his desire, in the years 1881 and 1882 where he was part of 
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the nationalist movement in Egypt, to see the continuation of the Ottoman Empire as 
the overarching structure of the Muslim ‘umma.  Even for a staunch anti-nationalist 
like Arslan, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and his failed attempts to revive 
it, Arslan became reconciled with the various ‘national’ attempts that emerged to resist 
French and British mandate rule.  Cleveland tells us that he became “an integral part 
of the Syro-Lebanese conflict with France, an actor in the Palestinian drama…mentor 
of a group of Moroccan nationalists…[and] involved with leading Algerian and 
Tunisian personalities.107 
The emergence of Arabism within the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century 
illustrates the ways in which Arab consciousness and identity for many were closely 
linked to Islam.  With the exception, I argue of the Egyptian nationalist revolt of 1879-
1882, Arab populations by and large did not display nationalist tendencies in terms of 
concerted efforts at achieving political independence from the Ottoman state.108  
Arabism emerged during the nineteenth century, linked as it was to an historical 
understanding of the unique links to Islam that the Arabs possessed.  This view, held 
by Arabs and many Ottoman Turks alike, considered the Arab people and the Arabic 
language as Allah’s preferred means of transmitting and disseminating Islam to the 
world.  However, despite Arabism becoming increasingly popular and emergent by 
the late nineteenth century, Ottomanism, with its association with the rule of the 
Sultan/Caliph as head of the Muslim ‘umma, who had expended considerable efforts 
in increasing his Islamic credentials as a way of encouraging the loyalty of his 
remaining, mainly Arab populated domains, remained the main institution to which 
Ottoman Arabs aligned themselves with.  At the political level, most Ottoman Arabs, 
with the exception of Egypt from around late 1881, considered the Ottoman Empire as 
the best option for protection against European imperialism but also, scholars 
including Albert Hourani and Hasan Kayali argue that “there were no lines of 
exclusion which kept the Arabs out of the Ottoman state and society.”109  In addition, 
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Hasan Kayali found that Arab Deputies in the first Ottoman Chamber of Deputies 
“were some of the most vocal, and often critical” with some Arab provinces under 
represented like Basra, Baghdad and Tripoli (Libya), while others like Aleppo and 
Syria were overrepresented.110  
My focus in this section so far on Arabism rather than Arab nationalism is premised 
on the fact that many scholars agree that Arab nationalism emerged in the aftermath 
of the Ottoman defeat which lies outside the scope of this study in terms of the period 
of study.  However, what much of the literature on Arab nationalism does show is the 
way in which Islam was intimately connected to the emergence of Arabism in the 
nineteenth century and a distinct Arab identity and consciousness which many scholars 
believe was the precursor and foundational basis of later expressions of Arab 
nationalism which emerged when the overarching structure of the Ottoman state had 
finally been disbanded in the early 1920s.  Islam made an important contribution to 
the meaning and basis of Arabism and Arab consciousness.  The Egyptian case of 
1879-1882 is important but unique in that I argue this was a nationalist movement 
during the time of the Ottoman Empire where many Ottoman Arabs remained loyal to 
the Ottoman Sultan.  The crucial point here is that Egyptian pro-nationalist ‘ulama – 
both reformist and conservative – joined forces with ‘Urabi’s nationalist movement to 
press for political independence while at the same time asserting their loyalty to the 
Ottoman Empire and Sultan as an integral member of the ‘umma.  In this way, they 
sought to draw a distinction between Egypt’s Islamic ties and membership of the 
Muslim ‘umma on the one hand, and on the other its right to political independence 
and national sovereignty based on its own distinct national consciousness. 
But if scholars have demonstrated the importance and role of Islam in the rise of 
Arabism in the nineteenth century and how Pan-Islamism can show very similar traits 
to nationalist movements, some scholars have also looked at the question of Islam’s 
role in the making of Egyptian national identity and “nationality.”  Two works in 
particular deserve some attention here.  The first is Michael Gasper’s book which 
“traces the emergence of modern Egyptian identity from the last third of the nineteenth 
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century to the first quarter of the twentieth century.”111  Gasper focuses on the 
emergence of two important social groups – the new urban intelligentsia and the 
Islamic modernist movement and shows how through their depictions and views of 
Egypt’s majority peasant population, they were able to forge a new Egyptian identity.  
Importantly, Gasper ties religion and in particular “the burgeoning Islamic modernist 
movement to the process of identity formation…[and] shows how religion became an 
integral part of modern Egyptian political, social and cultural life.”112 
The assumption by Gasper that religion was at some point not an integral part of these 
elements of modern Egyptian life, leads one to question Gasper’s base assumption.  
Yaseen Noorani, in contrast argues that “to understand the nature and logic of modern 
normative concepts, it is necessary to trace their emergence from pre-existing norms 
and to focus on what it means, in both cases, for individuals and societies to be 
ordered.”113  Noorani, like Gasper is concerned not so much with nationalism as he is 
with the idea and underlying normative structure of the logic of nationality.  He states 
that his aims are to explore the “nature of nationality as a moral ideal” and also to look 
at how this new moral ideal relates to older ones “already present in literate Arabic 
culture.”114 The focal point of Gasper’s enquiry is to explore the shifts, influences and 
transformations of Egyptian national identity within the context of an emerging urban 
intelligentsia and Islamic modernism which was, at the end of the nineteenth century 
a prominent intellectual force in Egypt.  Gasper points out that “the construction of 
modern Egyptian identity was a political and social project. The ideal of Egyptian-ness 
embodied in the figure of the civilised, urban, and literate sophisticate was not a mood, 
a trope, an image, or an intellectual development; rather it was a claim to political 
authority on the part of a rising social formation.”115 
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Noorani’s complex schema looks at the abstract relationship between desire and order 
both on an individual and communal level and argues that order is maintained in the 
“premodern Arabic intellectual tradition” by the ideal of virtue.116 Premodern 
communal order is maintained by virtuous figures, who for Noorani are those few 
people who have mastered and been able to control their individual desires through 
reason and adherence to divine commandments who are then able to command social 
and political authority.  In contrast, Noorani suggests that “the representation of 
nationality, however, alters the relationship between desire and order by transferring 
the locus of communal order from virtuous figures of authority to the national body as 
a whole.”117  The nation and therefore the ideal of nationality becomes the moral 
repository of communal order and while individual desire remains prone to deviation 
and acts of ‘chaos’, the ideal of nationality channels and regulates this propensity in 
the modern period.  But the nation – a moral community – must define itself and 
Noorani explains that “[a]rt, particularly literary art, takes up the task of representing 
an innate human nature that is initially, and thus inherently outside of moral order but 
yet gives rise to it.”118  In this respect, Noorani explores the literary, reformist and 
political writings of four authors spanning the periodization of his book from the late 
nineteenth century to the mid twentieth century.  What these authors put forward are 
various social and moral commentaries of the community, its ills and strategies for 
moral as well as social transformation and change.  In these accounts, Noorani argues 
that each author reveals different conditions and criteria depicting an integrated 
national community which provoked the formulation of a varied set of remedies which 
did not rely solely on liberal secular ideals but often made use of an older set of beliefs 
and concepts which were integrated into and applied by these authors to create the 
moral, social and political parameters and content of communal order which they saw 
as being embodied in the ideal of nationality and in the nation. 
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The analysis of Sami al-Barudi’s poetry in particular, a leading figure in the ‘Urabi 
movement, reveals no mention of Islam and the role that it plays perhaps not overtly, 
but in some of al-Barudi’s depictions of a moral order.  Tyranny, enslavement, 
individual moral corruption are all themes and messages that Noorani explains are 
within the content of the poems.  If these were all themes and ideas that were 
constituent parts of formulating a communal order and a new normative framework 
and were an attempt to make use of pre-modern moral ideals to forge a modern moral 
order and community, how would these themes have been interpreted by a society 
where Islam was a major contributor to moral values – both individual and communal 
– and remained so into the modern period?  The ideal of nationality that Noorani 
wishes to explore is pertinent and important given the transformation in the nature of 
communal loyalty from pre-modern attachments and communal bonds to those of the 
nation in the modern era.  However, Noorani takes us on a mostly abstract journey “to 
sketch a genealogy of modern moral and social ideals” without exploring the social 
and moral attachments that individuals and Egyptian society would have had in the 
nineteenth century and how these might have changed given a new set of institutions 
and ideals aimed at transferring authority from virtuous figures of authority to a 
national body.  In other ways though, Noorani’s work is important in that if forces us 
to look at normative frameworks of society and moral ideals which define society and 
the ways in which these are transformed not by wholesale replacement by new ideals 
and values but very much part of a continuing process, where a “putative logic of social 
development can efface existing concepts and values and produce the concepts and 
values it requires directly out of itself.”119 Echoing this approach, my own work seeks 
to locate and illuminate some of the continuities between conceptions of community 
in the ‘umma and how, in particular the ‘ulama, made sense of these in an age of 
nationalism and were able to articulate continuity with older notions of communal 
identity. 
Gasper’s approach is to “tell the story of Egypt’s nascent middle classes – a 
protobourgeosie made up of teachers, engineers, doctors, journalists and lawyers – 
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crafting a new kind of social, political and moral outlook that neatly complemented 
their own political aspirations.”120  These aspirations, Gasper tells us were linked to 
putting forward a “gendered, classed and “civilized” subject…as the primary agent in 
Egypt’s social and political life.”121  This new middle class used the depiction of the 
peasants, first as a social group that needed radical change and development if they 
were to be part of the new vision for Egypt which was to rid itself from foreign 
domination and to increase agricultural production.  Then as the “timeless repository 
of Egyptian-ness,”122 a depiction that they linked themselves to in order to lend greater 
authority and authenticity to their own class interests.   
Gasper sees the Islamic modernist movement as an integral actor in these debates in 
the respect that Islamic modernists were at the forefront of debates about the ills of 
foreign domination and the need for Islamic unity to dispel European encroachment in 
Egypt.  In chapter four of this thesis, I argue that the debates within ‘ulama circles 
around issues related to the interpretation of legal and sacred texts were not confined 
to religious debates but intimately linked to wider reform issues such as educational 
reform and legal reform and the nature of the political and cultural identity of Egypt.  
Gasper makes a similar point when he remarks that the “ramifications of this project 
reach beyond a narrow discussion of Islamic jurisprudence or ritual, for the ethos of 
Islamic reform left a very distinct impression on the emergent social formation of the 
‘afandiya.”123 
In this thesis however, and in terms of offering a critique of Gasper’s work, I attempt 
to focus not only on the Islamic modernist movement in showing how Islam was 
important to nation building and indeed nationalism in the years 1879-1882, but in 
showing some of the debates that occurred between reformist and conservative clerics 
on the issue of nationalism and in particular the events of the ‘Urabi revolt.  In contrast, 
Gasper focuses on the Islamic modernists but these debates were occurring in many 
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circles in the mosques and madaaris up and down the country.  Furthermore, both 
Gasper and Noorani miss the relevance of the ‘Urabi revolt in bringing these issues 
and debates to the fore and into public debate.  However, Gasper’s work is important 
in showing how the emergent urban elite and the Islamic modernists were together 
involved in debating the kind of society, in the modern period they wished Egypt to 
become.  The role of Islam was important in this respect because even the urban elite 
were aware of the cultural and social importance of Islam to society.   
Prelude to Nationalism: Egypt During the Nineteenth Century 
Scholarly analysis of the events leading up to and including the ‘Urabi Revolt appear 
broadly as three distinct sets of literature.  First, there exists a substantial body of 
literature on the general history of Egypt in the nineteenth century.  Secondly, there 
exists a modest body of writings that looks specifically at the Revolt of 1879–1882 
drawing on a variety of sources from English, Arabic, French and Turkish.124  Lastly, 
there is a number of memoirs and commentaries written by Egyptians and Europeans 
describing the events prior to and during the revolt years.  The Egyptian accounts were 
mainly written by Egyptian protagonists of the Revolt such as Sheikh Muhammad 
‘Abduh and Ahmed ‘Urabi himself and others who were close to the events or the 
people leading the events.  The European accounts are by the British officials resident 
in Egypt at the time or European travellers who demonstrated a fascination with Egypt 
and the political demands it was making at the time. These include the invaluable 
account by W. S. Blunt.125  My research has drawn substantially on all of these sets of 
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literature and I will below set out some of the limits and main criticisms I have of the 
general literature.  
In his history of Egypt from Muhammad ‘Ali to Sadat, P. J. Vatikiotis126 pays little 
attention to the ‘Urabi Revolt of 1879–1882 compared to other periods and events 
covered in his book.  After discussing the rise of Muhammad ‘Ali and the social, 
economic and political transformation of Egypt during the nineteenth century, he 
concludes that: 
political developments in the period 1866–82 cannot … be fully appreciated 
outside the context of the educational and cultural advances of the same period, 
or outside the context of the financial difficulties which brought European 
control over the Khedival government.127   
Vatikiotis is referring to the rapid transformation which impacted on many spheres of 
Egyptian society in this period and which began with Muhammad ‘Ali’s rise to power.  
Along with greater levels of autonomy for Egypt from the Ottoman Empire came other 
socio-economic and cultural changes, which transformed Egypt.  Arabic replaced 
Turkish as the official state language in the 1860s128 and Egypt increasingly looked 
towards Europe for trade and finance.  Attempts to centralize and develop the state 
along modern bureaucratic lines were made and the educational sphere in Egypt was 
widened: non-religious subjects became increasingly available within the new civil 
school system.  Although in Gellnerian terms, industrialisation129 and its implications 
for nationalism did not occur until much later, during the middle of the next century, 
the massive transformation Egypt experienced during the nineteenth century did 
introduce profound political changes which, according to Vatikiotis “for the first time 
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produced a local opposition to the Khedive”130 and led to the emergence of the ‘Urabi 
movement between 1879–1882.   
The account of events during the reign of Khedive Isma’il (r.1863–1879) is broadly 
similar in this and other books and Vatikiotis argues, like many others, that the political 
crisis was brought about by the pressures put on Egypt through its debt crisis, European 
domination, local resentment over Turco-Circassian elitism and the increasing powers 
of the constitutional movement, which was able to oppose the Khedive through the 
newly formed Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab (Consultative Assembly, or Council of 
Deputies) in 1866.131  Egypt’s debt crisis placed enormous strain on the population, 
with both the fellahin (peasants) and the urban lower middle classes aggressively taxed 
in order to service the state’s debt payments to the European powers who had lent most 
of the money for Egypt’s regeneration from the 1860s onwards.132   
These same class groups had, by the end of the nineteenth century, faced almost a 
century of tough economic measures.  From the latter part of the eighteenth century, 
they were taxed aggressively, this time in order to ensure the tribute was paid to the 
Ottoman Sultan to retain the autonomy Egypt had carved out and enjoyed from the 
Sublime Porte.133  In the political realm, Vatikiotis emphasises the role of the 
constitutional movement, which he says was dominated by the Turco-Circassian elites, 
and argues that, by paving the way for constitutional change and allowing opposition 
to his rule – albeit in a limited sense – Khedive Isma’il “opened a Pandora’s Box from 
which emerged the first Egyptian rebels”.134   
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However, measuring the achievements of the constitutional movement in Egypt, it 
becomes apparent that the movement was in fact largely unsuccessful.  The Majlis 
Shura al-Nuwwab lacked real powers, a fact confirmed by Ahmad Shafique in his 
memoirs when he commented that the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab was established so 
that Khedive Isma’il could appear to his European benefactors as a “constitutional 
monarch, permitting some public participation in power, to avoid the charge of 
absolutism”.135  
Further, many historians of Egypt have questioned the motives and achievements of 
the constitutional movement while others have disagreed with the dominant view that 
sees the movement as exclusively Turco-Circassian in ethnic origin.  Ibrahim Abu-
Lughod offers an interesting perspective arguing that:  
[b]y 1879 they [the constitutionalists] appeared to have achieved a good 
measure of success in their endeavour, but the emptiness of their victory became 
apparent immediately after their triumph when they were confronted with the 
nascent power of the alien European elite.136   
Indeed, the weakness of the constitutional movement appears glaringly obvious when 
we see their record in government.  For instance, Muhammad Sharif Pasha, leader of 
the constitutionalists and a member of the Turco-Circassian nobility, assumed the role 
of Prime Minister of Egypt on two occasions before the British invasion of Egypt in 
1882 and both times his government was short lived, lasting no more than five 
months.137   
The inherent weakness of the constitutional movement may be explained in two ways.  
In the first instance, most scholars view the old Turco-Circassian nobility as 
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representing the bulk of the constitutional movement.  Prior to Isma’il’s forced 
abdication in 1879, they were able to secure a range of constitutional changes and 
looked to be the major opposition group checking Khedival rule.138  However, after 
the accession of Isma’il’s son Tawfiq to the Khedival throne, the situation changed 
and the constitutionalists were overtaken by ‘Urabi’s nationalist movement.  The 
constitutionalists were widely seen as a narrow elite movement seeking to bolster only 
their own political capital in an attempt to protect and further their own economic class 
interests.  In this way, the constitutionalists were seen as representing only the narrow 
interests of the Turco-Circassian nobility and not the vast bulk of the Egyptian people.   
Secondly, being Turco-Circassian, they were seen as ethnically different from the vast 
majority of native Egyptians.  The Ottoman Empire had implicitly approved of the 
favouritism Khedive Isma’il had shown the Turco-Circassians by acquiescing to their 
promotions over and above those awarded to native Egyptians within government 
ministries and the Egyptian army.  So, ostensibly because of their ethnic background 
and their privileged positions within Egyptian society, they were seen as an extension 
of Ottoman and Khedival rule and consequently unable to attract popular support. 
However, Abu-Lughod’s analysis of the transformation of the Egyptian elite during 
the nineteenth century disagrees with the standard view of Turco-Circassian ethnic 
exclusivity.  He argues that the ethnic composition and character of this group had 
been transformed dramatically over the course of the nineteenth century and the Turco-
Circassian constitutionalists were now, in the main, “identical with the indigenous 
population except in prestige”.139  According to Abu-Lughod, after coming to power, 
Muhammad ‘Ali set about dispersing and diluting those social groups that represented 
a threat to his monopoly on power.  At the apex of society were the governing elites, 
exclusively Turco-Circassian in origin and firmly dominating the social, economic and 
political spheres of society.140  
                                                 
138
 Landau, op. cit. Parliaments and Parties, pp.16–27.  
139
 Abu-Lughod, op. cit. ‘Transformation of the Egyptian Elite’, p.334. 
140
 Ibid., p.327. 
Chapter 2/ Islam and Nationalism: Theoretical Reflections and the Case of Egypt 
95 
 
At this point, this elite social group were mainly concentrated in Cairo but after 
Muhammad ‘Ali’s rise to power and his determination to remove potential threats to 
his own rule, he forced them to abandon their positions in Cairo and to retreat to the 
countryside where, in many cases, they possessed large parcels of land and were forced 
to “renounce their old occupations and begin to build a new pattern of life”.141  Over 
the course of the nineteenth century, the old Turco-Circassian elites assimilated into 
life in the countryside and the social networks of the rural communities.  They married 
into native Egyptian families – ethnic differences being put aside in the face of 
religious affinities – and lost many of the features of their specific Turco-Circassian 
identity including everyday use of the Turkish language in favour of Arabic.  Likewise, 
with each generation, the Turco-Circassian ethnic identity became more and more 
obscure until by the 1870s, according to Abu-Lughod, it “had lost its meaning”.142   
It is uncertain whether Turco-Circassian identity entirely lost its meaning.  What we 
can be certain of, however, is that Turco-Circassian ethnic identity had changed 
significantly over the course of the nineteenth century and its perception amongst 
native Egyptians also changed over this time.  From accepting them as the landed elite 
nobility at the beginning of the nineteenth century, native Egyptians had changed their 
attitudes towards the Turco-Circassian elite by the last quarter of the century and were 
much less prepared to accept their prestigious status.   
However, while most scholarly opinion is in agreement over the constitutional 
movement being overtaken by ‘Urabi’s nationalist movement from 1879 onwards, 
none of the scholars have attributed this weakness to the constitutional movement’s 
largely secular nature.  Muhammad Sharif Pasha’s constitutional movement was in no 
way a religious movement and insofar as it was ‘nationalist’, it never made any attempt 
to incorporate Islam or indeed other features of Egyptian national identity into its 
specific nationalist discourse.  Vatikiotis is uncertain “whether Sharif could have 
attracted the ‘ulama, landowners and other elements in the Assembly … to his camp 
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away from the Orabists”.143  However, the point is that he did not and, more important, 
he made very little attempt to do so.  The constitutional movement made no religious 
appeal and possessed very narrow ‘nationalist’ aims that centred almost entirely 
around limiting the role of the Khedive, increasing the powers of the Assembly and 
assuming a more prominent role in negotiations with the European powers in trying to 
repay the country’s debts.144  Without questioning the importance of these aims, it is 
important to underline that they were not only elite driven but, more important, their 
appeal was pitched at the elite level without ever rousing the imagination and 
sentiments of the masses. 
In contrast, ‘Urabi’s movement had a much broader national appeal because it was 
seen as a movement headed by Egyptians for Egyptians.  Initially, it emerged as a 
protest movement against the favouritism shown to Turco-Circassian military officers 
over their native Egyptian counterparts.145  This has led a number of scholars to view 
the protest as driven by ethnic difference between Turco-Circassians and native 
Egyptians.146  This perspective fails to account for the fact that ‘Urabi himself was 
responsible for insisting that Muhammad Sharif Pasha – a Turco-Circassian – assume 
the role of Prime Minister and form the government after the first major standoff 
between ‘Urabi’s nationalist movement and Khedive Tawfiq in September 1881.  
‘Urabi’s own social origins and those of his fellow army officers were from humble 
rural backgrounds with which many Egyptians could easily and readily identify.147  As 
well as possessing native Egyptian origins and a modest social status, an important 
ingredient of ‘Urabi’s appeal was his ability to portray his national struggle as one that 
also sought to re-establish Egypt’s Islamic identity and heritage, as I will show in later 
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chapters.  For many Egyptians, the years of European domination had brought 
unprecedented levels of economic hardship but also a deep sense of cultural and 
religious alienation that ‘Urabi, with his native Egyptian background and the emphasis 
he placed on Egypt’s Islamic identity, promised to address.148 
It is one of the major contentions of this thesis that there is a lack of analysis of the 
role of the ‘ulama in the ‘Urabi Revolt and one of my aims is to address this deficiency 
in the literature on this subject.  Given the importance of the ‘ulama and their role as 
guardians of the faith and the most authoritative voices in Islam, by ignoring to a large 
extent the role of ‘ulama, scholars have also failed to address and appreciate the Islamic 
dimension of the ‘Urabi Revolt.  Although initially ‘Urabi’s protest movement sought 
to reinstate the rights and status of native Egyptian army officers in the military, as the 
movement gathered strength and evolved into a wider national movement that 
increasingly addressed broader national issues, ‘Urabi linked these to Egypt’s Islamic 
identity and portrayed nationalist concerns as being crucial to the protection of Egypt’s 
Islamic identity and heritage.   
In this endeavour, his most valuable constituency were the Egyptian ‘ulama – who by 
no means displayed a common position towards ‘Urabi and his nationalist movement.  
In fact, the ‘ulama remained divided and uncertain of their positions, with some 
deciding to side with the Khedive, others rejecting ‘Urabi’s growing popularity and 
opposition to the Khedive and his ever increasing claims for national independence 
from both the Khedive and the Ottoman Sultan.  However, it is also true that many 
supported ‘Urabi and, while some scholars have recognised this,149 there has been no 
attempt in the literature on the ‘Urabi Revolt to focus on this group and to explain their 
complex positions in relation to the emergence of Egyptian nationalism and the ‘Urabi 
Revolt.  Given the central importance of Islam to Egyptian society in the late 
nineteenth century, and the ‘ulama’s religious and moral prominence, the absence of 
analysis of these features of the Revolt constitutes a major weakness in our 
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understanding of the event itself and the ways in which Islam constituted a central 
component to the nationalist movement. 
The ‘Urabi Revolt, 1879–1882 
Apart from the coverage given to the ‘Urabi Revolt in the more general literature which 
looks at nineteenth century Egyptian history, two books, by Juan Cole150 and 
Alexander Schölch,151 that explore in greater detail the particular events of the Revolt 
have been for a long time the most authoritative texts in the field.  Other works on the 
‘Urabi Revolt (al-Thawra al-‘Urabi) in Arabic by scholars like Latifah Salim152 and 
the prolific early twentieth century writer Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i153 are either too 
descriptive or have a far too rigid class analysis.154  Despite these limiting features, 
these and other works by Arabic scholars offer substantial background to the subject 
and a valuable resource for checking, corroborating and providing starting points for 
researchers exploring the vast untapped and largely disorganised archives.155  In 
contrast, both Cole’s and Schölch’s texts attempt to look closely at the nature of the 
‘Urabi movement and its underlying causes, although the two texts look at the events 
through very different prisms.  Schölch’s prism is essentially political and is a 
microscopic view of the unfolding political events between the years 1879 and 1882, 
while Cole’s book is a socio-cultural analysis of the conditions under which the Revolt 
emerged. Cole’s work attempts to combine sociological analysis, revolutionary theory 
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and actual events, much like Theda Skocpol’s seminal work on the French, Russian 
Chinese and Iranian Revolutions.156  
Schölch’s analysis focuses almost entirely on the elites: those of a pro-Khedival nature 
within the Khedival government and the top military officials and those of the anti-
Khedival perspective, the new emerging local elites from both the revolutionary ‘Urabi 
camp and the gradualist constitutionalist camp of Muhammad Sharif Pasha.  
Criticising Schölch’s book, Cole remarks that, “the social dimensions of the 
Revolution escape Schölch”.157  In contrast, Cole tries to counter-balance elite-driven 
analysis by introducing a genuine attempt at analysing wider social forces, bringing 
into the picture groups such as peasants, guilds and intellectuals, and considering the 
particular class interests of these groups.  Indeed, he argues, “[e]conomic and 
demographic change and the growth of state power created new interests among the 
three strata that most participated later in the Revolution”.158 
Although the texts employ different analytical frameworks, there are significant points 
of agreement.  Both agree, for instance, that the ‘Urabi Revolt ended up being a 
convergence of social groups or forces, all with their own separate grievances against 
the Khedive and his government.  Schölch terms these “autochthonous social 
groups”159 to include army officers, lower ranked ‘ulama and indigenous journalists, 
who, he argues “stood in the forefront of this struggle”.160  Similarly Cole draws 
roughly the same conclusion on the social groups participating in the revolt but extends 
the boundaries somewhat to include “the rural population, the urban guilds and the 
intelligentsia … [who] were united by reference to a common enemy”.161  For both 
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scholars, the common enemy or struggle was directed against the Khedive Isma’il and 
later in 1879, after Isma’il’s abdication, his successor, Khedive Tawfiq.  Grievances 
centred on over-taxation of the rural peasants and guilds, unequal treatment of 
Egyptian army officers in relation to their Turco-Circassian counterparts and, for the 
‘ulama, Schölch tells us that “as a social group, the ‘ulama had not recovered from 
Muhammad ‘Ali’s blows economically and politically”.162  Cole also points towards 
the impact of “economic and social change in the 1860s and 1870s on the peasants, 
guilds and intellectuals”.163  These are significant claims that both authors make 
without critically examining the source or strength of such claims.  Consequently, both 
authors follow the dominant paradigm that sees the ‘ulama during this period losing 
their political power and influence.  As a result, the full extent of and the complexities 
behind the ‘ulama’s role in the ‘Urabi Revolt and the Revolt’s Islamic dimension in 
large part escapes both authors. 
On the role of Islam as a social force, both Cole and Schölch recognise this but in very 
limited ways.  For Schölch, the Revolution’s Islamic dimension is apparent, first, in 
the role of the ‘ulama, where he says that in the pre-Revolutionary period, senior 
‘ulama such as “Sheikh al-Bakri and Sheikh al-Idwi were won over” to the nationalist 
cause and in fact Sheikh al-Idwi preached in mosques against Ryad Pasha and the 
European Ministries”.164  Both Cole and Schölch rightly draw attention to the la’iha 
Wataniyya (National Declaration or Manifesto) by the National Party on 2 April 1879.  
Reflecting their particular perspectives, Schölch argues that this was adopted in the 
presence of senior ‘ulama like Sheikh al-Bakri, Sheikh al-Idwi and Sheikh 
Khalfawi,165 while Cole argues that the “religious and military branches of the 
intelligentsia supplied nearly half of the signatures”.166  Their general remarks continue 
in this same manner.  Cole, for instance, points towards the fact that “many of the 
Muslim high clergy or ‘ulama ended up siding with the Khedive, though ‘ulama did 
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form one branch of the revolutionary intelligentsia”.167  Both also agree that the 
emergence of ‘Urabi and the nationalist movement created for the ‘ulama a difficult 
and complex situation whereby they had to consider not only their relations with the 
Khedive but also those with the Ottoman Sultan and Egypt’s position in the Islamic 
‘umma.168 
While it is correct to point out the complexities in the ‘ulama’s position, both within 
the nationalist movement and in the anti-nationalist camp, neither author explores 
these considerations with enough depth.  The ‘ulama are just one social group of many 
that both authors are trying to cover and, as a result, treatment of the ‘ulama and their 
views, opinions and positions in relation to the various political currents is only 
minimally and inadequately explored. In too general a way, both authors put ‘ulama 
into simplistic binary positions almost entirely dependent on their official or non-
official status or on the basis of presumed loyalties towards the Ottoman Sultan and 
by extension the Khedive.169  In fact, the ‘ulama displayed much more nuanced and 
complex positions in response to the changing political situation in the years 1879–
1882 and the emergence of ‘Urabi and the nationalist movement.  Indeed, the 
pioneering work of more recent scholars like Indira Falk Gesink and Meir Hatina, 
analysing the ‘ulama in the nineteenth century, has shown that some of the most 
conservative ‘ulama were, contrary to the dominant paradigms in studies on the 
‘ulama, pro-nationalist and indeed were leaders and the most vociferous supporters of 
‘Urabi and the nationalist movement.170  
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Given the importance of the ‘Urabi Revolt as Egypt’s first expression of nationalism 
while still being part of the Ottoman Empire with the Sultan widely recognised as 
being the head of the Islamic ‘umma,171 it is astonishing that there exists no dedicated 
study on the role of Islam and of the ‘ulama in the ‘Urabi Revolt.  Cole and Schölch’s 
work is a valuable initial analysis of the ‘ulama’s position but, as discussed above, falls 
short of being adequate in numerous ways.  On the other hand, while Hatina provides 
a clear focused analysis of the ‘Urabi Revolt and the role of the ‘ulama, his departure 
points and main subjects of analyses are not the role of Islam in the emergence of 
Egyptian nationalism or the wider and more theoretical issue of the relationship of 
religion to nationalism.  Gesink’s work makes a significant contribution to studying 
the ‘ulama and she argues that much of the attention of scholars of the ‘ulama has been 
upon those modernist ‘ulama such as Muhammad ‘Abduh, resulting in a dominant 
narrative that sees conservative ‘ulama as “opponents of reform and enemies of 
progress”.172  Her main focus is the reform of al-Azhar and educational reform debates 
in Egypt in the nineteenth century and, by showing that conservative ‘ulama had 
significant contributions to make to these debates during this time, her analysis opens 
the door and shows how, even within the political sphere, both conservative and 
reformist ‘ulama remained active and their political positions, while complex, did in 
some cases converge on important political issues.173  Hatina shares this view but his 
main thesis is to re-assess the position of the ‘ulama as my research does and to move 
away from another dominant narrative that sees the ‘ulama being deposed throughout 
the nineteenth century from their traditional position of authority and political power.  
He agrees that, in the first part of the nineteenth century, ‘ulama political and economic 
influence was removed but argues that “Muhammad ‘Ali’s reformist program … failed 
to weaken their [the ‘ulama’s] status as the country’s intellectual elite and the 
attractiveness of al-Azhar as an institution of religious learning”.174  While I agree with 
Hatina’s point, my purpose is to demonstrate that, having retained many of their social 
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functions and protected their religious spheres and intellectual and moral dominance, 
the ‘ulama used these resources to play an active role in the nationalist movement.  
From both an organisational and mobilising perspective, by urging people to support 
the movement and by giving the movement religious legitimacy and by providing 
intellectual weight to the movement, ‘ulama were dominant and were at the core of 
Egyptian nationalism. 
Both scholars provide a clear and compelling reassessment of the traditional and 
hitherto dominant work on the ‘ulama and their reactions to modernisation in the 
nineteenth century by scholars such as Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot and Daniel 
Crecelius in the 1960s and 1970s whose overreliance on modernisation theory limited 
the theories and understandings of processes of secularisation and how these might be 
different in the Islamic world.  Hatina makes the important point that secularisation in 
Egypt did not occur:  
in the sense of the separation of religion and state.  Rather, it took the form of 
the penetration of the state into areas that traditionally had been under the 
control of the religious establishment such as the waqf (charitable endowment), 
the educational system and the judiciary.175 
On these fundamental questions, further research is needed to identify precisely the 
extent to which the state did in fact penetrate these traditional realms.  In the next 
chapter I offer an alternative perspective on the ways the ‘ulama reacted to reforms 
and address the nature of these reforms and how the government reforms may have 
failed to challenge many of the traditional realms of the ‘ulama.  Further clarification 
on these issues will provide a greater sense of the ‘ulama’s ability to resist state 
encroachment and retain popular influence and moral authority among the masses, 
significant factors that were retained through the nineteenth century and that were 
important features in the ‘ulama’s support of ‘Urabi and the emerging nationalist 
movement. 
 
                                                 
175
 Ibid., p.29. 
 104 
 
Chapter Three 
Changing Fortunes: The Rise and Fall of ‘Ulama Power? 
In Egypt, the ‘ulama had assumed a powerful political status by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.  During the period of Ottoman/Mamluk rule (1517–1798), 
characterised by Ottoman weakness and in-fighting between Mamluk tribes, the 
‘ulama were able to take advantage of the uncertain situation and amass considerable 
wealth and political influence. By advising Mamluk leaders and mediating in their 
internal conflicts, ‘ulama were often rewarded with cultivatable land, urban property 
and lavish gifts.1  More importantly, in advising Mamluk Beys, they also found 
themselves possessing considerable political influence by being at the centre of the 
political sphere. Even Napoleon recognised the ‘ulama’s importance and attempted to 
rule Egypt in collaboration with the ‘ulama in the hope that this would prevent 
widespread local opposition to his occupation of Egypt in 1798.  But, while some 
‘ulama supported Napoleon, others protested against French occupation and the 
‘ulama quickly became one of the leading groups in anti-French demonstrations and 
protests with the mosque/university complex of Al-Azhar becoming the intellectual 
and political heart of anti-French sentiment. 
The ‘ulama demonstrated their capacity to act independently and influence the political 
process when they defied the authority of the then Ottoman Vali (Governor) to help 
elevate Muhammad ‘Ali to power in 1801.  Soon after Muhammad ‘Ali’s emergence, 
however, the ‘ulama’s political status began to decline and continued to wane steadily 
over the course of the nineteenth century.  The ‘ulama became politically marginalised 
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which many scholars consider to result from their loss of economic and financial 
privileges, a process initiated by Muhammad ‘Ali himself.2   
The ‘ulama’s prominence in opposing the French occupation of Egypt (1798–1801) 
and their central role in Muhammad ‘Ali’s elevation to power in Egypt from the 
Ottoman General in Egypt to Ottoman Governor (1801–1805) demonstrate the extent 
of their political influence at this point.  Many scholars have argued that, in gradually 
losing their wealth and economic privileges over the course of the nineteenth century, 
the ‘ulama were largely removed from the political decision-making process in Egypt.  
My contention is that, damaging as these measures were for the ‘ulama’s political role 
in society, the evidence suggests that their religious, pedagogical and religio-legal 
functions remained relatively undiminished. Thus, in a country where mass religiosity 
existed and where the ‘ulama remained dominant in the religious, educational and legal 
spheres, they continued to be an important social group with considerable moral 
authority right up to the ‘Urabi Revolt of 1881–1882. 
Mamluk Egypt and the ‘Ulama 
When the Ottoman Sultan Salim I conquered Mamluk Egypt in 1517, his loyal 
Janissaries were left in Egypt to check and balance the power of the Ottoman Vali.  
The defeated Mamluks were permitted to continue to participate in the running of 
Egypt only after pledging their allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan.  They were appointed 
governors of various provinces or regions of Egypt and were accountable to the 
Ottoman Vali and ultimately the Sultan.  This tripartite relationship between the 
Janissaries, the Vali and the Mamluk Beys was fraught with difficulties and eventually 
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culminated in the “ascendancy of the Mamluk Beys so that by 1700, the Vali in Egypt 
was all but a pawn in their hands”.3 
Although the Mamluks controlled and effectively governed Egypt, their system of rule 
and bitter infighting led to widespread conflict and lawlessness throughout Egypt and 
to great uncertainty and instability.4  With the ‘ulama already possessing considerable 
moral influence among the population and rulers alike, and their right to participate in 
matters of government already well established, even though some leading ‘ulama 
vehemently rejected the ‘ulama in political roles, they assumed the role of mediators 
and advisors to the warring Mamluks.  Often, when contending Mamluk Beys could 
not settle differences and the infighting between them degenerated into open warfare, 
prominent ‘ulama were called upon to mediate and decide on amicable solutions.  In 
the words of al-Jabarti, an Al-Azhar ‘alim, Sheikh and chronicler of the time, “the 
‘ulama were there to serve as intermediaries with the rulers”.5  Al-Jabarti tells us 
further that the trust between Mamluks and ‘ulama originated from the fact that many 
“Mamluks had been reared in the laps of the ‘ulama, read the Quran, studied the Shari’a 
and went on the Hajj”.6  This encouraged reverence and adoration for the ‘ulama on 
the part of the Mamluks and an admiration and respect for their way of life and their 
wisdom. 
The relationship between ‘ulama and Mamluk Beys was by no means one-sided: 
prominent ‘ulama also came to regard the Mamluks with considerable favour.  Many 
‘ulama were dependent on the Mamluks for the wealth they had amassed and for their 
prominence within society.  Moreover, ‘ulama were:  
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dependent on Mamluks for their livelihood, they had attached themselves to 
Mamluk Houses and were given livings by them.  They visited those Mamluks 
who had religious tendencies, or literary pretensions, they intermarried with 
them and some wealthy ‘ulama even came to possess Mamluks of their own.7 
This role of the ‘ulama as intermediaries between Mamluk factions had also enabled 
them to amass great wealth and they were often rewarded by various Mamluk Beys 
with tracts of land and urban property, which gave them an independent and, in many 
cases, sizeable source of income as multazim (tax farmers).  The wealth of the ‘ulama 
was not just vast but was, to a large extent, immune from taxation by the Ottoman 
authorities and Mamluk Beys.8 
The fact that many ‘ulama controlled and possessed vast amounts of rural cultivable 
lands, urban property and other sources of wealth has prompted many social historians 
of Egypt to see them as a distinct social class.9  However, for all their wealth, they 
lacked military strength and a clear centralised leadership and organisation.  
Historically, the social structure of Islamic society was made up of two elite groups 
that held authority over the people.  In the temporal realm, the Caliph and his military 
were ‘the men of the sword’ while the ‘ulama in the spiritual realm were ‘the men of 
the pen’.10  If the authority of the Mamluks stemmed from their ability to exercise 
coercive force over the population, the “authority of the ‘ulama stemmed from their 
use of moral and religious sanctions which, in a society dominated by religion and 
tradition was in fact formidable”.11  As a result of mainly three factors – the moral 
weight of the ‘ulama in society, their largely independent economic power and status, 
and the role they had filled in mediating between Mamluk Beys – by the eighteenth 
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century the ‘ulama often braved “the displeasure of Pashas and Beys and were able to 
oppose the rulers with some measure of success and were even able to lead movements 
of opposition”.12 
By the late eighteenth century, Egypt was experiencing social unrest in both the 
villages and urban centres.  The taxation demands of the Ottoman sultanate on the 
Mamluks meant that the latter were imposing extortionate taxes on the fellahin and the 
urban guilds in order to pay the tribute due to the Ottoman Sultan and keep him out of 
direct involvement in Egypt.  Thus, the ‘ulama were frequently called upon to keep 
the peace without the use of force.  Al-Jabarti cites an incident in 1785 when:  
Ibrahim Bey, then Amir al-Hajj, made the rounds to the ulama, namely Shaykhs 
al-Bakri, al-Arusi and al-Dardir, requesting that they help him preserve the 
peace and prevent the populace from behaving in an unruly manner, and giving 
the Porte an excuse for intervention.  Thus, if the Mamlukes respected the ‘ulama 
and deferred to them, it was not only because of their religious upbringing, but 
because they knew that the ulama controlled the people and could rouse and 
restrain them.13 
The period from the late eighteenth to the early part of the nineteenth century is seen 
by many scholars as being the ‘golden age’ of the ‘ulama in terms of their power, 
wealth and influence both on society and on the rulers.  However, ‘the ‘ulama should 
not merely be seen as mediating in disputes and restraining public outcry and protest 
directed at the Mamluks and the Ottoman Sultanate.  As stated above, they were often 
themselves the impetus behind popular mobilisation and protest aimed at the rulers; 
when the French invaded and occupied Egypt (1798–1801), it was the ‘ulama who 
were a leading group in the uprisings and demonstrations against Napoleon and his 
army. 
‘Ulama, Al-Azhar and the French Occupation, 1798–1801 
Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798 met with very little Mamluk resistance.  The 
decline of the Ottoman Empire had also set in and it was powerless to intervene to 
                                                 
12
 Ibid., p.265. 
13
 Al-Jabarti, op. cit. ‘Aja’ib, Vol. II, p.111; see also p.266. 
Chapter 3/ Changing Fortunes: The Rise and Fall of ‘Ulama Power? 
109 
 
defend its province.  The occasion of Napoleon’s invasion was “in effect, the 
beginning of the end of the centuries of ‘ulama–Mamluk cooperation”.14  When news 
arrived of Napoleon’s taking of Alexandria, the ‘ulama heatedly accused the Mamluks 
of being the sole cause of Egypt’s troubles.15  With the Mamluks in disarray and utterly 
unprepared, Napoleon was able to occupy Egypt with very little resistance to his 
imperial forces.  Napoleon knew, however, that military superiority would not be 
enough to sustain French rule in Egypt and quickly began enlisting the support of the 
‘ulama for he saw them as the ‘natural leaders of native society’.  Napoleon set out his 
reasons for wanting the cooperation of the ‘ulama in ruling Egypt.  He stated: 
I have preferred the ulama and the doctors of the law: first, because they are 
natural leaders; secondly, because they are interpreters of the Qur’an and the 
greatest obstacles we have met with and shall meet with proceed from religious 
ideas; and thirdly, these ulama have gentle manners, love justice and are rich 
and animated by good moral principles … they are not addicted to any sort of 
military manoeuvring and they are ill adapted to the leadership of an armed 
movement.16 
Napoleon’s plea to the ‘ulama to “rule themselves” was accompanied by an invitation 
to them to occupy the places on the Diwan (Administrative Council) left vacant by the 
flight of the ruling elites.  He knew of their role as intermediaries between contending 
Mamluk factions but, more important, Napoleon knew of their role as political 
legitimisers for the Mamluks.  “Thus it came about that in composing his Diwan, 
Bonaparte filled it with ‘ulama who were to help him legislate, maintain order and act 
as intermediary between the French authorities and the people.”17  He also gave the 
impression that the French had come to help the Egyptians achieve liberty, equality 
and fraternity within a Muslim context.18 
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For the ‘ulama, being part of the Diwan was similar to their role under the Mamluks 
when they had also occupied seats in the Diwan.  But now, “for the first time the ruling 
power in the country was making a show of governing in consultation with the ‘ulama 
as representatives of the local will and the local weal”.19  Under the Mamluks, the 
Diwan’s importance as a governing body was minimal and its deliberations were never 
taken as seriously as the expression of popular feeling and anger out in the streets.  
Napoleon attempted to use the Diwan as an institution that would be responsive to the 
will of the people via the ‘ulama.  However, he also knew the capacity of the ‘ulama 
to rouse and mobilise the masses against rulers and, by filling the seats of the Diwan 
with ‘ulama, he hoped to curb this potential for revolt.  Thus, with the French invasion, 
Bonaparte’s revival of the Diwan and his wish for the ‘ulama to take the seats of 
government, “the ‘ulama came to see themselves, and be seen by the people, as 
occupying a greater position of authority than before”.20 
Despite the fact that Napoleon offered the ‘ulama the chance to rule, many ‘ulama 
grew increasingly angry at French rule and began to organise a series of revolts, which 
were ultimately to destabilise the French occupation of Egypt.  During this period, 
‘ulama actively refused to cooperate with the French. Crecelius sees this as “an 
admission of their [the ‘ulama’s] inability to perform these vital functions 
themselves”.21  He further argues that “just as the ulama would brook no intrusion by 
others in their special field of religious interpretation and instruction, so they in turn 
could not presume to encroach upon the functions of the scribes, the military, or the 
rulers”.22  So, when the opportunity presented itself to cooperate with the French and 
exchange the traditional role of power brokers to that of power holders, they chose to 
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turn their backs on this chance and pursue a course that would lead to the destruction 
of their power under Muhammad ‘Ali.23 
Many ‘ulama opposed the French occupation and in numerous revolts against the 
French, the ‘ulama were the impetus behind the popular mobilisations led by al-Azhar, 
the epicentre of the struggle, where people gathered to take instructions from the 
‘ulama.  The first of the revolts was an abortive one that was led by Sheikh of the riwaq 
(dormitory) and the blind in al-Azhar24 and ended with his execution alongside a 
number of other ‘ulama, for their role in the insurgency.  Another revolt took place in 
March 1800, which was led by Umar Makran, the Naqib al-Ashraf (Marshal of the 
Notables) at al-Azhar.  Many other ‘ulama were involved in the revolts including 
Sheikh al-Sadat, who was accused by Bonaparte of fomenting the first revolt.  He was 
not punished for fear of popular reaction but was “implicated in the second revolt [of 
1800], fined, imprisoned and beaten by the French”.25  As a result of this incident and 
the Sheikh’s refusal to accept a position on the Diwan, his prestige and popularity grew 
enormously amongst the people, while the authority of those ‘ulama who had 
befriended and accepted French rule diminished. As an example, “Sheikh al-Bakri who 
had befriended the French was deposed from his order after they had evacuated Egypt 
and his daughter was killed for consorting with the French”.26 
The revolts against the French illustrate clearly that many ‘ulama, chose to oppose the 
French and their occupation of Egypt.  Despite the reluctance of some leading ‘ulama 
to participate in the revolts and their criticisms of the protests, the ‘ulama were a 
leading group opposing the French.  As a result, al-Azhar became the centre and heart 
of the resistance movement against the French.  The revolts were often followed by 
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severe French reprisals, which on occasion “meant the desecration of al-Azhar where 
troops entered with arms and with their boots on.  The gap therefore grew wider 
between the occupiers and the ‘ulama; and the ‘ulama could not become receptive to 
French ideas”.27  The ‘ulama saw the French occupation as much more than a politico-
military crisis, it came to be seen as “a religiously alien and morally inferior force 
which was in temporary occupation of their land, so it was natural that their constant 
concern was for their liberation from the infidels”28 rather than to comply with them 
in the enslavement of Muslims. 
Muhammad ‘Ali and the ‘Ulama  
The evacuation of the French in July and August of 1801 heightened the chaos and 
anarchy in Egypt, with the Mamluks, Ottoman authorities and Janissaries fighting to 
fill the power vacuum left by the French.  The economic and political situation 
continued to deteriorate when, in 1805, the ‘ulama resolved to try and bring an end to 
the suffering and chaos.  The Sheikhs gathered to decide a course of action.  During 
this time, Muhammad ‘Ali had been lobbying Umar Makram, Marshal of the Notables, 
promising that if the ‘ulama threw their weight behind his candidacy for Vali, he would 
do nothing without their consent.  Muhammad ‘Ali, like many other rulers, knew that 
if he was to ascend to the position of Vali, he would need the good will and support of 
the ‘ulama.29 
Having deliberated for days, the leading ‘ulama, that is, Sheikh al-Sadat, Umar 
Makram, Sheikh al-Sharqawi and other leaders of orders and Muftis, finally presented 
their concerns and a list of demands to the incumbent Ottoman Vali who, without any 
consideration of their concerns, refused to comply.  For the ‘ulama, this was a clear 
sign that the Ottoman Vali had no intention of governing Egypt in accordance with the 
wishes of the people and the ‘ulama.  Knowing that the Vali would refuse their 
demands, they made their way to Muhammad ‘Ali immediately where, al-Jabarti tells 
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us, “Sheikh al-Sharqawi clothed him in a quftan as an official act of investiture”.30  
This marks the beginning of the 1805 revolt.  When the Ottoman Vali heard about this 
he refused to accept this state of affairs and the situation turned into an armed revolt 
with the ‘ulama again acting as the main impetus and rousing the masses to revolt.  
Sheikh al-Sharqawi and Umar Makran were amongst the ‘ulama who implored the 
population to arm and report for action.  In this instance, it was the ‘ulama who made 
the deposing of the Ottoman Vali effective, “for Muhammad ‘Ali’s troops were 
divided amongst themselves, and were insufficient to carry out the coup 
successfully”.31  During the 1798 and 1800 revolts against the French, it was the 
‘ulama who were under siege in the narrow lanes and streets of Islamic Cairo, with the 
French firing on them from the hills of nearby Muqattam.  Now, it was the ‘ulama 
who, with the help of the masses, had the Ottoman Vali hemmed in at the Citadel.  Al-
Jabarti yet again gives us an interesting account of what happened: 
When the Vali found himself besieged in the Citadel, he was forced to send a 
messenger, who demanded an explanation from Umar Makram, and asked why 
the ulama had seen fit to disobey those set in authority over them, that is the 
Vali.  Makram answered, ‘those in authority are the ulama and the followers of 
shari’a and the righteous sultan, but this is a tyrannical man, and it is the 
tradition from time immemorial that ahl al-balad (people of the country) depose 
the Vali if he be unjust.  Then, the messenger asked ‘are we kuffar (unbelievers) 
that they should be so ill-treated and Makram once again replied: ‘yes, for the 
ulama have decreed that it is righteous to fight you for you are rebellious 
(usah).32 
Umar Makram, the Naqib al-Ashraf, appears as a key figure in the 1805 revolt and in 
the effort to appoint Muhammad ‘Ali as Vali of Egypt.  Makram’s wealth was vast and 
he was highly respected, so much so that the office he held of Naqib al-Ashraf was 
traditionally meant to be filled by either the Sheikhs al-Sadat or Bakri but in this 
instance an exception was made for Makram.  In the 1805 revolt, al-Jabarti tells us 
that: 
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Makram levied a contribution from the wealthier citizens (which they paid 
willingly), and bought arms to supply the populace, and even paid the poorer 
artisans a daily wage, as indemnity for leaving their trade and turning soldiers.  
As a result, he could call upon nearly 40,000 armed men.33 
It appears that the people accepted Makram as their leader and Muhammad ‘Ali, at 
least for the time being, stood behind Makram.   
Muhammed ‘Ali consolidated his power between 1805 and 1808, using the support of 
the ‘ulama to legitimise his rule; by 1809 he felt sufficiently stable and confident that 
he now turned against the ‘ulama.  Muhammad ‘Ali was aware of the power and 
influence the ‘ulama held not only in terms of their political importance, being close 
to Egypt’s political centre and levers of power, but also through their ability to 
mobilise the population against unfavourable regimes and rulers.  Wanting to ensure 
the stability and longevity of his own reign, Muhammad ‘Ali saw the ‘ulama as being 
the greatest threat to this, having seen the strength of their political power in their 
opposition to the unpopular French occupation as well as to the Ottoman Vali in the 
aftermath of the French withdrawal from Egypt.   
Apart from wanting to eliminate those who could threaten his own rule, Muhammad 
‘Ali’s attack on the ‘ulama, and the weakening of the ‘ulama’s political potential, was 
meant to marginalise those who were most likely to oppose his personal plans for the 
modernisation and transformation of Egypt.  He sought to remove threats and obstacles 
to his own particular vision of Egypt and the process of modernisation that he had 
charted for his country.  Fundamental to his vision was the transformation of the 
country’s education system, the expansion and centralisation of the state and its 
institutions, and the development of a large powerful army.  These three interlinked 
processes and their consequent effects were to provide the basis of Egypt’s 
transformation to a modern, centralised state with an educated and literate population 
possessing the technical skills to be able to assume positions within the growing state 
structure.  His vision also saw Egypt possessing its own strong, well equipped and well 
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trained army capable of defending Egypt’s interests both at home and abroad.  He 
believed these features to be at the heart of European progress and success and sought 
to transform Egypt along the same European lines.34 
The process of concentrating power in his own hands, while beginning with the 
elimination of the powerful Ottoman–Mamluk elite, continued with Muhammad ‘Ali’s 
“willingness to depart from traditional patterns and concepts of government and to 
banish from the seats of power the representatives of Allah’s sacred law”.35  First, 
Muhammad ‘Ali broke the ‘ulama’s material strength by confiscating land owned by 
multazims and abolishing the iltizam (tax farm system) altogether.36  This move helped 
him gain favour in the countryside as many fellahin were treated unfairly by the 
multazims, of which the ‘ulama were a large number.  The awqaf managed and 
administered by the ‘ulama were also brought under state control, thereby depriving 
‘ulama of control over this vast wealth which paid for madaaris, mosques, katatib 
(religious elementary schools) and other basic social provision within society.37  
These measures significantly weakened the ‘ulama’s financial base which had, up to 
this time, enabled them to act independently of the political authorities.  The fact that 
they had independent sources of income meant that they had been able to criticise 
political authorities without fear of being penalised financially.  Not only were the 
‘ulama’s sources of income vast – certainly in the case of the elite ‘ulama – but their 
independence from the state, being untaxed, meant that the ‘ulama enjoyed 
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considerable autonomy from the state, a feature that strengthened their political 
potency.   
Second, the ‘ulama were pitted against each other; the long-standing internal divisions 
evident within the overall structure of the ‘ulama were exploited. According to Afaf 
Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, “the time honoured principle of divide and rule was put to use, 
[where Muhammad ‘Ali] was to dispose of prominent ‘ulama by using disgruntled 
rivals”.38  Al-Jabarti, keeping clear of the intrigue, tells us that Sheikh al-Sharqawi, the 
Sheikh al-Azhar was put under house arrest with the connivance of Sheikh Umar 
Makram, Marshal of the Notables.  But later, Umar Makram was unable to escape the 
assault of Muhammad ‘Ali and was himself then sent into exile through the intrigues 
of other Sheikhs whose names al-Jabarti withholds.  As well as being exiled, their 
wealth and property were seized and the uncompromising manner in which these 
measures were taken instilled fear and concern within the ranks of the ‘ulama.  Having 
injected panic and uncertainty within the higher ranks of the ‘ulama, and by deposing 
Umar Makram, Crecelius argues, “the ‘ulama had no leader and no longer posed a 
serious threat to the new regime and effectively silenced those who might have taken 
a more vociferous stand against the Pasha”.39 
Finally, Muhammad ‘Ali began to “interfere in the elections of the Sheikh al-Azhar so 
that no potential trouble makers could be elected. In this way, Sheikh al-Mahdi, an 
able politician, was discarded in favour of the pious and harmless Sheikh al-
Shanawani”.40  From this point on, the political rulers of Egypt were to play a central 
role in selecting the Sheikh al-Azhar, which has remained the case up to the present 
time.  This intrusion of the political authorities into the religious realm succeeded in 
further dismantling the political power of the ‘ulama and particularly the authority of 
the Sheikh al-Azhar.  By abolishing the independence of the Sheikh al-Azhar, 
Muhammad ‘Ali was able to bring the authority and political potential of this office, 
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which had previously been significant, under his own control and, as Crecelius puts it, 
complete the ‘ulama’s “expulsion from Olympus”.41 
If Muhammad ‘Ali’s aim to curtail the ‘ulama’s political power was to some degree 
successful, his ability to render them irrelevant in other areas where the state 
encroached did not yield the same results.  Crecelius concedes, “[h]aving eliminated 
the interference of the ‘ulama in his government, Muhammad ‘Ali left them virtually 
alone, to teach, think, write, or practice whatever they wanted so long as they did not 
undermine his programs within the sphere of government”.42  If this was the case, and 
the ‘ulama’s traditional spheres of authority remained untouched, it is important to 
reassess the wider reforms he pursued to see whether they further weakened the ‘ulama 
by challenging their traditional religio-legal and pedagogical functions.  Limiting the 
‘ulama’s political influence by removing them from the arena of government alone 
appears not to have resulted in their complete marginalisation.  Indeed, the ‘ulama 
remained dominant in many significant areas of Egyptian society where their 
prominent position as guardians of the faith continued unchallenged by modernisation. 
‘Ulama Networks and Land Reform in the Nineteenth Century 
Debates concerning the reforms in Egypt over the course of the nineteenth century 
have aroused a variety of opinions and would benefit from further research.  It is clear 
however, that Egypt underwent considerable transformation in this period but, as Baer 
argues, “[s]ocial change in nineteenth-century Egypt was a complex process which 
needs to be investigated in detail”.43  Egypt had four rulers or Valis who were later 
given the title of Khedive (Viceroy with hereditary succession) by royal firman (a 
decree issued by the Ottoman Sultan) during the course of the nineteenth century up 
until 1879.  Each had different outlooks on reform and modernisation.  Coupled with 
this, each ruler conducted foreign relations with the Ottoman Empire, and the major 
European powers (Britain and France in the main) in very diverse ways, seeing Egypt’s 
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place in the world along largely divergent tracks.  These factors also had a significant 
impact on their views on the position of Islam within society, Egypt’s place within the 
Islamic ‘umma and the role of the ‘ulama.  Further complicating the picture over the 
course of the nineteenth century was the fact that reforms and modernisation occurred 
haphazardly, often decided upon as a result of political, cultural and ideological 
contingency and expediency at any given time.44 
The foundation upon which the ‘ulama’s authority rested was primarily their religious 
authority, their Islamic scholarship and the historical legitimacy of their revered 
position within Islamic society.  Upon this foundation, the ‘ulama established for 
themselves an important set of functions that served society and increased their moral 
standing amongst the population.  These key functions comprised: their pedagogical 
role, their role as interpreters of the Shari’a, which gave them an important juridical 
role in society, and finally their role as Islam’s preachers and mosque functionaries, 
ensuring daily practice and adherence to orthodox Islamic principles.  The political 
role they had come to inherit by the early nineteenth century was not central to their 
core functions but was rather a by-product of their moral authority, which political 
authorities had come to recognise and consider as an important legitimising factor 
given the shortcomings of their own rule.  In providing a link between rulers and the 
ruled, ‘ulama acquired political relevance because rulers saw them as fulfilling an 
important role providing moral legitimacy to the political authorities.  Thus, as we 
have seen, the period of Mamluk rule was characterised by the ‘ulama’s heightened 
political role. 
The effective link to the masses was provided by virtue of the ‘ulama’s extensive 
networks built on the basis of their wide-ranging functions that were woven into the 
social fabric of society.  These networks were developed and strengthened over time 
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and existed outside of the political realm.45  So long as the ‘ulama’s religio-legal and 
pedagogical functions remained immune from wider reforms, the ‘ulama’s vast 
networks continued to operate and the ‘ulama found that their political marginalisation 
had very little impact on this aspect of their structural strength and moral influence on 
the masses.46 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the urban elite ‘ulama’s ties to rural Egypt 
were strong and ‘ulama could rely on support from the fellahin who were employed 
on the land and were often severely exploited by the multazims, including the ‘ulama 
multazims mentioned above.  Evidence to suggest that this changed after Muhammad 
‘Ali’s abolition of the iltizam is unconvincing.  According to Gabriel Baer, the village 
community was bound together by three main factors: first, the village served as a 
fiscal unit, which meant that taxes were liable collectively by the village as a whole; 
second, land was held in common, with no individual rights; and third, the supply of 
labour for public works and irrigation was a common duty of the whole village.47  
While these aspects changed over the course of the nineteenth century, administrative 
responsibility for the village did not and remained with the Sheikh al-Balad (village 
headman), who continued to fill this role.  The office of the Sheikh al-Balad had long 
been established during the period of Ottoman–Mamluk rule and continued right 
through the nineteenth century where it was later more commonly called umdah 
(sometimes referred to and spelt ‘Omdeh’).  Lord Cromer, Consul General in Egypt 
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from 1883 to 1907, observed as late as the end of the century that “it was not too much 
to say that the whole life of the village turns upon the Omdeh”.48  
Whether the Sheikh al-Balad was a religious position, as the title might suggest, is 
unknown and research in this field remains thin and inconclusive.  The truth is that 
some were Sheikhs in the religious sense of the word and others were not.  What we 
can say with certainty is that the post had key administrative functions intricately 
connected with the village and often relied on a Sheikh in his capacity as an assistant 
to help carry out tasks.  The Sheikh al-Balad was appointed by, and carried out his 
tasks on behalf of, the multazim and, after the abolition of the ilitzam system between 
1808 and 1814 when land was essentially nationalised, he effectively became a 
government employee.  Specific functions of the Sheikh al-Balad ranged from 
collecting the tax from the fellahin of the village, ordering of public works, 
redistribution of land annually or on the death of a fellah, security of the village, 
arbitrating in disputes, legal functions such as trying cases and imposing punishments, 
maintaining a record of births and deaths and acting as a link between government and 
the village.49  
To carry out these tasks, the Sheikh al-Balad had to be literate and in nineteenth 
century Egypt the ‘ulama constituted the most likely group to be literate to the extent 
that was necessary to carry out this work.  The only other group that possessed this 
capacity were the elite landowners and governing elites who constituted the vast bulk 
of Egypt’s multazims along with other ‘ulama.  While the Sheikh al-Balad was not a 
member of the formal ‘ulama corps, given that ‘ulama almost entirely controlled 
education provision within the country until the latter part of the century, the Sheikh 
al-Balad would have acquired his education within a madrassa or kuttab and then at 
one of the three higher education institutes (Tanta, Alexandria and al-Azhar in Cairo), 
which were dominated entirely by ‘ulama.  His education and learning would have 
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been religious in nature and village ‘ulama and then ‘ulama in the higher institutes 
would have been his teachers right throughout his studies. 
His title denotes a man of learning and knowledge and certainly, to carry out his 
functions effectively, he would need to have more than a primary level of education.  
The Sheikh al-Balad’s socio-economic and moral status within the community also 
had to be significant especially when we see all these features, they resemble those of 
the multazim ‘ulama that al-Jabarti mentions in his chronicles as possessing great 
wealth and power.  Indeed, in most cases, the Sheikh al-Balad was from “the richest 
families in the village … held large tracts of land [and] they paid no tax”.50  Many 
social historians of Egypt have rightly pointed out that the abolition of the iltizam was 
a major step towards land reform in Egypt, opening the door to private ownership, 
which was introduced under the rule of Muhammad Said (r.1854–1863).  It is further 
accepted that these measures may well have diminished the material wealth and 
political influence of the ‘ulama among ruling circles, although this was also due to 
the emerging centralisation and bureaucratisation of the state along non-religious 
technocratic rather than religious lines.  However, the administrative system remained 
largely intact – whereby the Sheikh al-Balad remained in his role with very few 
changes to his functions except that he was now a government employee; hence the 
entrenched networks of the ‘ulama in villages and the connection between urban 
‘ulama and their rural backgrounds did not change and remained largely undisturbed 
by reform.51 
The urban–rural networks of which the ‘ulama were an integral part were deeply 
rooted for other reasons.  First, studying at al-Azhar and gaining the status of ‘ulama 
had become one of the major mechanisms for social mobility.52  Many students of al-
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Azhar were from the countryside and often families sent their eldest sons to study 
while the younger sons remained on the land.  After completing their studies and 
receiving the ijaza (permission) to teach, preach or be recognised as jurists, many 
qualified ‘ulama returned to their villages to carry out a variety of functions within the 
mosque, madrassa or the local village administration and legal system.  Second, while 
it is correct to point out that the urban networks of the ‘ulama that developed around 
the guilds, as described above during the protests against the French, were more 
efficient because of the proximity of these groups to al-Azhar and the vast majority of 
urban ‘ulama, many ‘ulama were just as strongly attached to the villages and rural 
communities by virtue of their rural origins.  Indeed, the table below shows the rural 
origins of many of the bearers of the office of Sheikh al-Azhar. 
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Table 3.1 Rural Origins of Sheikh al-Azhars, 1689–1838 
Name of Sheikh Year of death Geographic Origin 
Al-Khorashi 1689 Abu Khorash in Buhaira 
Al-Nashrati 1708 Nashart 
Shanan 1720 Al-Jidiya 
Al-Fayyumi 1724 Fayyum 
Al-Shabrawi 1756 Shubra 
Al-Hifni 1767 Hifna 
Al-Sajini 1768 Sajin 
Al-Damanhuri 1778 Damanur 
Al-Arusi 1793 Minyat al-Arus 
Al-Sharqawi 1812 Tawila in Sharqiyya 
Al-Shanawani 1817 Shanawan 
Al-Arusi 1830 Minyat al-Arus 
Al-Damhudji 1830 Damhuj 
Al-Quwasni 1838 Quwasna53 
‘Ulama and Legal Reform 
The religious authority of the ‘ulama continued through the nineteenth century as a 
result of their intricate links to the Shari’a and, as a result, to Egypt’s religio-legal 
system.  This is despite many attempts at legal reform and a never-ending desire on 
the part of the political authorities to exert control over legal processes.  Skovgaard-
Petersen argues that, “everybody seems to agree that the 19th century witnessed a 
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continual decline in the jurisdiction of Islamic courts”.54  Similarly, most studies also 
concur that, over the course of the nineteenth century, rather than Islamic law being 
the sole domain of the ‘ulama, governments in Egypt continually interfered “in legal 
matters, often in complete violation of Shari’a precepts”.55  However, these studies fail 
to recognise that, despite government interference in judicial matters attempting to 
limit the importance of the Islamic courts, they did in fact continue to exist in Egypt 
throughout the nineteenth century (they were finally abolished in the 1950s).  
Moreover, the ‘ulama remained a vital part of the judiciary and continued to carry out 
key legal functions, acting as judges (Quda), jurists (Fuqahah) and teachers of Islamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh) and the Shari’a.  These key posts that the ‘ulama held within the 
judiciary meant that both in the structure of the legal system and in the method of legal 
application in Egypt, the ‘ulama remained integral to the functioning of the entire 
system. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Islamic courts had overall legal 
jurisdiction in Egypt with the chief judge (qadi ‘askar) being nominated by the Sultan 
in Istanbul.  The qadi ‘askar would then appoint the other Quda in Egypt who presided 
over the Islamic courts and applied the law to cases brought before them.  The Muftis 
(Islamic legal experts) were a crucial part of this structure as they often advised Quda 
on a point of law and could hear appeals against verdicts given by the Qadi and, when 
there was agreement between the Muftis of the four legal schools (madhaahib), could 
even get the Qadi to reconsider his verdict.  In this way, Muftis acted as an important 
counterbalance to the Qadi and indeed “a check to Qadi abuses”.56  Later in the 
nineteenth century, under the rule of Muhammad ‘Ali, where legal reform was aimed 
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mainly at either increasing Egypt’s autonomy from the Ottoman Empire or currying 
favour, new governing councils (Diwan al-Wali) were established across Egypt 
responsible for formulating laws and regulations in the areas of “education, navy, 
army, revenue, factories and European and Egyptian commercial affairs”.57  Despite 
this major administrative and legal reform, each Diwan had, as part of its organisation 
and structure, an ‘alim from each of the four main madhaahib of Egypt, who remained 
integral to the functioning of the Diwan.   
Even later during the nineteenth century, the ‘ulama continued to be integral to the 
judicial system even when legal reforms were aimed at establishing alternative legal 
structures to the Shari’a courts.  According to Skovgaard-Petersen, “[i]n the legal field, 
the most important event was the establishment of the Judicial Council, the Majlis al-
Ahkam in 1848–49 and similar councils in the provinces”.58  These new courts 
“operated until the ‘Urabi revolt and the British occupation”59 and assumed 
responsibility for criminal matters, taking these matters away from the Shari’a courts.  
On the surface, this measure can be seen as an attempt to limit the authority of the 
Shari’a courts but, on closer inspection, it becomes clear that, while alternatives to the 
Shari’a courts were indeed emerging, the Shari’a courts remained important.  So, for 
instance, Shari’a courts continued to preside over civil matters concerning “personal 
status and land”.60  Typically, this would have meant that disputes in marriages, 
divorce, inheritance and land status issues would have continued to be dealt with by 
the Shari’a courts.  Not only was this a wide remit but the issues themselves were 
important, giving the courts considerable regulatory authority over the lives of many 
ordinary Egyptians.   
                                                 
57
 Skovgaard-Petersen, op. cit. Defining Islam for the Egyptian State, p.57; see also Ziyadeh, op. cit. 
Lawyers, the Rule of Law, pp.12–13. 
58
 Skovgaard-Petersen, op. cit. Defining Islam for the Egyptian State, p.57. 
59
 Ibid., pp.57–58. 
60
 Ibid. 
Chapter 3/ Changing Fortunes: The Rise and Fall of ‘Ulama Power? 
126 
 
Equally important was the specific legal role of the ‘ulama in both the Shari’a courts 
and the new Judicial Councils.  While ‘ulama remained integral to the functioning of 
the Shari’a courts, providing Islamic legal guidance and direction to the Quda and 
guarding against miscarriages of justice, they also had a significant role in the newly 
formed Majlis al-Akham, which had primary importance in adjudicating criminal 
matters.  In the Judicial Councils, they also had a significant task in dispensing rulings 
and judgments and in the overall functioning of the Councils.  So, “[t]o each of the 
Councils was attached two muftis (a Hanafi and a Shafi’i)”,61 to ensure legal judgments 
stayed within accepted Islamic norms.  By holding key roles within the Majlis al-
Akham, the ‘ulama retained importance even in this legal sphere, despite many 
reforms. 
‘Ulama and Education Reform 
In the realm of education, reforms carried out in the nineteenth century by Muhammad 
‘Ali and his successors must also be contextualised with regard to their impact on the 
religious schools and the ‘ulama’s pedagogical domination.  At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, ‘ulama had almost total control over the provision of education in 
the entire country.  There was no centralised education system; rather, the primary and 
elementary religious schools and the three higher education institutes – al-Azhar in 
Cairo, the Ahmadi Mosque (Gamia’) in Tanta and the Ibrahim Mosque in Alexandria 
– were all funded by individual charitable endowments that were administered by the 
‘ulama.  The higher institutes all had dormitories (riwaqs) attached to them for board 
and lodging of their students and these were designated in accordance with the place 
of origin of the student.  For instance, there were riwaqs for students from Syria, the 
Maghreb and other parts of the Muslim world and for domestic students from parts of 
Egypt.62  These three institutions supplied virtually all the educated labour that was 
needed in Egypt at the time.  This included a wide range of personnel all over the 
country: teachers for the network of primary and elementary schools in towns and 
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villages; jurists attached to courts at every level from village to city; preachers (Imams) 
and sermon givers (Khatibs) to mosques up and down the country; and administrators 
to every institution as well as to the ruling elites and their commercial and land 
interests.63 
According to Gabriel Baer, literacy amongst the population at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century was low and very few Egyptians attended school.64  By contrast, in 
the description given by Edward Lane, the famous Orientalist, during his time in Egypt 
between 1825 and 1849, he observes that in the villages and rural areas there were 
many katatib and that the presence of these basic Islamic schools was difficult to miss, 
with gatherings of children and their instructors normally organised around various 
public places, including public fountains, mosques and other public areas.  Typically, 
an instructor taught the memorization of the Quran by first reading a sentence and 
requiring the children in the class to repeat after him over and over again.65  These 
were the primary level katatib situated all over the country, through which a religious 
education was dispensed. The extent of this education was certainly to teach students 
to read the Quran, that is, to memorise it, but there was no critical examination of the 
text.  The purpose was merely to impart religious values, customs and an 
understanding of Islamic principles and behaviour as prescribed by the Quran and to 
teach the basics of reading and writing.66 
The ‘ulama’s dominance over the educational sphere in Egypt was grounded in the 
historical fact that in Islam they were the possessors of knowledge, which itself derived 
from the religion and its sacred sources.  With knowledge (‘ilm) so intricately linked 
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to Islamic scholasticism, the ‘ulama were the sole experts and interpreters of the sacred 
sources; they were masters of the Arabic language that is, it is worth emphasising, the 
language of the Quran and the language of God given to the Arabs.  The ‘ulama 
controlled and dispensed justice based on Islamic law (Shari’a) with its ultimate source 
being the Quran and Hadith (the sayings and customs of the Prophet Muhammad).  
The link between Islam and knowledge is reflected in the curriculum of al-Azhar, 
which was almost entirely dominated by Islamic ‘transmitted’ sciences such as tajwid 
(art of Quranic recitation); qira’at (knowledge of the accepted reading of the Quran); 
tafsir (Quranic exegesis); Hadith (verified reports about the Prophet Muhammad’s 
sayings); fiqh (jurisprudence); usul al-fiqh (fundamental principles of jurisprudence); 
fara’id al-mirath (inheritance laws); tawhid (theology); tasawwuf (mysticism).67   
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, many of the mosques and schools were 
falling into a desperate state of disrepair largely due to ‘ulama mismanagement and 
the squandering of awqaf funds.  When, early on in his reign, Muhammad ‘Ali 
confiscated the ‘ulama’s jurisdiction over the awqaf and placed these under state 
control, the fear was that the situation would worsen for Egypt’s schools and higher 
education institutes.  Whether this did actually occur is somewhat outside the scope of 
this study, although it is yet another question that deserves further research.  The aim 
of Muhammad ‘Ali’s sweeping measure was to weaken the ‘ulama’s hold on the 
country’s educational sphere, allowing him to pursue the reforms he desired in line 
with his wider plans for Egypt’s modernisation and transformation.  As discussed 
above, his planned transformation of Egypt’s army and the centralisation of the state, 
manned by a well-trained and efficient bureaucracy, were only possible by training a 
new generation of educated Egyptians that could help run the country and administer 
and deliver the reforms efficiently.  With the education system he inherited almost 
entirely dominated by the Islamic sciences listed above and unable to provide a 
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sufficiently adequate labour force needed for a re-modelling of Egypt’s army, state and 
bureaucracy, Muhammad ‘Ali began to make plans to rectify this situation.68 
In the early years of his reign, Muhammad ‘Ali employed European technocrats and 
advisors to help reform and run the increasingly centralised state.  Likewise, with the 
collapse of Napoleon’s army in 1815, the services of a significant number of French 
military experts became available, which Muhammad ‘Ali used to begin modernising 
his army.69  In the years 1809–1830, he sought to provide the necessary training to his 
most talented indigenous students in two ways.  The first was to develop a range of 
secondary and higher level technical schools in Egypt.  The secondary level schools 
would feed students into the new technical schools.70  Second, and as early as 1809, 
he despatched students and study missions to Europe to receive training in a variety of 
sciences, humanities, military and technical subjects.  The early student missions 
received training mainly in technical areas such as military science and engineering, 
printing, shipbuilding and mechanics.71  The subjects studied in later student missions 
were extended to include language and literature, law, botany and zoology and other 
natural sciences, humanities and social sciences.  It was this later extended programme 
of subjects that was studied by Sheikh Rifa’a al-Tahtawi, the notable al-Azhar-trained 
reformer, who will be discussed in Chapter 4.72 
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There can be little doubt as to the consequences of early nineteenth century education 
reforms on the expansion of the economy, the growth of the military and indeed efforts 
to centralise and modernise the state bureaucracy.  Yet, structurally, these reforms had 
little or no impact on those areas of education that the ‘ulama controlled. Furthermore, 
the reforms failed to disentangle the country’s intellectual tradition from the grip of 
the ‘ulama.  For instance, it was the military schools that taught technical subjects not 
offered by the mass of the religious schools and the three religious higher institutes.  
The ‘ulama, while alarmed at the loss of their awqaf privileges, their iltizams and other 
wealth creating possibilities, nevertheless felt that their pedagogical functions and 
associated learning institutes – the katatib and the higher institutes – were largely 
unaffected by Muhammad ‘Ali’s educational reforms.  In fact, the reforms succeeded 
only in establishing a parallel educational system that could neither compete with the 
religious schools nor absorb them into its structure.73   
The primary religious schools were vast, had no central authority administering them, 
and, as mentioned, were also in a state of disrepair.  The cost and time needed to bring 
these up-to-date would have been enormous, two factors that Muhammad ‘Ali did not 
possess.  Revenue from increased agricultural production and the introduction of cash 
crops that marked Muhammad ‘Ali’s aggressive agricultural policy early in his reign 
were used in building his army to ensure his own rule and to secure Egypt’s borders 
from predatory imperial forces.  With the French having departed only recently, the 
need for shoring up Egypt’s defences was deemed more urgent than spreading non-
religious primary education.  In addition, the curricula of al-Azhar and the other higher 
institutes and the primary schools, the teaching methods and the personnel remained 
firmly in place throughout this period.  Indeed, it is unclear whether Muhammad ‘Ali 
was ever enamoured with the idea of primary educational reform.  Despite the Primary 
School Regulation of 1836, formulated much later in his reign, declaring to “spread 
the principles of science among the population”,74 Muhammad ‘Ali instructed his son 
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Ibrahim Pasha in a private note around the same time “against spreading education 
beyond the recruits for state service”.75 
The strides made by Muhammad ‘Ali in establishing a new education system in order 
to bypass religious madrassa education were not only limited in their reach76 but, by 
the 1840s, these had slowed down considerably as a consequence of the European 
powers restraining Muhammad ‘Ali’s expansionist pretensions through the 
Convention of London 1840, which required the reduction of Egypt’s standing army 
to a mere 18,000.  As a result, Egypt’s economy stagnated and educational reform was 
abruptly halted in the last years of Muhammad ‘Ali’s rule.  His next two successors, 
Abbas I (r.1848–1854) and Sa’id I (r.1854–1863), “did little to further the development 
of education”77 despite the formulation of a plan submitted to Sa’id I in 1854 to attempt 
to merge government schools with those reformed traditional schools providing a 
universal and comprehensive primary education able to equip students with a general 
and wide-ranging knowledge base.78  Sa’id’s successor, Isma’il I (r.1863–1879) did 
make a significant effort in the development of primary education.  In the realm of 
higher education too Ismail I made more use of graduates from the Islamic higher 
institutes – in particular al-Azhar – by establishing a teacher training college where the 
brightest students were sent to receive training in modern subjects and those teachers 
who showed reformist or modernist tendencies were instructed in new teaching 
methods. 
Isma’il’s intentions to develop Egypt’s education throughout the country were clear 
when he addressed the consuls of the foreign powers and declared that schools “are 
the base of every progress” and, following this speech, reopened the School 
Department, which had been closed down by his predecessor Sa’id almost as soon as 
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he took office in 1854.79  In 1868, Khedive Isma’il (he had been given the title of 
Khedive in 1866 by the Ottoman Sultan) ratified the Primary School Law, which 
proposed that all small katatib were to be supervised by the government and those with 
over seventy students be wholly taken over by the government.  Other measures, 
according to this Law, were that every province and large city was to have a 
government primary school where admission was open to all students regardless of 
social status or religion and tuition; meals and, if necessary, board and lodging and 
clothing were to be free.  After the neglect that Abbas I and Sa’id I had shown towards 
education and the failure of Muhammad ‘Ali’s educational drive to target primary level 
education and the traditional religious system of the katatib, these measures can be 
seen as the first attempts to extend “government control over all traditional systems”80 
and to formulate a national system of education merging the religious schools and 
government schools under one unified system. 
With such an ambitious plan to modernise Egypt’s schools and with awqaf revenues 
re-allocated to finance many of the schools (thus placing as little a financial burden as 
possible on the state), the policy soon ran into the practical problem of supplying 
adequately qualified teachers for the expanding government schools.  The few teachers 
who remained in the higher technical institutes, many of which had been disbanded, 
were employed within the higher technical schools themselves.  Al-Azhar and the 
other two higher institutes were, as the evidence suggests, left alone, unreformed and 
continuing to operate along traditional Islamic lines with tradition-bound teaching 
methods and a curriculum dominated by the Islamic ‘transmitted’ sciences.  As long 
as Muhammad ‘Ali had not modernised the traditional katatib system, al-Azhar 
continued to be sufficient as a supplier of teachers to the Islamic primary schools.  
Now, under Isma’il I, state policy on education had shifted fundamentally to targeting 
and reforming primary level education and to creating a unified national education 
system rather than merely creating a parallel system alongside the religious one.  
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Changes to the primary school syllabus included teaching foreign languages, 
arithmetic, economics, history, geography and, in the case of the madaaris markaziyya 
(central schools), zoology, botany and agriculture were now added for the first time.  
This meant re-training the existing teachers and ensuring adequate provision for new 
ones as the system expanded.81 
Many students sent to Europe on Muhammad ‘Ali’s study missions (see above) 
returned to take up positions within the state bureaucracy and had, by the second half 
of the century, established themselves as senior figures with significant state 
portfolios.  ‘Ali Mubarak Pasha was one of these figures and his talents extended into 
the educational realm.  A disciple of Sheikh Rifa’a al-Tahtawi, Imam to the first group 
study mission sent to France in 1826 (see Chapter 4), ‘Ali Mubarak held the post of 
Director of the Department of Schools.  Recognising that the success of the educational 
reforms being proposed at the primary level depended on “the availability of a 
sufficient number of suitable teachers,”82 he established the first teacher training 
college in Egypt.  Dar al-‘Ulum (House of Sciences) began training qualified graduates 
and teachers from the higher institutes, drawing most of its intake from al-Azhar. 
Both measures discussed above posed a challenge to the ‘ulama’s monopoly over the 
educational sphere of Egyptian society.  A few reformist ‘ulama, spurred on by the 
ideas of Sheikh Hassan al-Attar and Sheikh Rafa’a al-Tahtawi, had come to accept that 
entrusting the provision of national education to the ‘ulama would not lead to 
sufficiently comprehensive modernisation and reform.  Thus, in the committee that 
formulated the law, ‘Ali Mubarak was able to have a number of “‘ulama and notables 
from outside government service”.83  In addition, the avenues to social mobility had 
been widened with the expansion of the state bureaucracy, associated departments and 
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commissions, courts, and the economy; this led graduates to consider more lucrative 
careers in these areas rather than the traditional paths where recognition as a member 
of the ‘ulama would lead to.  An al-Azhar education and a career as an ‘alim was once 
the only route to social mobility but now modern schools offered opportunities to those 
who sought a formal westernised education in the state schools and aspired to positions 
such as clerks, civil servants and teachers in the new modern schools.  These were the 
proto-effendis of the early twentieth century84 and the new educational institutes 
offered the possibility of gaining qualifications and obtaining the type of training that 
would lead to these careers.  The challenge to al-Azhar and the ‘ulama’s dominance 
came as a result of the state offering an alternative, non-religious education.  Students 
– both at the primary and higher levels – became attracted to the benefits that an 
expanding state and economy offered and sought careers outside the traditional 
religious channels.  So, student numbers increased within the primary schools and al-
Azhar graduates now had many more opportunities open to them. 
The ‘ulama’s hold on education was further challenged by the plans laid out in the 
Primary School Law and the emergence of Dar al-‘Ulum.  For the first time, the 
government made a concerted attempt to control the content of the entire education 
system.  It established inspectors for the primary schools and insisted on the teaching 
of new subjects and modern teaching methods, which fell outside the competencies of 
the traditional ‘ulama.85  Reforms also sought to radically alter the structure of the 
system by abandoning the previous policy of leaving the religious schools intact and 
introducing a parallel system.  In contrast to earlier efforts, Isma’il’s reforms reached 
right to the heart of the ‘ulama’s dominance, not only by weakening their control over 
schools but by absorbing these into the state structure.  Even at the higher education 
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level, al-Azhar’s dominance was challenged by the establishment of Dar al-‘Ulum and 
by the introduction of a system of formal graduation and examination.   
Previously, students at al-Azhar would study under a recognised ‘alim and gradually, 
as they acquired the necessary expertise, would begin to instruct classes themselves.  
If the student demonstrated the requisite skills and his circle of students (halqa) grew, 
this would act as tacit recognition of his skill in his chosen subjects and mastery of the 
texts.  The student would then be given the ijaza (permission) to teach or to claim 
recognition as an ‘alim.  The introduction of a formal examination process in the same 
year Dar al-‘Ulum was established drew much criticism from students and Sheikhs 
alike despite being introduced by the Sheikh al-Azhar, Sheikh Muhammad al-‘Abbasi 
al-Mahdi (see Chapter 6).  As part of the new examination system, students would be 
examined formally by a panel of senior ‘ulama in a range of subjects and texts.  The 
introduction of formal examinations was yet another example of a unified approach to 
education aimed at ensuring teachers possessed a standardised quality and knowledge 
base able to teach within a unified and centrally administered education system.86 
Although the plans detailed above were wide-ranging, their implementation was 
fraught with difficulties, clearly evidenced in the final results.  Dar al-‘Ulum’s intake 
was almost entirely made up of al-Azhar graduates.  The training and instruction these 
graduates had received coming from al-Azhar was still overwhelmingly religious in 
nature and the early intake struggled to adapt to learning new secular subjects and also 
new teaching methods.87  Upper age limits were relaxed for the new intake to 
compensate for the lack of skills.  But if the older entrants to Dar al-‘Ulum 
demonstrated a greater knowledge of Arabic and a better knowledge of other secular 
subjects, they were nevertheless more entrenched in their inability to embrace new 
methods of teaching and instruction and found it difficult to adapt to the new demands 
that Dar al-‘Ulum placed upon them.  Indeed, it has been argued that the al-Azhar 
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teachers admitted to Dar al-‘Ulum “were criticised for still being under the spell of al-
Azhar rigidity”.88 
In fact, these problems can also be seen in the available data from the first years of Dar 
al-‘Ulum’s existence.  The first point to make is that it was the only institute of its kind 
to emerge in this period.  If Dar al-‘Ulum is to be considered a challenge to al-Azhar’s 
dominance in producing teachers for the national primary schools and as a higher level 
institute, it was a particularly weak one.  In its first year, its intake was a mere fifty 
students, all from al-Azhar.89  Contrast this with the number of students enrolled in al-
Azhar around the same time in 1875 – 11,095 – reported in Heyworth-Dunne’s study.  
Indeed, even comparing this to the students enrolled at the other higher institutes at the 
time in Tanta and Alexandria in 1875 – 3,827 in the Ahmadi Mosque in Tanta and 413 
in the Ibrahim Pasha Mosque in Alexandria – the figures for Dar al-‘Ulum seem 
insignificant.90  The results of Dar al-‘Ulum’s efforts are also worth highlighting as 
these reflect the problems students encountered with the new subjects and teaching 
methods.  In the first five years of producing graduates from 1873 to 1877, Dar al-
‘Ulum produced only 18 such graduates.  In the next five years up to the ‘Urabi Revolt 
in 1882, it produced a further 32.  It was not until the early part of the twentieth century 
that it began to produce significantly more graduates, with still only 64 graduating in 
1918.91 
Not only did Dar al-‘Ulum pose a limited challenge to the ‘ulama’s dominance of the 
higher education institutes and in particular al-Azhar, it fell far short of providing the 
teachers needed for the primary schools around the country which had come under 
government control.92  The meagre supply of teachers alone was not responsible for 
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the failure of educational reform at the primary level but it is true that the under-
qualified teaching provision played a part; it proved “impossible to narrow the gap 
between the great majority of these (katatib) schools and those of the modern system; 
for instance the plan to introduce arithmetic failed”.93  During the period of Isma’il’s 
rule, the first national girls’ school was opened with two schools, the largest among all 
the schools, with a combined enrolment of 890 girls – one of the Khedive’s wives 
taking a special interest in this project.94  Yet again, despite a clear desire to reform 
primary education, efforts and results were disappointing.  By the end of Isma’il’s rule, 
“there were in Egypt some thirty modern primary schools under government control, 
eight or nine of which were outside Cairo”.95 
It is evident that the modernising reforms in Egypt over the course of the nineteenth 
century were complex and had far-reaching consequences for Egyptian society.  For 
the ‘ulama in particular, the reforms clearly had a destabilising effect.  Abolishing their 
financial privileges and cutting their ties to the ruling elites enabled Muhammad ‘Ali 
to restrict their significant political influence, amply demonstrated during the 
Ottoman/Mamluk era, the French occupation and in fact his own rise to power.  Having 
weakened the ‘ulama’s political strength considerably, he also greatly diminished their 
capacity to oppose his rule and to mount an effective challenge to his planned reforms, 
some of which were to encroach later on the ‘ulama’s traditional functions in society. 
The emergence of a modern centralised state in Egypt further intensified the challenge 
to the ‘ulama’s previously dominant position.  As the state expanded and assumed 
greater control over society through reforms, it encroached on those areas that the 
‘ulama had either once dominated or had a major hand in, such as the rural and urban 
economies, land ownership, the law, education and pedagogy.  However, while the 
challenge to the ‘ulama’s domination of these spheres was significant, reforms were 
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not comprehensive and left large parts of society untouched where the ‘ulama were 
able to retreat, construct new obstacles to reforms and devise ways to limit the 
intrusion of the state on their traditional functions. 
Furthermore, while Egypt’s rulers saw the ‘ulama as largely conservative in wanting 
to preserve their privileges and obstruct reforms, they also recognised the advantages 
of having the ‘ulama’s cooperation in implementing and legitimising the reform 
agenda.  Throughout the period under discussion there were a small number of ‘ulama 
who welcomed reform and felt this necessary if Islam and the ‘ulama were to continue 
to have relevance in a rapidly changing modern world.  These reformist ‘ulama 
disagreed with their conservative counterparts and argued for change.  More important, 
at the conceptual level, reformist ‘ulama insisted that Islam was compatible with 
modernity and saw the need for ‘ulama to broaden their learning by accepting new 
forms of scientific knowledge, an approach that was absent in the Islamic institutes 
and that had led to a general lack of progress among Muslims.  According to the 
reformist ‘ulama, the curricula of the Islamic schools and higher institutes had to be 
updated and new teaching methods and subjects had to be introduced as a basis for 
rejuvenating Egypt.  These reformist ‘ulama, often referred to as ‘modernist’ ‘ulama, 
remained close to Egypt’s rulers, retained many of the privileges of old and were able 
to have a significant impact on the shape and direction of reforms and the intellectual 
tradition within Egypt over the second half of the century. 
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Chapter Four 
Modernism, Nationalism and the Nationalisation of Islam 
The emergence of nationalism in Egypt is intimately tied to the process of 
modernisation and reform and the ways in which these impacted on Egyptian society 
throughout the nineteenth century.  The increasing centralisation of the state and 
modernising reforms limited the political role of the ‘ulama and significantly reduced 
their economic privileges and status.  These reforms also forced the ‘ulama to retreat 
within those spheres of influence and authority that remained relatively untouched by 
state encroachment.  Gradually, however, reform measures also forced ‘ulama to 
confront and engage with fundamental questions relating to the modernisation and 
reform of Egyptian society.  While, at the beginning of the century, they had tried to 
insulate themselves and their traditional spheres of authority from the changes that 
they experienced going on around them, as reforms brought greater contact with 
Europe and new ideas about education, science, progress and community, ‘ulama were 
drawn into an increasingly wide ranging debate about how these ideas related to and 
should be applied in Egypt. 
This chapter will explore the relationship between the debates about Islamic reform, 
in particular in the educational and intellectual spheres, and debates concerning the 
reform of society and the emergence of nationalism in Egypt.  Initially, these debates 
were mainly carried out among a small circle of reformist ‘ulama but, as the century 
wore on, greater numbers of ‘ulama were attracted to the debates.  Most ‘ulama 
continued to reject the idea of Islamic reform and argued that what was needed was a 
return to the pristine and authentic teachings of the sacred sources of Islam.  On the 
other hand, reform minded ‘ulama believed that a proper reading of Islam’s authentic 
sacred sources showed that embracing new forms of knowledge and broadening the 
scope of education would not only be compatible with Islam but remained fundamental 
to its teachings and principles.  In this chapter, I will focus on the work of three 
reformist ‘ulama whose lives span the nineteenth century and I will demonstrate how 
their work not only became crucial to underpinning reform efforts in Egypt but also 
how these ideas were the precursors to, and vital influences on, the emergence of 
nationalism in Egypt. 
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Tahtawi and his ‘National’ Impact 
Rifa’a Badawi Rafi’ al-Tahtawi (1801–1873)1 began his studies at al-Azhar in 1817.  
He was taught by Sheikh Hasan al-Attar,2 who was one of the most influential ‘alims 
of the day and was Sheikh al-Azhar from 1830 to 1834.  Sheikh Hasan al-Attar was 
considered a brilliant scholar and studied in Istanbul, Albania and Syria between 1803 
and 1813; on his return to Egypt, he lectured at al-Azhar and advocated the reform of 
al-Azhar education, which he believed was outdated and narrow.  In a commentary he 
wrote on the Jam’a al-jawwami, a book on the fundamentals of theology, he offered 
his views on the inadequate nature of education at al-Azhar: 
We have limited ourselves to the study of narrow, derivative books composed by 
recent authors, which we repeat throughout life, and we do not permit ourselves 
to study anything else, as if true knowledge is contained within them.  When we 
receive a question on theology that is not found within them, we dispose of it [by 
saying] that it is of the philosophers’ debate … or a literary point from among 
the topics that have been disproved.3 
He was considered an ardent reformer and, although he enjoyed the favour of 
Muhammad ‘Ali for his reformist views, he was widely disliked amongst the 
conservative al-Azhar ‘ulama who were the overwhelming majority at the time.4  His 
close association with Muhammad ‘Ali played a role in persuading the Vali to send 
the young al-Tahtawi on the educational mission to France in 1826.  Al-Tahtawi 
remained in France for five years (1826–1831) and, as well as concentrating on his 
religious function with the mission, he spent much of his time studying the “French 
language and reading books on ancient history, Greek philosophy and most 
                                                 
1
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importantly eighteenth century French Enlightenment thought especially the works of 
Voltaire, Rousseau and Montesquieu”.5  According to Albert Hourani, the period al-
Tahtawi spent in France and his study of French Enlightenment thought had a profound 
effect on his intellectual development but, crucially, Hourani shows, through al-
Tahtawi’s own written works and his career in education and translating, that his time 
in France also “left a permanent mark on the Egyptian mind”.6 
For al-Tahtawi, his French experience had not only exposed him to the ideas of the 
Enlightenment but had also shown him the power of these ideas when applied to 
society.  Retaining a critical view of the French, al-Tahtawi nevertheless saw much to 
admire: as well as the general cleanliness of Paris, he also admired the French 
insistence on the “prolonged education of children”7 as well as their “intellectual 
curiosity and above all their social morality”.8  These features of French society were, 
according to al-Tahtawi, due in large part to France adopting and indeed embracing 
the ideals and principles of the Enlightenment.  But, most important for al-Tahtawi, 
was perhaps Montesquieu’s idea of the nation as a geographically bounded entity 
imbued with a particular “national spirit”, with love of this nation being the basis for 
political virtue.9  Al-Tahtawi sought to draw parallels between these ideas of the nation 
and Egypt and began thinking about the distinct and enduring history of Egypt and its 
almost unchanging territorial boundaries.10  On his return to Egypt, he took up various 
posts, including as Head of the new School of Languages, Schools Inspector and, later, 
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editor of the Government mouthpiece newspaper Waka’i al-Misriyya (Egyptian 
Events).11 
As well as the posts mentioned above where he prepared students for the emerging 
professional schools aimed at producing educated students capable of taking up 
positions in Muhammad ‘Ali’s expanding bureaucracy, al-Tahtawi’s most notable 
contribution must be his leading role in translating and indeed commissioning and 
overseeing the translation of many great works from French into Arabic.12  His 
activities were to bring the ideas contained in these works to an Arabic reading public 
for the first time – which proved to be highly influential for the next generation of 
Egyptian intellectuals.13  Al-Tahtawi believed that education in Egypt had suffered 
under the control of the traditional ‘ulama, becoming backward and inward looking.  
Instead of embracing the technological advances taking place in Europe, Egypt found 
itself unable to comprehend these advances because of its outdated and inadequate 
education system, which ignored the rational sciences and insisted on traditional 
Islamic education.  Far from relegating them to a bygone age, though, al-Tahtawi 
called for the ‘ulama to open their learning institutes to the “sciences created by human 
reason”,14 insisting that “if the ‘ulama are to interpret the Shari’a in the light of modern 
needs, they must know what the modern world is”.15  
Coupled with his work as a translator, al-Tahtawi’s importance to the development of 
Egyptian nationalism can be seen in his own works where he is, according to Hourani, 
the first Egyptian intellectual to “articulate the idea of the Egyptian nation … [and to] 
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justify it in terms of Islamic thought”.16  On his return to Egypt from Paris, he 
published his first major work, which gave an account of his stay in Paris and his 
observations of Parisian society.17  The importance of this work lay not merely in 
recording an Egyptian’s observations of mid-nineteenth century Paris but in what it 
shows about the impact of his sojourn there on his thought.  For al-Tahtawi, the 
qualities of the French and their society, to say nothing of their power and status in 
international terms, stemmed from the ideas of the Enlightenment and the fact that the 
French had embraced these ideas with great enthusiasm.  In a later work, which deals 
more with conditions in Egypt,18 al-Tahtawi takes great pride, unlike other Islamic 
scholars of the time, in pointing towards the immensity of the achievements of the 
ancient Egyptians: the thrust of this book is to urge its readers to once again achieve 
this greatness in the modern era. 
Indeed, rather than simply advocate embracing the rationalism of the Enlightenment, 
al-Tahtawi merges this with the history and Islamic traditions of Egypt.  For instance, 
in matters of government, he clearly draws on Montesquieu’s notion of the separation 
of powers and attempts to adapt this idea to local Egyptian circumstances.  He argues 
that Egyptian society is ordered or divided into four distinct ‘estates’, each with 
particular functions, which, if working properly, should all contribute to the well-being 
of the community as a whole.  The four ‘estates’, he says, are the ruler, the ‘ulama, the 
soldiers and those engaged in economic activity.19  Rejecting the secular civic French 
model of nationalism that asserts the centrality of the people to ‘rule’ and the abolition 
of an autocratic ruler, al-Tahtawi, cautious of the proximity and dependence of his 
position on Khedival favour, upholds the traditional Islamic model of governance, 
which sees the ruler rule in conjunction with the ‘ulama and where the ‘ulama represent 
the people to the ruler.  So, while he did not feel the traditional model of Islamic 
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governance should be altered, he did see how absolute power may corrupt and 
therefore insisted on the separation of ‘estates’ as representing an effective mechanism 
limiting the ruler’s power.20 
In relation to the status of the ‘ulama and the teaching at al-Azhar, however, al-Tahtawi 
found plenty to criticise.  Vastly knowledgeable in Islamic law himself and a Shafi’i 
by legal rite, al-Tahtawi blamed Egypt’s backwardness in education on the ‘ulama and 
their continued rejection of non-Islamic forms of education and fields of enquiry being 
taught at al-Azhar.21  According to al-Tahtawi, the ‘ulama’s refusal to teach the 
rational sciences meant that Egypt’s progress in the modern world remained severely 
hampered. For al-Tahtawi, progress was important for two main reasons.  The first was 
connected to his somewhat romantic view of Egypt’s ancient past and his longing for 
modern Egypt to duplicate the monumental achievements of its ancient ancestors.  By 
linking modern Egypt with its ancient past, al-Tahtawi puts forward his idea of the 
distinctiveness of the Egyptians and the historical continuity of the community.  
Indeed, he argues that “the physical constitution of the people of these times is exactly 
that of the peoples of times past, and their disposition is one and the same”.22  The 
physical and historical continuity of the Egyptian people therefore becomes, for al-
Tahtawi, the basis of the Egyptian nation and a reason to once again achieve greatness 
and to progress in a manner that befits a people with these unique qualities. 
For al-Tahtawi, progress is also important for practical reasons and reasons of social 
utility.  The progress of Egypt meant its economic prosperity, which in turn could only 
be guaranteed through engaging with Europe.  However, this had to be from a position 
of understanding the nature of the modern world and the “European laws of trade, 
commerce and credit”.23  Government and rulers, he argued, had a responsibility to 
provide the conditions for economic prosperity and welfare, the existence of which 
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would ensure raised living standards and greater satisfaction amongst the community.  
Al-Tahtawi argued that at the heart of delivering economic prosperity and progress 
was good and responsible government and in particular virtuous rulers.  Without the 
necessary checks and balances, a function most commonly carried out by the ‘ulama, 
rulers would stray from a virtuous path and abuse their power and authority which 
would lead to a lack of prosperity for the community as a whole. 
Here, al-Tahtawi criticises the ‘ulama and their attitude towards non-Islamic 
education.  They are singled out as fundamental to the process of government and the 
progress of society, not only because of their function as teachers, but also because of 
their connection to and influence over the ruler.  In the realm of education, al-Tahtawi 
insists that “teaching must be linked with the nature and problems of society”,24 and 
here the ‘ulama’s outdated teaching methods, along with their insistence on a purely 
Islamic education, significantly hindered Egypt’s progress.  Moreover, their stance on 
education and their conservative nature was also an important factor in their declining 
influence over rulers.  While al-Tahtawi believed that “the ruler should respect and 
honour the ‘ulama [and] treat them as his helpers in the task of government”,25 he was 
also acutely aware of how the influence of the ‘ulama had declined because of a 
fundamental difference in outlook with the ruler.  Rulers, and specifically Muhammad 
‘Ali in the Egyptian context, denied the ‘ulama their long-established role as vital 
components of the governing process because of the ‘ulama’s resistance to change the 
method and content of their teaching, thereby severely obstructing Egypt’s 
modernisation and prosperity. 
It could also be argued that al-Tahtawi was critical of an education system dominated 
by Islam and the ‘ulama because of his favourable attitude towards a specifically 
Egyptian patriotism.  Consistently throughout his work the function of a modern 
education system is a major theme and one is left in no doubt that, for him, this 
represented a fundamental cornerstone of a modern, prosperous society.  But, his views 
on education were strongly connected to his ideas on the nature of community and 
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particularly the distinction between a religious community and one based on national 
similarities.  The ‘ulama, with their insistence on Islamic education were fostering a 
community based on religious belief and religious practice but for al-Tahtawi, there 
was an alternative type of community which was “a national brotherhood over and 
above the brotherhood in religion”.26 
Indeed, a major theme throughout al-Tahtawi’s work is the idea of the Egyptian nation 
and its distinctive qualities, which separate it from the Islamic ‘umma based on 
common religion.  The love of country (hubb al-watan) is for al-Tahtawi, the “main 
motive, which leads men to try to build up a civilised community”.27  The religious 
bond associated with the ‘umma, while important for al-Tahtawi, never captures his 
imagination and enthusiasm like that of the Egyptian nation.  For him, the bond of 
nationhood (wataniyya), and specifically Egyptian nationhood, is something distinct 
and continuous, quite separate from Egypt’s position within the ‘umma.  This 
articulation of Egypt as a nation is the first of its kind and, for al-Tahtawi, is based on 
the continuous shared history of Egypt, its long-standing territorial cohesion and the 
glories of its ancient past.   
While he elevates the national community to the highest level, he nevertheless 
recognises the importance of other types of community built on different types of bond.  
For instance, although he sees the historical legacy of Egypt as dating back to ancient 
Egyptian civilisation, for him the most important event in history was the Revelation 
and emergence of Islam in the seventh century.28  Thus, while his work continually 
manifests a fascination with modernity, and the imperative of embracing modern 
education, technology and modern forms of community, for him this is always 
grounded in the traditional, with constant references to Islam, the actions of the 
Prophet Muhammad and his companions – and the justifications these events provide 
to legitimise engaging with the modern world.  In this respect, he was one of the first 
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Islamic scholars to attempt to demonstrate Islam’s compatibility not only with the 
emergence of nationalism but with modernity and the western world as a whole. 
Although al-Tahtawi died in 1873, nearly a decade before the nationalist ‘Urabi Revolt 
in 1882, there remains little doubt that his ideas were central to the emergence of 
nationalism in Egypt.  The work of al-Tahtawi, both as a translator and as a writer, 
represents the beginning of Egypt’s encounter with the ideas of European 
Enlightenment thought and these ideas had a profound impact on the transformation 
of Egypt during the nineteenth century.  It is significant also that, in an age where the 
power and influence of the ‘ulama was in rapid decline, al-Tahtawi should find himself 
at the forefront of Egypt’s intellectual transformation.  Perhaps his appreciation of the 
political environment of the time and the fact that he was allied to ‘ulama explain why 
he continued to enjoy the favour of Muhammad ‘Ali and his descendants.29  True as 
this may be, it is far more important not to lose sight of al-Tahtawi’s intellectual 
engagement with the ideas emanating from Europe about the nature of knowledge and 
its relationship to society and the individual.  In this respect, al-Tahtawi’s thought and 
his intellectual contribution can be seen not as an attempt to sever Egypt from its 
historical past but of using this past to forge a new, modern, Egypt.   
Islam and Modernism in the Thought of Muhammad ‘Abduh 
There is little doubt that any discussion of Islamic reform in Egypt must include an 
analysis of the work of Muhammad ‘Abduh and his views on the need for Islamic 
reform and modernisation. 
Born in 1849 into a village family of local standing and piety in Egypt’s delta region, 
‘Abduh demonstrated scholarly attributes from an early age and was sent first to study 
in the Ahmadi Mosque (Gami’a) in Tanta and then, from 1869, at al-Azhar, where he 
completed his studies in 1877 at the age of twenty eight.30  His early career was, in 
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part, spent outside the formal ‘ulama corps and, aside from his teaching activities at 
al-Azhar and Dar al-’Ulum, he pursued writing and journalism in the first years after 
his graduation from al-Azhar.  Already during his studies in Tanta and al-Azhar, 
‘Abduh became acutely aware of the limitations of the education he was receiving, 
with its emphasis on religious instruction and the imitation and memorising of ideas 
and views of Islamic scholars from a ‘pre-modern’ era.  During his time at al-Azhar, 
‘Abduh frequently looked outside the formal al-Azhar structures in order to broaden 
his intellectual horizon and on one occasion was reprimanded by Sheikh Muhammad 
‘Illaish, a prominent conservative cleric and one of his teachers.31  However, the 
experience of meeting the renowned Afghani scholar, Islamic philosopher and 
moderniser Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and later being part of his inner circle where he 
studied under him, had by far the greatest intellectual influence on ‘Abduh’s thought.32 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani33 was one of the most vociferous critics of European 
penetration and intervention in the Islamic world.  He had arrived in Egypt via Turkey 
in 1871 and initially taught at al-Azhar university.  But, after disagreements with a 
number of prominent al-Azhar ‘ulama, he was prevented from teaching there any 
longer and began holding informal classes and discussion groups in local coffee houses 
and at his residence in the Khan al-Khalili district of Cairo close to the mosque of al-
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Azhar.34  Although he no longer taught at al-Azhar, he continued to enjoy the favour 
of Khedive Ismail and to be paid a salary.35  During the 1870s, many of the figures 
who were to play a prominent role in the nationalist movement between 1879 and 1882 
attended his classes and were influenced by his ideas.  One of these attendees was in 
fact Khedive Ismail’s son, Tawfiq, who later assumed the Khedival throne.  The young 
son of Khedive Ismail was struck by Jamal al-Din’s insistence on the need for internal 
Islamic reform, which deeply influenced him.   
Adamant that Muslim society required reform, Jamal al-Din insisted that it must come 
from Muslims themselves rather than be imposed from outside.  He also warned 
against unquestioned imitation of the west, arguing that this would lead to the 
abandonment of Islam and greater moral, social and economic decay.  To this end, he 
argued that the foundation for reform must be the wholesale reconstitution of the 
provision of education in Muslim countries.  According to Jamal al-Din, Muslims had 
for too long received a narrow education based primarily on religion, and taught 
through techniques of imitation and duplication, which had stifled intellectual rigour 
and enquiry.  By providing a broad-based education which incorporated a religious 
basis but opened up non-religious fields of enquiry, Muslims would be able to master 
aspects of the world that would equip them with the necessary tools to embrace the 
modern world and to understand Islam’s compatibility with it, as well as its relevance 
and indeed role within it.36 
Jamal al-Din’s emphasis on the need for Muslim reform came from the observation 
that the Islamic world had stagnated and had been overtaken by the western world, 
leading to large parts of the Islamic world being controlled, either directly or indirectly, 
by the European Powers, of which Britain and France were the most dominant.  His 
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political activity was aimed at limiting and ultimately ending European dominance of 
Muslim countries and he believed that, for Egypt, further European control would lead 
to greater injustice for Egyptians.  Arguing in the first instance for greater 
understanding of the modern world by broadening the scope of education, Jamal al-
Din also advocated political agitation against European dominance.  In this respect, he 
saw the use of the emerging printing press in Egypt as a fundamental tool of political 
agitation to be utilised by Egyptian intellectuals, ‘ulama and political groups in order 
to disseminate ideas of reform, liberation and anti-occupation amongst the Egyptian 
masses and make them aware of the ills of European interference. 
According to Hourani, while ‘Abduh and al-Afghani were both concerned with 
identifying the particular causes of decline and decay of Muslim societies, ‘Abduh 
“was to become a more systematic thinker than his master and have a more lasting 
influence on the Muslim mind, not only in Egypt but far beyond”.37  Certainly, far 
more of ‘Abduh’s writings remain extant than al-Afghani’s and, while both men 
travelled to other parts of the Muslim world as well as Europe, ‘Abduh remains far 
more grounded and indeed connected to Egypt, possibly through his family 
background but also perhaps through his institutional affiliations to a number of 
newspapers and journals as a writer and commentator, and to al-Azhar and Dar al-
’Ulum,38 through his teaching activities and his politico-legal roles, first as part of the 
nationalist movement but later as Egypt’s highest legal authority as Grand Mufti.  
These roles frame ‘Abduh’s career and were the mechanisms by which he sought to 
affect the change and reform of Muslim society that he believed to be imperative in 
order to halt the decline of the Islamic world and re-emphasise the importance of Islam 
in a rapidly changing and modern world. 
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At the core of ‘Abduh’s thought is the idea, shared with al-Afghani, that the Muslim 
world had declined relative to the west.  By the end of the nineteenth century the 
Muslim world was, in political terms, either directly or indirectly subordinate to the 
west, with the same being true of the Muslim world’s economic prosperity, 
technological advancement and military strength.  ‘Abduh was concerned with 
unearthing the reasons behind this decline and subordination and he thought that 
identifying the cause would enable Muslims to rectify their own situation and allow 
them to embrace progress and extract themselves from their subordinate relationship 
to the west.  According to ‘Abduh, Muslims had departed from ‘true’ Islam and its 
teachings and philosophy and, by doing this, had fallen into a condition that ‘Abduh 
likened to the pre-Islamic condition of jahiliyya (backwardness/ignorance).39  In an 
article he wrote at the beginning of his career in the newly formed al-Ahram 
newspaper,40 he claimed that Egypt was in fact in a state worse than pre-Islamic 
jahiliyya, with “hopes for our people’s development diminish[ing]”.41  Importantly, 
‘Abduh refers to the pre-Islamic period as one where “intellectual enquiry into faith or 
indeed into the details of the universe was vetoed [and where] the principle that reason 
and religion had nothing in common, but rather religion was the inveterate enemy of 
science was promulgated”.42  His criticism of late nineteenth century Egyptian society 
was based on exactly the same ideas of the divorce of Islam from reason and logic and 
the absence of rigorous intellectual enquiry in matters of faith and knowledge.43   
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In fact, ‘Abduh went as far as to suggest that Muslim populations had lost sight of and 
become separated from ‘true’ Islam because they had abandoned the use of reason and 
logic and, just as during the period of jahiliyya, Muslims now failed to recognize the 
idea that Islam could not be practised without logic and reason.  According to ‘Abduh, 
God had given man the ability to speak and think not only for the purposes of 
understanding the world and the divine order of things but also to use these faculties 
to develop the world out of its primitive state.44  The fact that God had created man 
and the universe did not mean that the universe was static and could not be changed. 
On the contrary, ‘Abduh argued, man was given reason precisely so that the world 
(which was God’s creation) could be altered and developed from a primitive state to 
one where, through understanding and critical evaluation of its characteristics, could 
be altered and indeed modernised. For ‘Abduh, Islam more than any other religion 
freed man from the confines of narrow belief and opened a vast horizon of enquiry 
based on its fundamental compatibility with, indeed insistence on, the use and 
importance of free reason, critical enquiry and logic.45 
However, if it was true that at the core of Islam there existed a fundamental 
compatibility with reason and logic, why, according to ‘Abduh, had this disappeared?  
And what was behind his notion that Muslims (Muslims in Egypt) had ventured away 
from the ‘true’ Islam?  ‘Abduh first criticised the various developments within Islamic 
civilisation that encouraged schism and disunity amongst Muslims after the period of 
the first four Rashidun Caliphs.  Internal struggles amongst Muslims, between sects 
and dynasties, followers of the different schools of legal thought and adherence to the 
different theological schools had all contributed to the emergence of schisms in belief 
and practice.  ‘Abduh first singles out the period during the Abbasid dynasty when the 
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Caliphs “became content to possess the title of ‘Caliph’ and ceased to be scholars and 
trained in religious matters, rejecting the exercise of ijtihad (independent reason)”46 in 
favour of taqlid (imitation) -based learning and scholarship (i.e. the imitation and 
memorisation of, and adherence to, previously held laws and rules) as the period when 
disunity befell the Muslims. 
A second important phase for ‘Abduh, which leads to the end of the practice of ijtihad, 
was the passing of the Caliphate from Arab to Turkish Ottoman hands.  According to 
‘Abduh, under Turkish rule Muslims were encouraged to abandon the use of reason 
and logic as a means to discover ‘truths’ about the world and instead to rely only on 
those ‘truths’ that had been deciphered for them by previous Islamic scholars and 
transmitted through the ages by mere imitation and memorisation rather than critical 
evaluation and the use of independent reasoning and logic.  For ‘Abduh, Ottoman 
control of the Islamic Caliphate suffered from a crisis of legitimacy because it took the 
institution out of Arab hands and into Turkish hands.  This transition of power meant 
that the centrality of the relationship of Islam and the Arabs was lost and, with it, a 
proper understanding of Islam, of the Arabic Quran and of the Prophet’s message, who 
after all was an Arab.47  The idea that the Turks fundamentally misunderstood Islam 
and the Prophet’s message and did not represent the ‘core’ of Islam had led to the 
questioning of their legitimacy to head the ‘umma and, ‘Abduh tells us, as a result, 
they stifled independent reason and critical free thinking and encouraged blind 
acceptance of established rules and norms in an attempt to curb internal dissent and 
protect their own rule.  Co-opting and corrupting the ‘ulama became the means by 
which they achieved this goal as it was the ‘ulama who controlled and were responsible 
for education, adherence to the Shari’a and determining how Islam would be 
interpreted and applied in society.48 
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Clearly, for ‘Abduh, the ‘ulama played a vital role in Islamic society and he returns to 
the subject of their moral corruption throughout his life and works.49  For ‘Abduh, the 
legal, educational and political spheres of Muslim society were intricately connected 
to each other and at the core of his thought was the belief that Muhammad’s prophetic 
mission was not only to communicate and spread God’s message but also to build a 
virtuous community based on divine law as contained in the Quranic revelation.  
‘Abduh believed that communities were based on laws that should be understood and 
recognised by people within the community.  As the world changed through the ages, 
so laws would have to adapt to this change, not merely through imitating legal 
decisions taken previously by Islamic legal scholars but by using reason, logic and 
modern methods of interpretation based on Enlightenment rationalism, in order to keep 
laws relevant to Muslim peoples throughout the passage of time.   
The dominance of taqlid meant that in matters of legal interpretation and Quranic 
exegesis, Muslims had yet again moved away from the ‘true’ Islam.  So, if laws were 
the basis of a virtuous community and adherence to divine law ensured orthodoxy and 
proximity to ‘true’ Islam, for ‘Abduh the question of the interpretation of the divine 
sources of law became crucial to Muslims if they were to adhere to laws that kept them 
closely connected to the teachings and message of Islam.  It was in this respect that he 
argued that taqlid and its advocates had led Muslims away from true Islam and he laid 
the responsibility for this firmly in the hands of the ‘ulama. 
The debate over whether the practice of taqlid was an adequate method of applying 
laws and rules to Muslim society, particularly in a modern era where many legal 
questions and issues had no comparable examples in earlier periods, versus the practice 
and allowable extent of ijtihad (independent reasoning), went to the heart of the issue 
of education in Muslim societies and questions concerning its content, delivery and 
purpose.  Put simply, if taqlid was to remain the dominant method of legal formulation 
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and reasoning, the education system must reflect this in ensuring students learnt (and 
in most cases memorised) legal texts and philosophies of the early Islamic jurists and 
the ways in which they interpreted the Quran and Hadith in setting the legal and moral 
code for the Muslim community.  If on the other hand, one believed in the necessity 
of ijtihad, as ‘Abduh did, in ensuring that independent reason and logic be used in 
formulating laws and applying the Quran and Hadith to an entire array of rapidly 
changing legal and moral issues, the education system in its present state was not fit 
for purpose. 
As well as being responsible for determining pedagogical method and Quranic 
exegesis in Egypt, the dominance of taqlid had important consequences, according to 
‘Abduh, for Egypt’s national progress.  Since he held that Europe’s domination over 
Muslim societies, and specifically Egypt, was as a direct consequence of Europe’s 
embrace of new scientific knowledge and the rationalist ideals of the Enlightenment,50 
he attributed Egypt’s fall back into a nineteenth century state of jahiliyya to the 
widespread rejection of scientific learning within al-Azhar and the government 
schools.  In a rhetorical article published at the start of his career in journalism he 
comments on a group of students who looked beyond the traditional Islamic sciences 
that were being taught at the time and their attempts to venture into the field of rational 
scientific enquiry.  ‘Abduh tells us that they were told by their families to “stop reading 
these misleading texts in order that you do not fall into sin and to follow the footsteps 
and beliefs of [your] fathers and grandfathers”.51  For ‘Abduh this showed how 
methods of teaching that insisted on imitation and memorisation went together with an 
educational content focused on the Islamic sciences and rejection of modern scientific 
enquiry: they were equally responsible for Egypt’s backwardness and lack of progress. 
‘Abduh’s thought and his views on Egyptian and wider Islamic society are important 
for understanding his association with ‘Urabi and the nationalist movement.  Prior to 
the revolution of 1882, his ideas about Egypt’s backwardness were formed during his 
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time as a student at al-Azhar and in his early career when, along with al-Afghani and 
others within their intellectual circle, they discussed ways to change the situation and 
elevate Egypt and the rest of the Islamic world to a position of international envy and 
prominence.  ‘Abduh used the Egyptian press to disseminate his views as widely as 
possible and, reformist ‘ulama being by no means in the majority, ‘Abduh’s views 
were opposed vehemently by large parts of the conservative ‘ulama.  However, this 
did not deter ‘Abduh’s prolific writing and publishing and frank assessment of the 
dominance of conservative ‘ulama and their insistence on taqlid based methods of 
learning and interpretation as being at the root of Egypt’s problems of backwardness 
and poverty.52   
Importantly though, rather than impose European laws and education models on 
Egyptian society, ‘Abduh believed that the solutions to Egypt’s problems lay in its 
people’s return to ‘true’ Islam.  To embrace free reason, science, scientific enquiry and 
critical evaluation of circumscribed or preordained ‘truths’ was, for him, also to 
embrace ‘true’ Islam.  In this crucial aspect of ‘Abduh’s thought, it is clear to see the 
role that Islam plays in his attempts to reawaken Egyptian society.  Through the return 
to ‘true’ Islam, now identified with the recognition of the importance of science and 
scientific knowledge and understanding, Egyptians would be able to overhaul their 
education system and introduce modern scientific subjects relevant to a modern world.  
At the same time, a return to ‘true’ Islam would also ensure that the sacred sources of 
the Shari’a could be properly and critically interpreted using the methods of ijtihad 
and then applied to society as rules for proper conduct and behaviour, thereby ensuring 
orthodoxy in practice and the continuation of the Prophet Muhammad’s virtuous 
community.53 
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Nation and ‘Umma in Marsafi’s Risalat 
The nineteenth century modernisation and transformation of Egypt had allowed 
greater European penetration of Egyptian society and with this came the influx of new 
political ideas.  The spread of European nationalism in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution (1789) had had a profound impact on the nature of government in Europe 
where rule by the people and representative government altered Europe’s political 
landscape by replacing the sovereignty of monarchical rule.  The appeal of nationalism 
and its emphasis on the nation as the most ethical form of community, with the right 
to govern itself, soon spread beyond Europe.54  In Egypt, new political ideas were 
quickly adopted as a result of Egypt’s constitutional developments and its increasing 
contact with Europe.  Coupled with the expansion of the popular press in particular 
under Khedive Isma’il, discussion and debate concerning new political ideas linked to 
local political events increasingly took place in the emerging popular press.55 
With terms like nation, community and fatherland being used increasingly frequently 
in Egypt, a prominent Sheikh from al-Azhar thought it necessary to define such terms 
in order that people better understood them and were able to use them properly.  Sheikh 
Husayn al-Marsafi (d.1890)56 published his Risalat al-Kalem al-Thaman (Treatise on 
the Eight Words) in 1882, the very year of the ‘Urabi Revolt.  It is important to 
highlight two aspects of his book that should be considered when looking at its content 
and that serve to provide important context not only for this book but also the overall 
significance of al-Marsafi’s contribution. 
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The first important point about al-Marsafi’s Risalat is the timing of its publication, 
coming in the year that the ‘Urabi Revolt entered its most decisive phase – but also the 
year when the Revolt itself ultimately failed. The British invasion of Egypt brought 
‘Urabi’s nationalist movement down and restored Khedive Tawfiq to power: the 
Khedive was widely considered to be under the influence of the British.  In fact, the 
timing of the book’s publication marks the culmination of a period of events that saw 
the emergence of an Egyptian national consciousness through a number of processes 
and new developments in Egyptian politics, which al-Marsafi, partly at least, attempts 
to address in his work.  So, for instance, the development of an Egyptian constitution 
had taken place, as had the development of parliamentary politics.57  While these two 
crucial developments had not been entirely successful in wresting political control 
from the Khedive, they nevertheless did stimulate widespread debate about the 
justification of Khedival rule and the imperative of national self-rule.  In this way, al-
Marsafi’s contribution can be seen as coming at an important juncture where the 
emergence of nationalism in Egypt and the idea of political independence help to 
articulate an Egyptian national consciousness and promote a more forceful drive 
towards political nationalism. 
The second important point is that al-Marsafi’s book is an attempt by a prominent al-
Azhar ‘alim to explain key political terms that had come into popular usage.  For much 
of the nineteenth century, almost all the ‘ulama remained on the political margins, with 
successive rulers increasing the distance between Egypt’s political institutions and its 
religious ones (and thereby lessening the influence of the ‘ulama).  Al-Marsafi’s book 
thus represents a significant turning point for the ‘ulama – the fact that a high ‘alim 
from al-Azhar was defining political terms and institutions that the ‘ulama themselves 
had been expelled from or were excluded from participating in.  For instance, the 
‘ulama had been almost entirely excluded from the realms of government and politics 
and yet here was a prominent ‘alim defining these very terms.  Similarly, the 
educational realm had been entirely under the control of the ‘ulama but, with the 
growth of non-religious schools in the nineteenth century, the ‘ulama found themselves 
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being increasingly criticised and in fact marginalised in this sector.  Al-Marsafi’s 
Risalat ignores this marginalisation and offers a lengthy definition of what an 
education system should deliver.  Most compelling of all is al-Marsafi’s definition of 
the two categories of community with which he begins his book – al-‘Umma and al-
Watan – which defy the traditional view of Islam’s incompatibility with nationalism 
and put forward the idea that Islam can in fact live with and accommodate loyalty to 
the nation.  And it is the author’s background as a recognised and highly respected 
member of the al-Azhar ‘ulama that elevates the significance of al-Marsafi’s Risalat. 
The Risalat offers guidance, definitions and explanations on eight key words that al-
Marsafi considers to be in popular usage: al-‘umma (the nation), al-watan (the 
homeland), al-hukuma (the government), al-‘adl (justice), al-zulm (injustice), al-
siyasa (politics), al-hurriya (liberty/freedom) and al-tarbiya (upbringing).58  For the 
purposes of this study, I will concern myself with the first two terms only as these 
demonstrate the ways in which al-Marsafi defined and indeed conceptualised these 
types of communities and their particular traits.   
For al-Marsafi, “a nation [al-‘umma] is a group of people bound by a certain tie”.59  
According to al-Marsafi, there are three possible ties of a national group, the tie of 
language, the tie of place or territory and the tie of religion.60  Al-Marsafi’s definitions 
appear in the first section of his book dealing with al-‘umma and it is no surprise that 
his idea of al-‘umma and a national group overlap considerably.  In classical Islamic 
terms, the ‘umma was seen to have three important defining features.  The first of these 
was the bonds of religion, where the ‘umma was a community of Muslims sharing 
religious ideals, adhering to a single holy text, accepting the Holy Prophet and indeed 
all the teachings of this Prophet.  Common belief in Islam and the acceptance of its 
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teachings and traditions meant that all other ties relating to tribe or ethnic group were 
relegated to a position beneath that of common faith.  In al-Marsafi’s conception of 
the nation, the religious tie is an important one where “people follow a Prophet and 
commit themselves to his laws”.61   Indeed, the nation for al-Marsafi is a religious 
community and thus his definition shares the religious features of the classical 
definition of al-‘umma.  It should further be recognised that his emphasis on religious 
ties was not only meant to remind people of the centrality of the ‘ulama to the nation 
but was also aimed at supporting the native nationalist movement led by ‘Urabi against 
the prospect of the imminent ‘non-Islamic’ British invasion of ‘Muslim’ Egypt.   
However, for al-Marsafi by far the most important national bond is the bond of a 
common language.  He insists that the “nation that is bound by language is the most 
proper one because language comes from within the people”.62  Here, al-Marsafi is 
perhaps pointing towards the organic qualities of the nation where he draws an analogy 
between the nation’s linguistic foundations and the growth of a tree, arguing that a 
nation is similar, with an abundant root providing the basis for larger growth and 
ensuring that, in the event that the tree dies, other trees would certainly succeed it.63  
As well as pointing towards the nation’s organic characteristics, he is also raising the 
question of the nation’s authenticity.  In arguing that language comes from the people, 
al-Marsafi’s line of reasoning is that the linguistic nation is also the authentic nation 
because language derives from the people. 
The qualities and characteristics of a linguistic nationalism appear frequently in al-
Marsafi’s work and in a later section, where he talks about the importance of 
newspapers to the development of the nation, not only is there the presence of a proto-
Andersonian conception of the nation being ‘imagined’ on the back of the development 
of print capitalism64 but there is also the insistence that the language in newspapers 
should be accessible to the public in order to inform and engage the nation because 
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“when a group of people share the same language, they live in harmony”.65  Still, 
overall, the importance al-Marsafi attaches to the linguistic basis of the nation is again 
reminiscent of classical ideas of the ‘umma.  The ‘umma was seen primarily as a 
religious community and the Arabic language was itself seen as closely tied to the 
religious community, underlined by the importance of the Quran being an Arabic text 
recited in Arabic not only by Arab speaking Muslims but also by non-Arabic speaking 
Muslims around the world.  So, despite the existence of non-Arabic speaking Muslims 
in the ‘umma, the widespread practice and indeed imperative of reading and reciting 
the Quran in the original Arabic represents an important part of being part of the 
Islamic ‘umma for all Muslims regardless of linguistic group. 
Departing somewhat from a classical definition of the Islamic ‘umma, al-Marsafi puts 
forward his third basis of a nation, which for him is the idea of a nation being 
territorially bounded. According to al-Marsafi, “a nation bound by territory means a 
group of people possessing a piece of land that distinguishes them from other territorial 
nations like the Egyptian nation or the Hijazi nation”.66  At first glance, al-Marsafi’s 
emphasis on an ‘Egyptian nation’ seems at odds with the universalism of the ‘umma.  
By classifying the nation along particular ‘Egyptian’ or ethno-national lines, his 
territorial definition appears to contradict the core idea of the ‘umma of transcending 
tribal, ethnic or national bonds and can even be seen to have the least in common with 
the classical idea of the ‘umma in that the ‘umma has no borders or fixed territory and 
in fact territorial boundaries are almost meaningless.  More important, when seen 
within the context of a failing Ottoman Empire and the emergence of an increasingly 
forceful native nationalist movement in Egypt, al-Marsafi’s assertion, at that particular 
historical moment, of the existence of an exclusively Egyptian territorial nation would 
appear to question and indeed defy Egypt’s place within the Ottoman Empire.  If the 
three factors in al-Marsafi’s definition of ‘umma were the bonds of religion, language 
and territory, the Egyptian nation qualifies under all three criteria.  In contrast, the 
Ottoman Empire would just about fit the criteria under the bond of religion and, 
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without explicitly drawing this conclusion, al-Marsafi may well be questioning the 
legitimacy of the Ottoman Islamic ‘umma itself.   
While al-Marsafi’s emphasis on the territoriality of the nation and particularly his 
remarks about an exclusively Egyptian nation can be seen to oppose the traditional 
view of the ‘umma, there is nevertheless some evidence to suggest that even the 
territorial aspect of al-Marsafi’s definitions of the nation cannot be taken to be a 
complete departure from the idea and form of the classical ‘umma.  Indeed, while the 
‘Egyptian nation’ refers to a relatively undisputed territorial demarcation, it is equally 
true to point out that even the traditional ‘umma had within it a territorial aspect.  The 
dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) was a central feature of classical ideas of the ‘umma, as 
was its opposite the dar al-Harb (abode of war).67  While these demarcations pitted 
Muslims in the ‘Muslim lands’ against non-Muslims, either for expansion or defence, 
they were clearly linked to ideas of territory – on the one hand, the territory of the 
Muslims and, on the other, the territory of the non-Muslims.  In this way, al-Marsafi’s 
insistence on the territorial aspect of the nation can be seen to share some common 
ground with features of the ‘umma.  However, the similarities become even stronger 
where al-Marsafi talks about the defence of the territory of the nation.  According to 
al-Marsafi, “the nation must believe that their land is like one’s home [and] they should 
defend it with their lives”.68  Here, al-Marsafi can be seen to invoke the moral 
imperative upon all Muslims to engage in jihad in order to defend the integrity of the 
dar al-Islam.  By linking the moral imperatives of jihad to the defence of Muslim 
territory, he is also, almost certainly, making a strong point in the direction of the need 
to defend Egypt against a non-Muslim British invasion.  This can be seen when al-
Marsafi insists that “nobody should be allowed in one’s home unless for service, 
visiting or living but even for these purposes there are certain limits”.69 
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In addition to al-Marsafi’s idea of the three ties of the nation and their similarity to the 
features of the classical ‘umma, there are two more striking aspects of the Risalat 
worth highlighting here.  The first is the prominence of a moral dimension to al-
Marsafi’s conception of the nation.  His definitions not only attempt to make the nation 
into a moral community but also, for al-Marsafi, human agency, being crucial to the 
development of the nation, is driven by a moral imperative.  In addressing the reasons 
behind the improvement or worsening of the condition of the nation, he insists that 
tolerance lies behind a nation’s strength and intolerance behind its decline.70  So, for 
instance, he repeatedly refers to the need to respect the opinions of others, whether 
they are the nation’s youth or its elders, and insists that the nation should be in constant 
discussion and consultation with its people, with recognition of people’s rights as well 
as duties towards the nation.71  
Al-Marsafi addresses the question of rights and duties more extensively in his chapter 
on al-watan.  He uses the word watan in a broad sense to mean ‘homeland’ and argues 
that there exists many different types of watan, all serving different and varying 
purposes.  He identifies a public homeland and explains that this is a “piece of land 
that a community would consider as their place where they would live and work for 
their land”.72  Similarly, he points out that there also exists a ‘private watan’, which is 
one’s residence; the soul also is watan as this is the place where one’s feelings reside; 
the watan of the body is where the soul resides, and so on.73  Clearly then for al-
Marsafi, al-watan is about residency, where “the house, the district, the village, the 
country, the world and globe are watan because they are places of residency”.74 
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Conversely, while al-Marsafi’s definition of al-watan goes beyond the boundaries of 
the nation, his focus on the rights of the watan are emblematic of the rights he sees 
should be accorded to the nation and he insists that the watan has rights that everybody 
– whether in the public or private domain – has a moral imperative to uphold.  So, for 
instance, in the case of the city and the country, which for al-Marsafi represent two 
types of watan, he insists that while people have civic duties to maintain its streets and 
roads, the government has a duty to ensure the safety of people and their cattle by 
limiting the traffic on the roads and providing paths for pedestrians.75  In a similar way, 
he argues that the country’s rights emanate from the people’s sense of civic 
responsibility, where “everybody should believe that his country needs his time and 
effort and when people have this feeling, it will benefit their own security and they 
would never hesitate in helping their own country”.76  In this way, al-Marsafi 
demonstrates the moral dimensions of the nation (or watan) by urging people’s actions 
to be based on moral and ethical principles but also for the nation to be seen as a moral 
community enshrining the rights of the people. 
If al-Marsafi portrays the nation as a moral community, he places Islam and the ‘ulama 
at the centre of this community.  Throughout the Risalat, he gives example after 
example of the practices of the Prophet Muhammad to highlight and support his views 
and opinions about the particular features and imperatives of both ‘umma and watan.  
While these two types of community share similar characteristics, it is clear how, for 
al-Marsafi, the nation’s moral robustness stems from its Islamic core and the ‘ulama’s 
ability to “call people to do good deeds and dismiss them from doing the wrong 
ones”.77  Indeed, on the importance of the ‘ulama to the nation, al-Marsafi portrays 
them as representing the historical continuity between the Prophet Muhammad and his 
companions, through to the early Imams and their methods of legal interpretation, and 
ending, finally, with the modern ‘ulama providing explanations of the Quran and 
Hadith and moral guidance for the community.  In this way, through their 
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understanding and interpretation of the holy texts of Islam, they are able to provide 
people with a direct link to the original teachings of Islam and a legitimate guide for 
everyday behaviour.   
The bond of a common religion receives by far the most extensive treatment in al-
Marsafi’s definitions of ‘umma.  He argues that the nation’s bonds grow stronger 
through “holding fast to the rope of God”.78  For him, the bond of religion not only 
leads to unity but also ensures that the nation remains just, equitable and fair.  
However, while the lessons for keeping the community morally and ethically robust 
can be found in the original teachings and texts of Islam contained in the Hadith and 
the Quran, al-Marsafi tells us that “people tend to forget and get distracted by other 
things”.79  By this he means that, by becoming divorced from their religion, the 
cohesion of the community is weakened and the community loses sight of its purpose 
and ideal and begins to decay and become weak, making it prone to attack from 
external forces.  This was a common theme among both the conservative and reformist 
‘ulama at the time, where religious and moral regeneration were seen as the appropriate 
and necessary responses to modernisation and European penetration.  Here, al-Marsafi 
can be seen to be pointing towards the crisis that Egypt found itself in at the end of the 
nineteenth century where Egypt faced the threat of British invasion.  At the same time, 
he also points towards the importance of “a group of people for the sake of reforming 
an entire nation”80 but it is left unclear to whom al-Marsafi is referring here. 
Indeed, for al-Marsafi, the group of people tasked with reforming the nation would 
almost certainly have included the ‘ulama.  However, he by no means bundles the 
entire ‘ulama corps together.  On the contrary, he admits that, while the “orators of the 
pulpit [are] more skilled than the public”81 at interpreting the holy texts of Islam, some 
are also guilty of merely “memorising words whose meanings they don’t 
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understand”.82  Looking at the ‘ulama through the lens of history, al-Marsafi claims 
that the early ‘ulama “established the discipline of the fundamentals of religion [and] 
purified the authentic pillars of Islam”.83  Later, the ‘ulama developed legal techniques 
and methodologies in order to interpret the holy texts and ensure their practical use 
and applicability as well as their continued relevance to the community.  As described 
above, this era in ‘ulama history was accompanied by the emergence of differences 
between contending schools of thought and interpretation and these differences often 
spilt over into violent hostility between opposing groups.  At this point, al-Marsafi tells 
us, the ‘ulama became politicised, as rulers became involved in their infighting and 
‘ulama allied themselves to different rulers, thus beginning the process of the ‘ulama’s 
moral corruption.84 
According to al-Marsafi, the period when ‘ulama became politicised was brought on 
by their disunity and what followed was a period where public trust in the ‘ulama 
declined because, rather than work for the public interest, they were seen to be 
embroiled in currying favour with the political rulers and indeed under the influence 
of these rulers.85  With this process of politicisation came an increasing separation 
between the nation and its religious ties, with devastating consequences for the 
strength of the nation.  The very bond responsible for the nation’s cohesion was being 
lost through the disunity of the ‘ulama and their political ambitions.  Without a strong 
unified ‘ulama acting as moral guardians and protectors of the faith, the nation, 
according to al-Marsafi, will inevitably suffer and become weak.  So although he holds 
the disunity of the ‘ulama as largely responsible for the decline of the nation, it would 
also be fair to say that, for al-Marsafi, the religious bond that provides a vital cohesive 
element for the nation does, in fact, derive from having a strong unified ‘ulama corps.  
Viewed in this way and looking at the emphasis he places on Islam being the moral 
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bedrock of the nation, the ‘ulama become the sole group of people that protects the 
very foundations of the nation.  They are, in al-Marsafi’s opinion, “like Prophets but 
without Revelation [and] are the guardians of the Revelation who explain its content 
to the people and educate them through this Revelation”.86 
As was mentioned previously, the Risalat must be seen within the context of its 
historical backdrop.  Published in 1882, the year when the nationalist movement of 
Ahmad ‘Urabi emerged as a powerful political force with mass popular appeal, the 
Risalat was not widely read by the population of Egypt and cannot directly take 
responsibility for the popular appeal of ‘Urabi’s nationalist movement.  The main 
readership of al-Marsafi’s Risalat would have been the ‘ulama and where the 
significance of the Risalat’s contribution to the nationalist movement can be seen is in 
its appeal to the ‘ulama and indeed other branches of Egypt’s intelligentsia.  A highly 
prominent ‘alim, al-Marsafi came from a family of eminent scholars and taught Arabic 
Literature at al-Azhar and later Dar al-’Ulum.  He was highly respected by his 
contemporaries as a brilliant teacher and scholar and can be considered one of the elite 
or high ranking ‘alims of the day.87  
His status as a high ranking ‘alim and pro-nationalist are confirmed by the fact that he 
was one of the senior ‘ulama who signed the fatwa that deposed Khedive Tawfiq as 
ruler of Egypt in July 1882 (see Chapter 7).  With al-Marsafi occupying such a 
prominent and senior position within the ‘ulama corps, the publication of his Risalat 
would have attracted the interest of many ‘ulama within Egypt.  Along with his 
prominent status, his engagement with the issues of nationalism, and Egypt’s 
‘national’ status in particular, would have been eagerly observed by many of his fellow 
‘ulama and would have stimulated and encouraged widespread debate of these issues 
amongst a large number of them.   
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Whether they agreed with him on his definitions or his observations and views on the 
nature of the nation and ‘fatherland’ cannot be determined accurately.  However, what 
al-Marsafi’s intervention demonstrates is the commencement of the elite ‘ulama’s 
participation in the nationalist politics of the day and, indeed, the beginning of their 
engagement with a nationalist movement that sought to give voice simultaneously to 
an emerging Egyptian national consciousness as well as a rejection of Ottoman and 
British imperialism. 
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Chapter 5 
The Strategist and the Orator: Islam and the ‘Urabi Revolt 
Muhammad ‘Abduh, Islam and Egyptian Nationalism 
Although it is widely accepted that Sheikh Muhammad ‘Abduh played a prominent 
role supporting the nationalist movement, his support of ‘Urabi and the nationalists 
was in no way a straightforward matter.  When the nationalist movement was still in 
its infancy – in fact when it was only a protest movement aiming to acquire greater 
rights and status for Egyptian army officers in 1879–1880 – ‘Abduh was ruthlessly 
critical of its aims.  In ‘Abduh’s view, ‘Urabi and the rest of the military officers were 
pursuing narrow self-serving objectives that failed to address the underlying causes of 
Egypt’s problems, which ‘Abduh believed could only be repaired by reforming 
people’s minds, changing the education they received and strengthening the legitimacy 
of the laws under which Egyptians lived. Instead, ‘Urabi and his fellow army officers 
were protesting over the number of local Egyptian officers permitted in the army and 
about raising the pay and status of native Egyptian officers to match that of their Turco-
Circassian counterparts.  Evidently, there was a fundamental and sizeable difference 
between ‘Abduh’s desire for widespread Islamic reform, albeit beginning within a 
national Egyptian context, and ‘Urabi’s limited demands for increased rights for local 
army officers.1 
‘Abduh’s criticism of ‘Urabi’s movement was based on a number of points of 
fundamental disagreement.  First, ‘Abduh believed that ‘Urabi and his fellow officers 
came from, and represented, the elite class of native Egyptians and therefore could not 
truly represent the people of Egypt.  According to ‘Abduh, national movements that 
challenge the authority and legitimacy of dictatorial regimes usually came from an 
educated middle class or working class background.2  Of key importance for ‘Abduh 
here was the matter of education and, while Egypt possessed a middle class and 
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working/peasant class, the latter were, for ‘Abduh significantly lacking in education.  
As a consequence, ‘Abduh argued that, even if ‘Urabi and the army officers were 
successful in limiting Khedival power and devolving power through parliament to the 
people, without the mass of the people possessing necessary education and knowledge 
on how best to use this power, the efforts of the army officers would be counter-
productive and highly damaging for the long-term development of the nation.3 
As well as the premature assumption of power by an uneducated middle/working class 
who were not yet ‘ready’ to exercise power in a meaningful way, ‘Abduh also argued 
that the protests of ‘Urabi and his fellow officers and their desire to confront the 
Khedive in order to limit his political authority would, in all likelihood, end in foreign 
intervention and occupation.4  For him, this would be disastrous as it would jeopardise 
the reforms so carefully planned by ‘Abduh and his fellow modernisers.  Throughout 
the period of Isma’il’s reign (1863–1879), Egypt’s parliament, despite huge financial 
burdens, had been steadily gaining in confidence and authority and was increasingly 
able to check Khedive Isma’il’s rule.5  Significant changes were being experienced in 
Egypt’s political culture, with a plethora of new newspapers and journals being 
produced by Egypt’s emerging printing press.6  The political opinions represented in 
the new newspapers and journals, while not explicitly critical of Khedival rule, did, 
however, offer wide-ranging views on political, social, cultural and economic matters.  
Satirical journals were also emerging that were able to offer harsher criticism of the 
government and the Khedive, albeit disguised under a veil of humour.7  ‘Abduh’s 
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mentor, al-Afghani, had urged the reform minded intellectuals whom he had taught 
and influenced during his time in Egypt to use the emerging printing presses to 
disseminate modernist views, which had as their rallying call the reawakening of 
Islamic societies in order to eliminate the dominance of Europe over them.8 
The third and perhaps most fundamental difference between the two stemmed from 
‘Abduh’s belief that the transformation and modernisation of Islam that he and other 
reformers had been calling for during the 1870s would in fact take many years to 
accomplish.  Indeed, it would take generations to change the ways Muslims thought 
about the world, and for Muslims to accept and understand their religion’s 
compatibility with modern science, the ideals of the Enlightenment and socio-
economic and political progress.9  As for ‘Urabi’s talk of establishing a truly 
independent parliament in Egypt for the people, ‘Abduh’s response was to dismiss 
‘Urabi’s claims, arguing that “the first thing must be education and upbringing (‘ilm 
wa tarbiyya) in order to create men capable of practising parliamentary life and who 
understand how to encourage government to work for the people”.10  Indeed, the 
animosity between ‘Urabi and ‘Abduh is reported to have reached dramatic 
proportions: on more than one occasion ‘Abduh’s criticisms of ‘Urabi’s nationalist 
movement prompted ‘Urabi and his followers to exit the room when ‘Abduh was 
present.  Some reports stated that ‘Urabi’s officers had at times actually threatened to 
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physically harass ‘Abduh, even plotting to assassinate him if he continued to criticise 
‘Urabi and his fellow officers.11 
However, although ‘Abduh was critical of ‘Urabi’s self-interested movement, and 
animosity between the two does appear to have been fierce, over the course of events 
during the years 1881 and 1882, the two were nevertheless brought closer together.  
While in the years 1879 and 1880, ‘Urabi’s movement for Egyptian army officers was 
by no means a popular nationalist movement and lacked widespread appeal and 
support, events in 1881 and 1882 moved quickly and, as a result, ‘Urabi found himself, 
by the end of 1881, at the head of a movement that was now nationalist in its demands 
and, furthermore, supported by a significant proportion of Egyptians of varying social 
class and background.12  Far from suggesting a lack of agency on the part of ‘Urabi to 
shape and take advantage of events, it was ‘Urabi himself who did indeed alter his 
demands and make changes to his movement to take advantage of the growing 
uncertainty of the revolutionary situation, adopting new strategies and forcing all the 
concerned parties (Britain, the Ottoman Empire and the Egyptian Khedive) to confront 
nationalist demands and protests themselves driven by ‘Urabi and the nationalist 
movement (see Chapter 6).  In this way, ‘Abduh’s concerns about the representative 
nature of an anti-Khedival movement and his insistence on its working class 
foundations seem to have been somewhat satisfied by the fact that ‘Urabi’s nationalist 
movement had, by late 1881, gained sufficient mass popular support and could no 
longer be ignored.13 
As the revolutionary events of 1881 and 1882 unfolded, it became increasingly 
apparent that the Ottoman Empire would not support ‘Urabi in his struggle against the 
incumbent Khedive Tawfiq.  For ‘Urabi and his movement to take on and attempt to 
depose the Khedive, was thus implicitly go against the wishes of the Ottoman Sultan 
and thus he needed the support of his own local ‘ulama to imbue the nationalist 
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movement with religious authority.  Had the Ottoman Sultan supported ‘Urabi and the 
nationalists, it is likely that ‘Urabi would not have appealed to the local Egyptian 
‘ulama as there would have been no need to do so.  The Ottoman Sultan would simply 
have dismissed Khedive Tawfiq by issuing a firman (royal mandate) from Istanbul as 
he had done in the case of Tawfiq’s father Isma’il.14  But, the Ottoman Sultan was 
clearly concerned that such a measure might trigger British armed intervention in 
Egypt in support of Khedive Tawfiq and Britain’s own interests.  Seeking to avoid a 
potential conflict with Britain, which would have resulted in certain loss of territory, 
the Ottoman Empire acted both indecisively and duplicitously, supporting both 
Egyptian parties and then finally, under British pressure, officially supported Khedive 
Tawfiq.  It is clear, then, that the international dimension of the internal struggle taking 
place between ‘Urabi and Khedive Tawfiq was crucial.  In view of the position of the 
Ottoman Empire, ‘Urabi required the support of the Sultan in his confrontation with 
the Khedive in return for assurances of his and Egypt’s loyalty.  But, when that was 
not forthcoming, he turned to the Egyptian ‘ulama in order to inject his own nationalist 
movement with an alternative, religious, authority.15 
In turn, ‘Abduh’s support of ‘Urabi and the nationalist movement can, in part at least, 
be explained by his dislike of the Ottoman Empire.  For him, the Ottoman Empire and 
their ‘illegitimate’ rule over the Muslim people was at the root of Islam’s 
backwardness.  For him (see Chapter 4), free critical thinking was suppressed by the 
Ottoman Empire in order to minimise criticism of the Ottoman authorities.  This had 
led to the gates of ijtihad being firmly shut and the dominance of taqlid in methods of 
education and legal interpretation, which was, according to ‘Abduh and other reform 
minded ‘ulama, the main reason for the decline of the Muslim world.  ‘Abduh’s dislike 
of the Ottoman Empire can further be seen in his conversations with the nationalist 
                                                 
14
 Schölch, op. cit. Egypt for the Egyptians!; see Chapter 1 for an account of the dismissal of Khedive 
Isma’il; see also P.J. Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Sadat, London, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980. 
15
 Ahmed ‘Urabi, Mudhakiraat al-Za’im Ahmed ‘Urabi: Kashaf al-Sataar ‘Ain Sur al-Asraar fi al-
Nahda al-Misriyya al-Mushhoora bil-Thawra al-’Urabiyya (Daraasa wa Tahqeeq Dr ‘Abd al-Mon’im 
Ibrahim al-Jami’i) (The Diaries of the Leader Ahmed Urabi: Unveiling the Secret of all Secrets on the 
Egyptian Renaissance Known as the Urabi Revolution) (Studied and edited by Dr ‘Abd al-Mon’im 
Ibrahim al-Jemi’i), Cairo, Dar al-Kutub, 2005, Vol. 2, p.684. 
Chapter 5/ The Strategist and the Orator: Islam and the ‘Urabi Revolt 
174 
 
sympathiser and English traveller, Wifred Scawen Blunt.  Of a number of 
conversations with Blunt after their initial meeting in 1881, Blunt reports that ‘Abduh 
“detests the Ottomans”16 and recalls that ‘Abduh had told him that “[t]he House of 
Othman [sic] for two hundred years had cared almost nothing for religion, and beyond 
the right of the sword had no claim any longer to allegiance.”17  So, as ‘Urabi and the 
nationalists became increasingly nationalist in their outlook and sought to limit any 
expansion of Ottoman authority in Egypt, ‘Abduh’s dislike of the Ottomans and their 
role in hindering Islamic progress became a point of convergence for the two: rejection 
of Ottoman authority over the Egyptian nation became a common cause for ‘Urabi and 
‘Abduh. 
Staying with the international dimension of the revolutionary situation in Egypt during 
1881 and 1882: Britain’s role in events was further cause for ‘Abduh to align himself 
to the nationalist movement.  ‘Abduh had always argued strongly for Egypt and the 
wider Muslim world to extract itself from the control and domination of the western 
powers.  While he greatly admired the progress western nations had made in their 
intellectual advancement, economic prosperity and political institutions, he adamantly 
believed that progress in the Muslim world must not be based on blind imitation of the 
west but on the rediscovery of the true message and nature of Islam.  ‘Abduh declares 
that “the Quran is the secret of success for the Muslims and there will be no way for 
them to return from the state they are in without it”.18  Coupled with the notion of a 
return to ‘true’ Islam was ‘Abduh’s belief that foreign intervention in Egypt had been 
calamitous and highly exploitative.  In an article he wrote in Waki’i al-Misriyya 
(Egyptian Events) while still its editor, he addresses the causes of poverty in Egypt and 
cautions against foreign intervention in Egypt, stating that “if the hands of intruders 
penetrate this country they will extract all its wealth and the power that comes with 
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it”.19  The increasing prominence of Britain’s interest in Egypt through the debt crisis, 
Britain’s central role in ousting Khedive Isma’il and replacing him with his son Tawfiq 
as Khedive in 1879, and the continuous involvement of Britain in order to impose a 
political solution favourable to its own interests in the years 1881 and 1882 were 
significant factors influencing ‘Abduh’s decision to move closer towards ‘Urabi’s 
nationalist movement.   
However, it would also be erroneous to attribute ‘Abduh’s support of the nationalist 
movement solely to these international factors.  A key reason why ‘Urabi’s nationalist 
movement and ‘Abduh’s views on the need for Islamic reform markedly converged in 
the years 1881 and 1882 was ‘Abduh’s increasingly optimistic view that, through 
nationalism, and particularly ‘Urabi’s nationalism, Islamic reform and modernisation 
– in particular the modernisation of education which ‘Abduh believed had to be at the 
foundation of Muslim reform – could be achieved. ‘Abduh’s entire raison d’être was 
to reform and modernise Islamic institutions and learning, believing that this would 
then enable, and be the foundation upon which, national regeneration could take place.  
But, with the success and popular appeal of the nationalist movement occurring before 
his modernisation and reform had happened, ‘Abduh compromised his insistence on 
the need for reform and modernisation coming first, now adopting the position that the 
nationalist movement could be the vehicle by which his wider programme of reforms 
could be achieved.20   
Likewise, he seems to have changed his views considerably on the issues of foreign 
domination and occupation.  Initially, ‘Abduh had criticised the nationalist movement 
on the basis that it was likely to prompt foreign powers to intervene more deeply into 
Egyptian affairs and indeed ultimately lead to occupation.  The British along with the 
French already had considerable interests in Egypt and had made it clear that they were 
not willing to leave these interests unprotected. Similarly, the Ottoman Sultan, already 
presiding over a weak empire and worried about eruptions of Arab and local 
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nationalisms elsewhere in the Empire, was determined to retain control of Egyptian 
territory and at the same time send out a firm and clear signal to other groups and 
imperial subjects that he remained in complete control and would not entertain the 
break-up of the Empire.21  Despite ‘Abduh having warned of the dangers of foreign 
intervention and particularly that ‘Urabi’s tactics were likely to trigger this, 
nonetheless ‘Abduh now came around to the view that the nationalist movement could 
represent “a step in freeing the country from bondage to foreigners”.22  ‘Abduh, then, 
changed his view of the nationalist movement, no longer seeing it as inviting greater 
foreign domination and control of Egypt but, rather, as a movement capable of 
dispelling foreign powers and preventing them from exerting their influence on Egypt 
and generally offering the greatest hope of political independence for the people of 
Egypt. 
There had also been an important shift in the nationalist movement itself that enabled 
‘Abduh to throw his weight behind it and clearly illustrating his strategic approach to 
politics, which was probably heavily influenced by his mentor and teacher Jamal al-
Din al-Afghani.23  The shift can be seen by starting with the phase of ‘Abduh’s 
opposition to the ‘Urabi movement, an occasion when he was addressing ‘Urabi and 
his fellow army officers in response to their calls for a confrontation with the Khedive 
and the immediate establishment of a constitutional government in Egypt.  ‘Abduh 
first pointed out to them that, while he agreed with them over the issue and, indeed, in 
the desire for constitutional government, he nevertheless believed the route to 
achieving this should be through peaceful means and negotiations with the Khedive 
rather than engaging in conflict with him.24  ‘Abduh criticised them further on this 
issue and accused them of being politically naïve and of acting in their own self-
interest by leading a revolt in the name of the ‘people’ without actually representing 
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the particular interests of the poorest classes in Egypt.  In a blistering attack on ‘Urabi 
and the other leaders of the movement, he asks ironically how they have come to 
represent the people and what kind of equality do they wish to achieve?  ‘Abduh asks 
‘Urabi and his fellow army officers: 
Have you upset the custom which God has followed with his creatures, and has 
the order followed by human society been reversed?  Has virtue reached a 
perfection with you that no one else has ever attained, so that, of your own choice 
and willingly, with full vision and understanding, you have decided to make the 
other members of your nation sharers with you in your power and glory, and put 
yourselves on an equality with beggars, out of love for justice and humanity?  Or 
are you following a course of which you are ignorant, and doing that which you 
do not understand?25 
‘Abduh’s disdain for ‘Urabi and his fledgling movement is clear.  The overwhelming 
evidence suggests that, even very late on, just before the Khedive was deposed by the 
Majlis al-‘Urfi in July 1882, ‘Abduh still opposed open confrontation with the Khedive 
and, more important, was against armed conflict to secure the demands of the 
revolutionary movement.  On this point, ‘Abduh’s disciple and biographer Muhammad 
Rashid Rida, explains, in hagiographic terms, ‘Abduh’s stance when he states that 
‘Abduh “was the opponent of the military revolution even though he was a directing 
spirit to the intellectual movement”.26 Rida is likely referring to ‘Abduh’s widely 
accepted role as a leading Islamic modernist figure and its connection to the ‘Urabi 
movement.  However, the nationalist movement did evolve into a broad-based 
movement that sought to establish greater independence for Egypt by strengthening 
Egypt’s political institutions and making the Khedive more accountable to his people, 
and by seeking to limit the power and influence of both the Ottoman Empire and the 
European powers in the affairs of Egypt.  Most important of all for ‘Abduh, ‘Urabi and 
the nationalist movement had evolved into a genuinely national movement 
representing the demands and aspirations of Egyptians of all classes, religions and 
social backgrounds: it was only when it was clear to ‘Abduh that the nationalist 
movement was “free from personal aims”27 and was “following the course of reform 
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and demanding justice and equality”28 that ‘Abduh supported ‘Urabi and the 
nationalist movement. 
Even though ‘Abduh began as a vociferous opponent of the nationalist movement, the 
aims and attitudes of both converged significantly in the years 1881 and 1882.  From 
here onwards until it finally collapsed in September 1882, his influence on the 
nationalist movement was as important as any of its leaders: Rida once again in 
hagiographic terms states “that ‘Urabi’s followers never made any plans without 
consulting ‘Abduh first”.29  His influence on the direction, trajectory and tactics the 
nationalist movement employed was not, however, the only way in which he was 
central to the movement.  Indeed, people all over Egypt read his articles in the 
government newspaper Waka’i al-Misriyya, as well other newspapers and journals, in 
the period prior to and immediately leading up to the revolution; taken together, his 
commentaries had a significant impact on the way people conceived of the Egyptian 
nation.  His writings often pointed towards the uniqueness of the Egyptians in 
linguistic terms just as much as in historical terms, also invoking particular national 
characteristics such as being hard working, loyal, humorous and eternally 
welcoming.30  He also drew particular attention to Egypt’s unique landscape and 
territoriality, asserting that “the habitable land is surrounded by dry deserts and salty 
waters”31 that demarcated its territory by easily identifiable and immovable geological 
factors that all gave a sense of a geographically bounded and historically continuous 
territory. 
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In defining the Egyptian nation, however, his most striking contributions must be his 
continuous insistence on the rights and duties of its citizens and his views on the 
centrality of Islam to the Egyptian nation.  In what was a continuous thread through 
the entire body of his work either as Grand Mufti, or as a teacher, writer or indeed as 
a political activist, he never deviated from his deep-seated belief that a return to the 
original and true message and nature of Islam was the only way to guarantee national 
regeneration and progress for the Egyptian nation.  While it was accepted that various 
tribal and ethnic categories existed, Islam superseded these loyalties and “prevented 
this tribalism and made people equal”.32 
‘Abdallah al-Nadim – His Early Career 
If ‘Abduh was widely acknowledged as the strategist for the nationalist movement 
after he joined them in late 1881, ‘Abdallah al-Nadim (b.1843, d.1896)33 was without 
doubt the movement’s propaganda and public relations machine.  He was born in 
Alexandria and his early education was in the mosque school of Sheikh Ibrahim Pasha, 
also in Alexandria, where he displayed a tremendous literary aptitude and excelled in 
the subjects of classical Arabic, poetry and prose, contrary to his father’s wishes.34  He 
arrived in Cairo for the first time in 1861 and, although he worked in a telegraph office, 
he attended various free classes in language as well as theology at al-Azhar and was 
taught by prominent ‘ulama such as Sheikh Muhammad al-Imbabi, who was later 
appointed Sheikh al-Azhar in late 1881.35  But, more than these classes at al-Azhar, al-
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Nadim was drawn to the literary forums, discussion groups and intellectual 
gatherings36 taking place on the fringes of the formal classes, where he came into 
contact with ‘ulama, intellectuals, writers and poets and discussed with them not only 
the issues of the day but the nature of the Arabic language, its departure from classical 
Arabic and the role of literature and poetry.  Like ‘Abduh, al-Nadim was also a disciple 
of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and attended al-Afghani’s discussion groups regularly and 
was greatly influenced by his teachings and philosophy.37  As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, while the key element of al-Afghani’s philosophy was the need for wholesale 
reform of Muslim society and its institutions, he stressed in equal measure, the need 
for political action in order to implement reforms.  And, if ‘Abduh gave al-Afghani’s 
ideas greater coherence and structure, al-Nadim was largely responsible for 
implementing al-Afghani’s ideas on political action and agitation. 
In many respects, al-Nadim’s training and career follow a similar path to that of 
‘Abduh.  For instance, al-Nadim, like ‘Abduh was disillusioned and dissatisfied with 
the formal teaching that was being given in the government schools and sought 
intellectual fulfilment either outside the formal school structures and classes or, in al-
Nadim’s case, by abandoning traditional Islamic studies and pursuing his interest in 
poetry and literature.  Their careers are also somewhat similar in that they both began 
writing and initially pursued careers in journalism.  But, while ‘Abduh’s journalism is 
associated with his early career, al-Nadim remained a writer throughout his life.  
Indeed, al-Nadim’s work within the broad definition of being a writer is impressively 
varied and includes a literary output that includes writing and editing numerous 
journals and newspapers, poetry, novels and some of the first Arabic plays and 
theatrical dialogues.  Unfortunately, while most of ‘Abduh’s writings are still 
available, most likely because he occupied official government positions and perhaps 
because his disciple Muhammad Rashid Rida compiled and collected his works after 
‘Abduh’s death, the same cannot be said of al-Nadim’s work.  Very few of his writings 
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remain and what exists is almost never complete.  So, although al-Nadim was a prolific 
writer and editor, it is unfortunate that many of his writings before and during the years 
1879–1882 have either been lost or are difficult to locate with the exception of his 
journal al-Tankit wa’l Tabkit.38 
Al-Nadim’s reputation as a great debater and speaker within intellectual circles 
emerged in the 1870s but his writing and journalism began to earn him great respect – 
and notoriety – from around 1878 onwards.  It was around this time that he met al-
Afghani and began writing in and editing two journals, which were pro-Islamic and 
pro-nationalist in nature and which sought to increase the powers of the newly formed 
parliament while at the same time limiting the power of Khedive Isma’il.  In al-
Nadim’s own words, the owners of the two journals – Adib Ishaaq and Salim al-
Naqqash – asked al-Nadim to edit the journals Misr (Egypt) and al-Tijara (The 
Business) in Alexandria, which had become Egypt’s publishing centre; al-Nadim 
accepted “since the journals matched my own beliefs”.39  These journals were 
concerned with highlighting the desperate financial situation Egypt found itself in and 
the hardship felt by Egyptians due to Egypt’s debt crisis.  They focused on the role of 
the European powers and particularly the Dual Control, by France and Britain, of 
Egypt’s financial obligations, arguing that this was the first step towards foreign 
occupation and control of Egypt by the European powers.  Editorial comment also 
often questioned the role of the British in India and the French in Algeria and 
concluded that not only were these European powers intervening in Egypt as an 
extension of their own imperial policies but that British and French imperialism had 
not brought any benefits to the people of India and Algeria: if Egypt allowed itself to 
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be occupied by Britain and France, Egyptians would find themselves suffering the 
same fate as other colonised peoples around the world.40  It is important to note that 
the anti-colonial views expressed by al-Nadim in al-Tijara and Misr also included 
criticism of Khedive Isma’il, calling for him to be replaced by his son Tawfiq who was 
seen as being sympathetic to the ideas of political reform and limiting the power of the 
European Dual Control.41  In this respect, al-Nadim’s nationalism can be seen as a 
response to British and French attempts to colonise and occupy Egypt. 
Al-Nadim’s nationalism was evident not only in his early writings but also in his other 
political activities.  Misr al-Fatah (Young Egypt)42 was a secret nationalist movement 
that al-Nadim came to know of and join around 1878.  The main aim of the 
organisation was to end the rule of Isma’il and to assign greater powers to the 
parliament.  In nationalist terms, Misr al-Fatah also aimed to halt the steady 
encroachment of European domination and penetration of Egypt and bring to 
ascendency the native Egyptian political elite from which Misr al-Fatah sprang.43  
Because of the sensitivity of the issues that Misr al-Fatah advocated – the overthrow 
of Khedive Isma’il – and the risk of being imprisoned by Khedive Isma’il’s spies, the 
organisation was forced to operate in secret.  Although al-Nadim fully supported the 
movement’s aims, he disagreed with the clandestine and secret nature of its operations, 
believing that the organisation only served the interests of its elite members and that 
Misr al-Fatah’s modus operandi should be more visible with the aim of raising mass 
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public awareness.44  Unable and indeed unwilling to compromise on what was for al-
Nadim a fundamental issue, he left the organisation after a matter of months. 
Convinced of the need to raise mass public awareness around the issue of Egypt’s fall 
into European hands, the seriousness of the Debt Crisis, and the general decline of 
Egyptian society, al-Nadim launched a charitable foundation, whose aim was to 
develop a nationwide network of schools that would be able to provide free education 
to the poor.45  In the same way as ‘Abduh believed the provision of education to be 
crucial in order to develop a generation of informed and educated Egyptians able to 
understand the modern world and define Egypt’s place within it, al-Nadim saw the 
provision of education amongst the poor as crucial to the success of a native nationalist 
movement.  For al-Nadim, a national education was the cornerstone and very 
foundation of the national community: it would enable the people of the nation to share 
a common set of understandings around religious and social issues and cultivate 
“national and patriotic feelings in their hearts”.46  Coupled with the importance of a 
‘national’ education was the need to inform the wider public of national events, of 
communicating and disseminating national issues to the people of the nation and of 
forming national public opinion on a particular cause or issue.  For al-Nadim, being 
part of the nation meant that members of the nation speak the same language, discuss 
national events and imagine themselves, through mass communication to share a 
common history and heritage as well as a common vision of their national future.47 
For al-Nadim, the low literacy rates, especially among the lower classes in Egypt, 
meant that the emerging newspapers and journals had only a limited potential to inform 
and mould mass public opinion.  Because of this, al-Nadim not only gave classes in 
Arabic, basic reading and writing but also in public speaking, art, literature and drama 
– all forms of communication he hoped students would use for the purpose of 
                                                 
44
 Al-Hadidi, op. cit. Khatib al-Wataniyya, pp.80–81. 
45
 Ibid., p.85. 
46
 Al-Tijara, 19th April 1879, reprinted in al-Hadidi, op. cit. Khatib al-Wataniyya, pp.85–86. 
47
 Al-Hadidi, op. cit. Khatib al-Wataniyya, pp.86–87. 
Chapter 5/ The Strategist and the Orator: Islam and the ‘Urabi Revolt 
184 
 
“heightening national feelings and raising national consciousness”.48  Although the 
school was successful with over four hundred students enrolled49 and later a second 
community school opened for children from Egypt’s Coptic community, al-Nadim’s 
foundation never reached the national scale he had envisaged and al-Nadim’s own 
skills as a stimulating public speaker and a fluent and accessible writer were to have a 
far greater influence on public opinion and impact on the nationalist movement.  What 
his schools project does demonstrate, though, is his belief in the need to cultivate an 
Egyptian national consciousness through education and through mass 
communications,50 which was evident in his work throughout his life and particularly 
during the period of the nationalist movement. 
Al-Nadim – Orator of the Nationalist Movement 
Khedive Isma’il’s departure and the installation of his son Tawfiq as Khedive in 1879 
marked the beginning of a period of hope for the nationalist movement but this hope 
was short lived. Khedive Tawfiq, having been elevated to the Khedival throne 
primarily through British insistence and Ottoman compliance, was never able to act 
independently and in favour of the native nationalist movement as ‘Urabi and the other 
nationalists had hoped. Consequently, Tawfiq’s government, headed by Ryad Pasha, 
was continually criticised by the Egyptian pro-nationalist press, particularly al-Tijara 
and Misr, which al-Nadim continued to edit in the early years of Tawfiq’s reign.  Even 
though the government controlled its own press corps which bolstered the 
government’s policies and acted as its mouthpiece, Ryad Pasha nevertheless felt the 
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need to shut down numerous anti-government newspapers, including al-Tijara and 
Misr in November 1879.51 
Al-Nadim criticised the government for its complicity with, or more precisely its 
ineffectiveness to resist, greater European penetration of Egypt.  For al-Nadim, the 
consequences of Europe’s presence in Egypt were plain for all to see and his writings 
most of all attempt to draw attention to the role Britain and France played in Egypt’s 
decline.  In June 1881, al-Nadim established the journal al-Tankit wa’l-Tabkit 
(Witticisms and Criticisms) which was to become synonymous with the nationalist 
movement itself.52  Its style was satirical and al-Nadim writes that “[W]hen it appears 
to criticize, it actually makes fun and when it appears to praise, it actually attacks”.53  
Most probably, this style was adopted in order to divert the attention of the authorities, 
hence the tactic of overtly heaping praise on the Khedive as a means criticising his 
actions.  But it was also a reflection of al-Nadim’s own personal style of rhetorical 
engagement and ironic argumentation that is evident throughout his work and the 
fragments of his speeches that remain.  Nevertheless, his writings in al-Tankit wa’l-
Tabkit and his speeches during the period of the nationalist movement of 1881 and 
1882 are the best illustration of the precise shape and contours of al-Nadim’s 
nationalism and deserve special attention here. 
National regeneration and the reawakening of an Egyptian national consciousness 
were at the heart of al-Nadim’s thought.  For al-Nadim, it was important to assert 
Egyptian traits of national identity because these characteristics appeared lost and 
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forgotten under European influence and domination.  The power and influence of 
Europe had brought with it economic misery and hardship for many Egyptians but, 
equally important for al-Nadim, was the cultural and religious dilution of Egyptian 
society under the impact of European penetration.  In the very first issue of al-Tankit 
wa’l-Tabkit, a fictional story appears of an Egyptian diagnosed with the disease of 
westernisation.  In the article, entitled ‘Medical Diagnosis for Someone Infected with 
the Western Disease’,54 Al-Nadim tells of a young healthy Egyptian man being led 
astray by somebody posing as a friend.  The imposter leads him away from the 
company of wise men and intellectual debate into the squalor of the market where he 
is shown prostitutes and is enticed, after some resistance, into participating in immoral 
deeds and actions.  His resistance is broken only when he sees his fellow countrymen 
engage in similar behaviour.  As a result, he contracts syphilis and falls ill.  Doctors 
try to cure him and warn the ill man’s friends, who have gathered around him, to be 
vigilant of imposters and their immoral influence.55 
The story acts as a metaphor for the crisis Egypt finds itself in and which remains the 
backdrop for a nationalist awakening, with many obvious references to the causes, 
victims and conspirators of Egypt’s situation.  The imposter in the story is clearly the 
role al-Nadim attributes to the European powers corrupting and damaging the Egyptian 
nation.  But, al-Nadim’s story also illustrates other interesting and perhaps more 
nuanced aspects of his nationalist outlook.  Al-Nadim’s insistence that, although 
initially led astray, the young Egyptian man only succumbs to the temptation of the 
market when he sees others similar to him do the same thing.  Here is the idea of 
collective responsibility for the fate of the nation.  Al-Nadim characteristically 
attempts to show that, if the nation’s decline is because of its people’s inability to resist 
European influence, it is the Egyptian people collectively who ultimately bear the 
responsibility to arrest their nation’s decline.  At the same time the collective 
responsibility that al-Nadim points towards also implies a shared understanding of the 
underlying characteristics of the nation and the shared values of the community.  In al-
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Nadim’s narrative, while the Egyptian man follows his fellow Egyptians in their 
immoral acts, these same fellow Egyptians also surround him, seeking his recovery 
and imploring the doctors to cure him. 
If collective responsibility was an important aspect of national regeneration for al-
Nadim, then equally important was the idea of retaining those features that were at the 
core of an Egyptian national identity.  First among these was the linguistic 
homogeneity of the Egyptian people and their inseparability from the Arabic language.  
According to al-Nadim, one of the main defects that had developed in Egyptian society 
during the period of European penetration was the dilution of the Arabic language.  In 
his rhetorical style, he criticised the introduction and proliferation of foreign non-
Arabic words in Egyptian society in an article in the second issue of al-Tankit.56  There 
he emphasised the link between the Arabic language and Egyptian national identity 
and argued that he “who abandons his language gives up his homeland (watan)”.57  A 
consequence of European penetration in Egypt, and indeed of greater contact with 
Europe as a whole, was the steady abandonment of Arabic and the adoption of 
European languages such as English or French among the native elite.  In addition, 
Egypt’s status as part of the Ottoman Empire also meant that Turkish was also 
prominent in the bureaucracy and official circles.  According to al-Nadim, this had 
profound implications not only in terms of Egyptian national unity but also for the 
social fabric of the nation.   
Al-Nadim was critical of the emerging native elite who increasingly saw their use of 
European languages as a sign of their social ascendency.  In al-Nadim’s view, national 
language went together with national traditions and customs and, without these, the 
very social fabric and sustenance of the nation was threatened. So, when a nation’s 
language is being eroded, its traditions and customs no longer have the same 
importance and it becomes only a matter of time until they become obscure and 
meaningless.  This process had already begun in Egypt and al-Nadim tells the story –
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perhaps fictitious – of a boy sent to Europe to study who, on his return to his native 
village, is disgusted and ashamed of his father’s welcoming behaviour.  Rather than 
responding to the traditional Egyptian greeting of kissing his son on the cheek, the son 
asks his father merely to shake hands.  The Europeanised son has also forgotten his 
native language and is unable to communicate with his own family.58  Clearly then, 
for al-Nadim, language was an important cornerstone of Egyptian national identity and 
its retention was also vital for national traditions and customs to flourish and continue 
to be meaningful for members of the nation.   
As well as being a mechanism to protect and strengthen national traditions and 
customs, al-Nadim also insisted that the importance of language lay in its ability to 
communicate, inform and provide cohesion to the nation.  Here, Benedict Anderson’s 
concept of ‘imagining the nation’ through language and the rise of print capitalism59 
is reflected in al-Nadim’s assertion that the popular press, public speeches and other 
communication methods are crucial to the development of nations and nationalism.  
Al-Nadim was aware that, although the Egyptian press was emerging and publications 
were multiplying all over the country, there remained many obstacles to and 
constraints on raising mass popular awareness of the need to mobilise against greater 
European domination and to forge nationwide support for the rising nationalist 
movement.  Greatest among these constraints was the low level of literacy among both 
the rural and urban lower classes.  Coupled with this, al-Nadim was convinced that, 
for the nationalist movement to be successful, it had to represent and be supported by 
the rural and urban lower classes,60 who represented the overwhelming majority of the 
Egyptian population.  Considering these constraints, al-Nadim chose to use a variety 
of communication methods as well as the printed word to reach his audience, another 
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facet illustrating the importance he placed on sharing and maintaining a common 
national language. 
In order to engage his target audience, the choice of subject matter was of primary 
importance.  Looking through his writings and speeches, the first noticeable feature is 
the way he addresses the real problems that people were facing.  Social tensions, 
economic hardship and political alienation were all issues that al-Nadim regularly 
wrote and spoke about and, in this way, he was able to build a dedicated and cohesive 
national audience who identified closely with the issues that al-Nadim was raising and 
as a result became increasingly politicised. Straying into the realms of Arab 
nationalism, as he often did, al-Nadim captures the feeling many Egyptians (and Arabs 
for that matter) would have had at a time when much of the Arab world was under 
colonial rule.  He calls the Egyptians to react to: 
a call from a brother who drinks humiliation and eats injustice.  When he sleeps, 
the threat of theft covers him and when he wakes, the sun of hostility rises to 
remind him of his pitiful status.  So, he continues to walk in the streets staring at 
the ground, wearing the shoes of fear and the coat of horror.  He continues in 
the hope of being rescued one day.  He serves his masters without reward and 
waits for them to be pleased. Poverty shows him no mercy and he even loses the 
very clothes he wears.  He finds himself in prison and manages merely to stay 
alive.  We are all this man.61   
As well as focusing his attention on everyday themes and concerns felt by Egyptians, 
the particular language he used is also a key feature of his writings and speeches.  
Rather than the standard written Arabic (fusha), predominantly used in the popular 
press, official government communications and religious sermons and speeches, and 
which was highly complex, al-Nadim wrote in a colloquial style (‘ameyya), which was 
specifically Egyptian (rather than coming from other Arabic-speaking territories) and 
was everyday usage for the urban and rural lower classes.62  By using the colloquial 
form of Arabic, particularly in al-Tankit and his speeches, al-Nadim was able to ensure 
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that what he had to say was widely accessible to a national audience.  Indeed, because 
of the low literacy rates in Egypt, the language al-Nadim employed meant that copies 
of al-Tankit were often read to audiences in coffee houses and other social forums as 
a form of entertainment, which fulfilled the twin functions of informing audiences of 
national political events while, at the same time, developing a national consciousness 
around which support for the nationalist movement could be activated.63 
Finally, al-Nadim’s method of communicating national issues to a national audience 
also shows that he was acutely aware of the limits of the national education system 
and its ability to furnish people with basic literacy skills.  In this respect, al-Nadim’s 
works, span a variety of different mediums all aimed at informing and influencing his 
target audience.64  So, for instance, rather than restrict himself and his message to being 
disseminated through the publication of his al-Tankit, al-Nadim informs people of a 
variety of ways in which they can engage politically and inform themselves of the 
injustices they are being subjected to.  His writings and speeches frequently urge 
people to inform themselves of the political circumstances and debates of the time and 
perhaps in a reference to his own early quest for knowledge and understanding, he 
implores people to “[g]o to the various literary gatherings and associations and discuss 
with the people there and exchange views about politics”.65   al-Nadim also wrote 
plays, poetry, short stories and, while involved in his Islamic charitable schools 
project, actively promoted the teaching of these skills as well as drama, art and oratory 
in order to communicate, to as wide an audience as possible, issues of national politics 
and concerns. 
Language, and specifically native Egyptian Arabic, was clearly an important core 
feature of the Egyptian nation for al-Nadim.  His use of Egyptian colloquial Arabic in 
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his speeches, articles, plays and stories was meant to serve three important purposes.  
First, by using a specifically Egyptian, al-Nadim sought to underline the ‘innate’ link 
of the Egyptian people to a distinct and particular language.  Egypt’s particular 
historical evolution, with its links and encounters with Arabs, Mamluks and Turks, 
served to form a particular language and historical tradition, which was, according to 
al-Nadim, a national history.66  Second, by doing this, he was able to put forward the 
idea that, through a distinct ‘national’ language, a set of national customs, traditions 
and indeed a national consciousness could both be articulated and reinforced by 
members of the nation.  So, ensuring the continuation of the language would, as a 
necessary by-product, lead to the strengthening of national consciousness and the 
affirmation of Egypt’s national identity.  Lastly, the use of Egyptian colloquial Arabic 
had for, al-Nadim, a number of practical purposes.  By using colloquial Arabic, he was 
in touch with the language of everyday usage, which enabled him to target and appeal 
to those social groups where literacy rates were lowest.  The writing style al-Nadim 
employed, as well as the language he used to convey his ideas about national 
regeneration, leant itself to being read as stories and entertainment in public places 
frequented by people unlikely to be literate.  Standard Arabic – the modern relative of 
classical Arabic – was used in elite circles and the Egyptian elites hardly ever received 
praise in al-Nadim’s writings and speeches.  The government elites they were 
consistently portrayed by him as the major cause of Egypt’s problems.  He also 
criticised the ‘ulama for using standard Arabic in their sermons and classes to analyse 
abstract theological principles that people neither understood nor took a great deal of 
interest in.67  Using Egyptian colloquial Arabic allowed al-Nadim to show his rejection 
of these social groups and provide an alternative path to national liberation. 
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Nationalism With or Without Islam? 
Although al-Nadim was never part of the formal ‘ulama corps, he had considerable 
religious training.  By the age of nine, he had memorised the entire Quran and later 
went on to study at the Sheikh Ibrahim Pasha Mosque in Alexandria.  Coming to Cairo 
in 1861, he also studied at al-Azhar and attended classes held by some of the most 
prominent ‘ulama of the day in Islamic theology and Arabic studies.68  Even though 
his religious training may not have been as formal and structured as the other ‘ulama 
reviewed in Chapter 4, his credentials as an ‘alim of high knowledge and considerable 
authority never seemed to be in doubt.69  Moreover, his writings and speeches 
addressing Egypt’s decline and the necessity of recovering the country from European 
domination and occupation remain firmly grounded in his insistence that Islam 
represents, along with the Arabic language, a fundamental core feature of the Egyptian 
nation, which must be re-asserted if Egypt’s decline is to be halted. 
Although al-Nadim’s emphasis on Islam as a core element of the Egyptian nation is 
evident, at the same time it must be seen within the context of Egypt’s relationship to 
the Ottoman Empire and as part of the wider Muslim ‘umma.  While al-Nadim’s 
writings clearly illustrate a strong sense of an Egyptian national identity and 
distinctiveness, his emphasis on Egypt’s Islamic identity is placed alongside Egypt’s 
position within the Islamic ‘umma and he consistently places Egypt’s Islamic identity 
under the authority of the Ottoman Sultan.  In this respect, he powerfully articulates a 
distinction between Egypt’s desire and indeed her right to claim national political 
independence from the Ottoman Empire, with her obligations towards and aspiration 
to remain firmly under the Islamic authority of the Ottoman Sultan and, by extension, 
within the largely symbolic community of the ‘umma (see Chapter 6).  This changes 
dramatically when the Ottoman Sultan finally decides, under pressure from Britain and 
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to a lesser degree France, to publicly denounce ‘Urabi and the nationalist movement 
and to allow British troops to land in Egypt, crush and overthrow the nationalist 
government and return Khedive Tawfiq and his government to power.  These events 
are discussed in greater depth in Chapter 6. 
For al-Nadim, there seemed no contradiction between affirming Egypt’s Islamic 
identity while at the same time asserting Egypt’s right to national self-government: it 
is here that al-Nadim makes a fundamental contribution to the debate on Islam’s 
relationship to nationalism.  According to him, Egypt’s history was a history of many 
different peoples (jins)70 coming together and settling within Egypt over long periods 
of time.  Special mention is given to Egypt’s Turkish, Arabic and Circassian 
immigrants who, al-Nadim insists, “are all people of this country”.71  Rhetorically, al-
Nadim argues that if they were told to return to their countries of origin, they would 
find that they no longer knew where they came from and that their national identity 
was now wholly Egyptian.  This aspect of the nationalist movement was overshadowed 
by the way that many foreign journalists, diplomats and foreign governments focused 
on ‘Urabi’s initial demands for greater rights for native Egyptian army officers; they 
ignored the way the nationalist movement came to broaden its demands and therefore 
its constituency.  As a result, fear was widespread that the nationalist movement was 
merely asserting the rights of native Egyptians, which led al-Nadim to stress and make 
clear the inclusiveness of Egypt’s nationalist movement.72 
The inclusiveness of the nationalist movement – which al-Nadim was largely 
responsible for articulating, was to have significant implications for the way the 
movement dealt not only with Egypt’s various ethnic groups but also the assertion of 
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Egypt’s Islamic identity and how this identity was reconciled with its national identity.  
So, for instance, in relation to the Arabs, Turks and Circassians mentioned previously, 
al-Nadim argues that “the tie of religion united us firstly and then the tie of watan 
provided us with the tie of love and unity”.73  The implication here is that, it was due 
to the imperative of the spread of Islam and the expansion of its political influence that 
people of various ethnic origins encountered each other and were brought together in 
this process.  With the passage of time, people lived together, intermarried, settled and 
exchanged and took on new cultural practices, or abandoned old ones, all of which 
crystallised into the ‘modern’ Egyptian nation, which, for al-Nadim, “takes away all 
discrimination according to (previous) national affiliations”.74  Hence, al-Nadim is at 
pains to show that the nationalist movement, having brought down the government of 
Ryad Pasha after the ‘Abdin incident in September 1881 (see Chapter 6), had no 
hesitation in forming a government with Sharif Pasha – a Circassian – as its Prime 
Minister.  For al-Nadim, the overthrow of the Ryad Pasha government was not for 
reasons of ethnic exclusion but because it failed to recognise and attribute equal rights 
to all its citizens, instead favouring the Turco-Circasssian community and allowing 
unacceptable levels of European domination of Egypt’s domestic affairs.  Thus he puts 
forward the idea that the nationalist movement aims to “protect and defend our country 
from any threat … and that Egypt is one community regardless of whether the 
government is Arab, Turkish or Circassian”.75 
It also evident that al-Nadim sees the tie of a common religion and the tie of watan not 
as incompatible but rather as organically linked and convergent.  The common bond 
of Islam among the people of Egypt evolves seamlessly into the bond of nationality 
and, while the Islamic bond is one of worshipping the same God, adhering to the same 
scriptures and Prophets and participating in the same religious practices, the tie of 
watan imbues members of the community with a set of rights, duties and national aims.  
In this way, al-Nadim sees Islam as providing a particular and, for him, a fundamental 
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common bond that has the strength of providing the nation with common cultural 
understandings, a common history and in view of Egypt’s multi-ethnic nature, a 
common heritage.  So, it is in the realm of common cultural understandings that the 
Arabic language, as discussed above, contributes significantly to the watan’s particular 
identity, as do social traditions and customs which are woven into the social fabric of 
the nation.  In addition, in terms of a common history and heritage, Islam provides the 
over-arching historical bond for members of a nation which possesses a variety of 
ethnic histories and heritages.  So, in one of the last issues of al-Tankit wa’i-Tabkit, 
al-Nadim addresses a lengthy article to patriotic Egyptians and insists that “our love 
for our country and our religion unites us and prevents us from abandoning it”.76  
Similarly, he promises to continue his patriotic advice and implores the nation to 
“follow the rule of obeying Allah, the Prophet and our rulers … and whoever follows 
the disbelievers instead of following the believers has indeed strayed from Allah’s 
path”.77 
Not only are there contradictions in al-Nadim’s insistence on the central role of the 
‘ulama in arresting the decline of the nation but his insistence that Islam represents the 
underlying common feature upon which the bond of wataniyya is built does not 
account for the role of the significant Coptic Christian community in Egypt at the time.  
Indeed, al-Nadim’s assurances that the nationalist movement recognises Egypt’s 
multi-ethnic foundations and, rather than represent a purely ‘native’ Egyptian 
constituency, in fact seeks to incorporate and secure equal rights for all ethnic groups, 
appears on closer examination to ignore the question of religious diversity in Egypt.  
Although Coptic Christians, Egyptian Jews and Armenian Christians accounted for 
only a small percentage of the population, these ethno-religious communities had 
existed in Egypt for considerable lengths of time, the Copts being descendants of the 
ancient Egyptians and converting to Christianity in the early years after the death of 
the Prophet Jesus.  All these communities played a significant part in the social, 
political and economic life of the country and, in fact, al-Nadim’s national declaration 
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on behalf of the National Party (al-Hizb al-Watani), widely published on 1 January 
1882, recognises the importance of Egypt’s ethno-religious diversity.  Clause 5 
emphatically asserts that: 
The National Party is a political, not a religious, party.  It is composed of men 
of differing creeds and beliefs.  All the Christians and Jews, and all who plough 
the soil of Egypt, and speak their language, are affiliated with the party.  It has 
no interest in religious differences, and acknowledges that all are brethren, 
whose rights, in political life and before the religious laws are equal.  This is 
accepted without question by the highest religious authorities (Sheikhs) of al-
Azhar, who support this party and believe that Muhammad’s true law [al-
Shari’a al-Muhammadiyya al-haqqa] forbids hatred and considers that all men 
should be treated equally.78 
But as shown in the earlier section of this chapter on al-Nadim’s contribution to 
defining the Egyptian nation, the high ideals of Clause 5 in the National Party 
declaration were frequently ignored by al-Nadim in many of his articles and speeches; 
indeed, his default position of portraying Islam as the most powerful defining feature 
of the nation was what he returned to more often than not.  In fact, with the British 
invasion of Egypt in the second half of 1882, and the escalation of hostilities between 
British forces and the Egyptian national resistance, al-Nadim’s, and the rest of the 
nationalist movement’s political rhetoric became even more imbued with specifically 
Islamic calls to jihad, heroism and the taking up of arms to protect Egypt’s status as a 
nation of Islam.  
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Chapter 6 
Between ‘Umma, Empire and Nation: The Coalition of 
‘Urabi and the ‘Ulama 
If the years 1879 and 1880 can be characterised as the years where ‘Urabi emerged as 
leader of the nationalist movement in Egypt, the years 1881 and 1882 can generally be 
seen as the ‘revolutionary years’ when his nationalist movement came to make more 
vocal demands for independence and which culminated in violent demonstrations and 
an anti-occupation war against the British in the second half of 1882.  While the 
‘ulama’s involvement in the emergent nationalism of 1879 and 1880 was important, it 
remained confined to the intellectual and religious sphere.  A further reason why their 
support remained somewhat muted during those years was division and indecision 
within their ranks as between supporting the Khedive, the Ottoman Sultan or the 
various other local nationalist forces competing with each other at the time.   
However, in the years 1881–1882, many Egyptian ‘ulama questioned their links to the 
Ottoman Empire, re-assessed their loyalty to the Caliph of Islam and rejected their 
subservience to the Khedive by supporting a local nationalist movement that had mass 
popular appeal and quickly emerged as the dominant political force within Egypt.  
Having discussed the main intellectual currents behind the modernist or reformist 
movement and the intellectual foundations of nationalism in the works of Abdallah 
Al-Nadim and Muhammad ‘Abduh, this chapter will focus on some of the practical 
concerns the ‘ulama displayed in supporting ‘Urabi and the nationalist movement.  In 
particular, this chapter examines some of the factors behind the ‘ulama’s shift away 
from the universalism of the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim ‘umma and local 
embodiment of this institution in the Khedive towards a native nationalist movement. 
During the period 1879–1882, ‘Urabi’s nationalist movement itself underwent 
considerable change and transformation.  From a relatively narrow protest movement 
aimed at promoting the status of native Egyptian army officers, it evolved into a broad 
movement for national sovereignty and independence.  These political expressions had 
to be reconciled with Egypt’s place within the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic ‘umma, 
which, ‘Urabi recognised, could not be discarded outright for fear of alienating his 
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popular support among Egyptian Muslims, who still regarded the Ottoman Sultan as 
the head of the Islamic ‘umma.  At the same time, ‘Urabi also had to acknowledge that 
local Khedival rule (first Isma’il and then Tawfiq) was in fact the local embodiment 
of Ottoman rule and of the Sultan’s authority in Egypt.   
Egyptian national independence and the limiting of Khedival authority would not only 
have political consequences but also significant consequences for Egypt’s relationship 
to the Ottoman Empire in terms of its Islamic attachments to the ‘umma.  In seeking 
to pursue the desire for national independence while at the same time retaining Egypt’s 
Islamic character and position within the ‘umma, ‘Urabi came to see the ‘ulama of 
Egypt, with their widely held moral and religious authority, as a key constituency.  
Considering the ‘ulama’s importance as potential legitimators of his movement, the 
‘Urabists co-opted important sections of the ‘ulama into supporting their particular 
conception of Egypt by emphasising an Islamic dimension to their nationalism upon 
which they were able to appeal directly to the ‘ulama for their support? 
However, the ‘ulama of Egypt were not a homogenous group with broadly similar 
attitudes to political change.  In fact, their reaction to the rise of ‘Urabi and the 
nationalist movement was varied, complex and heterogeneous, based on a number of 
factors that are important to examine.  Many ‘ulama, it is true, did support ‘Urabi and 
the nationalists but many rejected his movement and the emergent nationalism ‘Urabi 
came to represent.  This chapter considers the positions of both pro-nationalist ‘ulama 
and those of the anti-nationalist camp in order to better understand where the ‘ulama 
situated Islam in the political events occurring at the time.  For the ‘ulama, supporting 
‘Urabi and the nationalists may have meant the rejection of an oppressive monarchical 
system with growing European attachments that were not easily reconcilable with 
Islam.  But it also meant questioning Egypt’s relations with the Ottoman Empire, the 
Sultan and the Islamic ‘umma, which had already, over the course of the nineteenth 
century, become increasingly distanced. Within the context of these concerns about 
political community and loyalty, the ‘ulama held and disseminated various views and 
opinions and examining these debates is important in assessing their complex and 
heterogeneous views on nationalism and the ‘Urabi movement.   
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‘Umma or Empire? Egypt’s Islamic Attachments 
The nineteenth century saw Egyptian Islam in many respects gradually shift away from 
the influence of Ottoman Islamic institutions.  In terms of the Shari’a, “since the time 
of the Ottoman conquest in 1517, there had been a tradition of importing the leading 
judges from Istanbul”.1  However, the emergence of Muhammad Ali and his desire for 
judicial independence from Istanbul changed this, “mark[ing] the end of Turkish 
influence on the Egyptian courts with most judges now being Azhar graduates”.2  It 
must be pointed out that, although Egypt began providing its own court judges, the 
official legal madhhab (school of jurisprudence) of the Ottoman Empire, the Hanafi, 
continued to be applied in the Egyptian Shari’a courts even though the population of 
Egypt was mainly Shafi’i and Maliki.  However, while the courts dispensed rulings 
based on the Hanafi madhhab, an adherent of the Shafi’i madhhab always occupied 
the powerful office of the Sheikh al-Azhar until that tradition was broken with during 
the reign of Khedive Isma’il.3  This will be discussed later in this chapter. 
In the crucial area of pedagogy, Egyptian ‘ulama already enjoyed great autonomy from 
Istanbul.  As noted above, with most Egyptian court judges coming from the various 
seminaries around Turkey, graduates from al-Azhar often found employment as 
teachers “at al-Azhar itself or at madaaris in Egypt or abroad”.4  In this way al-Azhar 
became a major provider of teachers, who were sent to various parts of the Empire.  
Similarly, al-Azhar was almost entirely responsible for the appointment of religious 
posts like Imams, Khatibs and Muezzins in local mosques throughout Egypt5 and in 
                                                 
1
 Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, Defining Islam for the Egyptian State, Leiden, Brill, 1997, p.41. 
2
 Ibid.  
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 Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i, al-Thawra al-‘Urabi w’al-Ihtilaal al-Ingalizi (The ‘Urabi Revolt and British 
Occupation), Cairo, al-Nahda Publishing House, 1937, p.164.   
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 Muhammad ‘Abduh, Mashru’a Tartib al-Masajid (Plans to Rearrange Mosques) in Muhammad 
‘Amarah (ed.) Al-A’mal al-Kamila al-Sheikh Muhammad ‘Abduh (The Collected Works of the Sheikh 
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many cases were asked by other parts of the Empire to supply these religious 
functionaries.   
Ottoman cultural influence on Egypt also declined considerably, especially after 
Arabic replaced Turkish as the state language in 1863.6  Still, as Ibrahim Abu Lughod 
has rightly pointed out, the impact of this change was only felt gradually over many 
years as many Egyptian ministries were run by the Turco-Circassian elite, who were 
not comfortable or familiar with Arabic and who continued to run their ministries in 
Turkish or employed numerous translators.7  Moreover, many ‘ulama appear to have 
supported a more independent stance towards the Ottoman Empire.  In April 1879, a 
National Party Manifesto (al-la’ihah al-wataniyya) was submitted to representatives 
of the European and Ottoman powers, which reveals that out of the 329 signatories, 60 
were ‘ulama from Cairo, Alexandria and Damietta.  Senior ‘ulama such as Sheikh 
‘Abd al-Baqi al-Bakri,8 Sheikh Abu al-‘Ala al-Khalfawi,9 and Sheikh al-‘Idwi10 were 
present when the Manifesto was adopted11 and, according to Schölch, the signatures 
of 60 senior ‘ulama meant a “protest against the influence of infidels in Egypt and the 
endangering of Islam as a religion and a way of life”.12  In fact, there may well have 
been more ‘ulama signatures, as some were also members of the Chamber of Deputies, 
                                                 
6
 P.J. Vatikiotis, History of Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Sadat, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1980, p.127.  See also Yasir Suleiman, The Arabic Language and National Identity: A Study in Ideology, 
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2003, in particular the chapter on Egyptian nationalism. 
7
 Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ‘The Transformation of the Egyptian Elite: Prelude to the ‘Urabi Revolt’, 
Middle East Journal, No. 21, 1967, pp.325–44. 
8
 “Abd al-Baqi al-Bakri, who was Naqib al-Ashraf, Shaykh al-Sajjada al-Bakriyya and supreme head 
of the Sufi orders in Egypt”; see Frederick de Jong, ‘The Sufi Orders in Egypt During the ‘Urabi 
Insurrection and the British Occupation (1882-1914): Some Societal Factors Generating Aloofness, 
Support, and Opposition’, Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt, Vol. 21, 1984, p.131. 
9
 Meir Hatina, ‘‘Ulama’, Politics and the Public Sphere: An Egyptian Perspective, Salt Lake City, UT, 
University of Utah Press, 2010.  Sheikh al-Khalfawi was “a Hanafi scholar from the province of 
Minufiyya, ... a lecturer at al-Azhar and mufti of the Judicial Council (Majlis al-Ahkam) in Cairo 
established in 1848–9” (p.54).   
10
 “Hasan al-Idwi al-Hamzawi who was Shaykh of a Shadhiliyya order of his own”, De Jong, op. cit. 
The Sufi Orders in Egypt, p.133. 
11
 Alexander Schölch, Egypt for the Egyptians! The Socio-Political Crisis in Egypt, 1878–1882, 
London, Ithaca Press,1981, p.88. 
12
 Ibid. p.89. 
Chapter 6/ Between ‘Umma, Empire and Nation: The Coalition of ‘Urabi and the ‘Ulama 
201 
 
another category of signatories to the Manifesto.  Nevertheless, ‘ulama signatories to 
this Manifesto are the joint third highest grouping and demonstrate significant ‘ulama 
involvement and support of the nationalist movement in 1879.   
But, despite the widening of political, religio-legal and even cultural distance between 
Egypt and the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century, loyalty to the Ottoman 
Sultan remained widespread amongst many Egyptians.  Cole argues that “literate 
Egyptians, for the most part saw themselves as loyal subjects of the [Ottoman] 
Sultan”.13  Sultan Abd al-Hamid (r.1876–1909) himself became concerned with 
promoting his moral authority through the idea of the Caliphate and Egypt’s links to, 
and inclusion within, the wider Islamic ‘umma.  Again, Cole argues that with 
‘Abdulhamid insistently laying claim to the Caliphate, his moral authority may have 
actually increased in the late 1870s and early 1880s, especially among the ‘ulama and 
literate classes”.14  In crisis both domestically and abroad, with territorial losses in the 
Balkans and a series of humiliating military defeats during the Russo–Turkish war, the 
Empire was in desperate need of allies and support.  Appealing to Muslim sentiment 
and the Islamic ‘umma was a way of generating much needed backing. 
Egypt’s relationship with the Ottoman Empire was thus a complex one that was by no 
means consistent.  On the one hand, evidence suggests a strong divergence between 
them along political and institutional lines.  Muhammad Ali and his successors all 
sought, with varying degrees of success, to gain greater political freedom from the 
Empire so as to govern Egypt with as little interference from Istanbul as possible.  
Similarly, institutional links to Istanbul through the judicial system and the mosques 
were also gradually weakened, with al-Azhar becoming increasingly prominent in 
providing judges for the Egyptian Shari’a courts, as well as already providing teachers 
and religious functionaries for its domestic Islamic needs.  At the same time increased 
political and institutional autonomy from the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth 
century was accompanied by moves to maintain its Islamic ties through ties to the 
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‘umma and the Ottoman Sultan.  Clearly then, there was a distinction between Egypt’s 
desire to remain within the ‘umma, with the Ottoman Sultan as its Caliph and ultimate 
moral authority, and, on the other hand, its political and institutional links to the 
Empire.   
The parallel aims of gaining greater independence from the Ottoman Empire while 
maintaining loyalty to the Sultan are evident in the January 1882 declaration of the 
National Party, which ‘Urabi and other nationalist army officers had come to dominate 
during the late 1870s.15  The declaration was published widely in Egypt and abroad as 
a result of the ‘Abdin Palace confrontation on 9th September 1881.  ‘Abdin Palace, in 
the heart of Cairo was the official residence of Khedive Tawfiq.  ‘Urabi and the 
nationalists marched to the palace, confronted Khedive Tawfiq and issued a set of 
nationalist demands.  These actions shocked both the European powers and Istanbul 
both because of the audacity of confrontation and the demands themselves, which 
included a call to dismiss the Government of Ryad Pasha, the incumbent Prime 
Minister, enhance the role and authority of Parliament and increase the size of Egypt’s 
standing army.16  Yet the demands were met, with a statement published in the official 
government newspaper stating that “on Saturday evening, September 10th 1881, the 
Government of Ryad Pasha was discharged and Sharif Pasha was asked to form a new 
Government”.17  
After this success, ‘Urabi and the nationalists felt they had to make clear their 
intentions and explain their outlook for Egypt in order to calm the foreign powers who 
all had vast interests in Egypt’s political future.   The National Party declaration of 1st 
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January 1882 was published in The Times of London,18 as well as local and regional 
newspapers.  Interestingly, the first clause in the declaration addresses Egypt’s 
relationship with the Sublime Porte and opens by declaring:  
the National Party believes that relations between Egypt and the Sublime Porte 
should be well maintained, consulting with it where necessary.  Moreover, the 
[National] Party believes the Sultan Abd al-Hamid is their master and Caliph of 
God on earth and the leader of the Muslims.19 
By addressing the Porte in the first clause of the declaration, ‘Urabi and the nationalists 
show clearly that they considered Egypt’s relationship with the Porte to be of primary 
importance.  Despite the declining strength of the Ottoman Empire, by now widely 
acknowledged, the nationalists, by recognising Egypt’s relationship with the Porte 
first, underlined Egypt’s loyalty and historical links to the Empire.  But interestingly, 
while doing this, the declaration also attempts to set new parameters to the relationship, 
asserting the aspiration of Egyptian independence and the promotion of Egyptian 
national interests.  The uncompromising pursuit of the goals of Egyptian national 
independence was thus tempered somewhat and qualified within the context of giving 
importance to Egypt’s loyalty to the Porte, based on the institutions of the Caliphate 
and ‘umma. 
This is far from manifesting a subservient relationship.  On the contrary, the 
declaration asserts the National Party’s determination to “protect the national interests 
as much as possible” and its willingness to “resist whoever would try and make Egypt 
an Ottoman State (meaning whoever deprives Egypt of the advantages of its 
administrative independence)”.20  The statement therefore draws a clear distinction 
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between, on the one hand, the Nationalists’ desire for national independence, Egypt’s 
right to self-government and, on the other, their acknowledgement of Egypt’s loyalty 
to the Sultan as part of the community of Muslims and the Sultan’s position at the head 
of this religious community.  However, while distinguishing the two conceptions of 
community, the document also attributes considerable importance to each.  In the same 
breath the Declaration accepts the national and the Islamic foundations of the Egyptian 
nation and places them together at the core of Egyptian nationalism.   
Attaching a strong religious dimension to national aspirations may well have been a 
key factor in attracting members of the ‘ulama to support the aims of the nationalists. 
In July 1882, ‘ulama were once again prominent signatories to the Second National 
Congress Manifesto deposing Khedive Tawfiq on 29th July 1882.  In an analysis of the 
393 signatories of this crucial Manifesto, Cole splits the signatories into five groups; 
ruling elite, intelligentsia, urban groups, rural groups and unknown.  The intelligentsia, 
he tells us, is the largest among these groups with 160 signatories.  More important, 
Cole’s analysis reveals that the ‘clergy’21 represent over half the signatories in this 
category with 86 ‘clergy’ signing the Manifesto, making them the largest single group 
of signatories.  According to both Schölch and Cole, ‘ulama opposed and supported 
the nationalist movement. 
While the work of Schölch and Cole in this area has been a valuable contribution in 
pointing towards the stance of this important social group, it merely sets the scene for 
further analysis of the ‘ulama’s position.  For instance, who were these ‘ulama and 
what influenced them in making the decision to support or reject the nationalists?  In 
relation to the Ottoman Empire and Egypt’s Islamic ties to the ‘umma, what factors 
did ‘ulama consider important in this relationship and what were the considerations of 
those ‘ulama who sided with the nationalists?  Finally, to support the deposition of the 
Khedive was to also question the Ottoman Sultan’s authority in Egypt: on what basis 
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did anti-Khedival ‘ulama see this as a legitimate position consistent with Islamic 
principles of community, loyalty and power?  
Interestingly, as the ‘ulama became increasingly prominent in the National Party, the 
number of army officers signing key manifestos declined, with only 15 army officers 
signing the July 1882 Manifesto, as opposed to 93 senior military officials signing the 
April 1879 Manifesto.22  This reconfiguration of the prominent groups within the 
nationalist movement is a result of the widening of its particularistic aims in the early 
years of 1879–1880 to a broader focus on Egyptian national sovereignty and 
independence.  Nevertheless, ‘Urabi and the nationalists were clearly aware of the 
importance of Egypt’s relationship with the Ottoman Sultan and seem equally aware 
of the importance of the Sultan’s endorsement of their movement – which in the end 
was never received. However, in order to attract the Sultan’s support, ‘Urabi and the 
nationalists portray the struggle as one that not only seeks to solve the problems being 
encountered in Egypt but that also attempts to re-impose the Sultan’s authority in 
Egypt in the face of European encroachment and, indeed, to re-assert Egypt’s position 
at the heart of the Islamic ‘umma.  The problem for ‘Urabi and the nationalists was 
that, while many ‘ulama supported this view, many also believed that nationalism 
would harm Islamic unity because it would lead to a greater presence of the European 
powers in Egypt and hence a greater distance between Egypt and the Ottoman Sultan 
and, vitally, Egypt’s place within the Islamic ‘umma. 
‘Urabi, ‘Ulama and the Ottoman Empire 
The ‘Abdin Palace confrontation between ‘Urabi and Khedive Tawfiq changed the 
political map in Egypt, where ‘Urabi emerged as the leading political force.  His 
dominance sprang from the fact that his demands to Khedive Tawfiq gave expression 
to many of the nationalist forces, including Sharif Pasha’s constitutionalists, Egyptian 
nobles, senior military officers and merchants and notables, who all, as a result, 
coalesced around ‘Urabi and his popular movement immediately after the 
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confrontation.23  At the same time, the confrontation alerted the Ottoman Sultan to the 
possibility of losing power in Egypt to the nationalists and, equally, the possibility of 
Britain increasing its influence in Egypt through an alliance with either Khedive 
Tawfiq or ‘Urabi and the nationalists.  This led to a dramatic increase in the political 
intrigue instigated by all parties.  Without examining this in detail here, it is sufficient 
to say that the evidence24 suggests the Ottoman Sultan did indeed send contradictory 
messages to ‘Urabi and the Khedive offering support to both of them and that this may 
have been a significant factor in shifting ‘ulama loyalties away from the Ottoman 
Sultan in favour of ‘Urabi and the nationalists.  
Despatching a first official delegation to Egypt in October 1881 soon after the ‘Abdin 
confrontation, the Sultan tasked the mission, headed jointly by ‘Ali Nizami, a 
decorated Ottoman General, and ‘Ali Fu’ad, the Sultan’s private secretary, with 
gaining “as much advantage as possible for the Sultan from the conflict between the 
Khedive and the Egyptian officers” and to “strengthen the ties between Egypt and the 
Porte”.25  As well as meeting the Khedive, the delegation also met with senior army 
officers close to ‘Urabi, although seemingly not ‘Urabi himself.  Then, after meeting 
the key players in the ‘Abdin confrontation, the Ottoman delegation also engaged with 
senior ‘ulama in order to gauge their opinions of the confrontation and to determine 
the extent of the ‘ulama’s loyalty to the Sultan after the events of ‘Abdin. 
Of considerable concern to the delegation was the fear that the ‘Abdin incident was in 
some way connected to, or a prelude to, an emergence of Arab nationalism coupled 
with strong anti-Turkish feeling that by extension rejected the Caliphal claims of 
Sultan Abd al-Hamid.  An Arab nationalist and other anti-Ottoman protest movements 
had already emerged, around 1880 onwards, in Syria, Lebanon, Sudan and Baghdad, 
calling for a revolt against the Turks and the re-imposition of Arabs at the head of the 
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Islamic ‘umma.26  The Ottoman Sultan feared that either the Khedive or the ‘Urabists 
were inspired by these ideas and would give Arab nationalism its Egyptian expression.  
However, when this was put to the ‘ulama, they rejected it outright and proclaimed 
their unreserved loyalty to the Sultan.  The senior ‘ulama present at the meeting were 
Sheikh al-Azhar Muhammad al-‘Abbasi al-Mahdi (1827–1897), Sheikh ‘Abd al-Baqi 
al-Bakri and Sheikh Muhammad ‘Illaish (Mufti of the Maliki madhhab, 1802–1882).27 
During the meeting, these senior ‘ulama underlined Egypt’s loyalty to the Sultan and 
its central place within the Ottoman Empire.28 
The three ‘ulama mentioned above reflect well some of the complex and overlapping 
concerns and opinions of the ‘ulama of the time in relation to modernisation and the 
emergence of nationalism.  Sheikh al-‘Abbasi (who will be discussed later in this 
chapter) was in fact one of ‘Urabi’s main critics at the time and, recognising this, 
‘Urabi, with the support of other, pro-nationalist, ‘ulama made numerous attempts to 
undermine his authority, weaken his position and break the relatively close relationship 
Sheikh al-‘Abbasi enjoyed with the ruling Khedives.29   
Sheikh ‘Illaish, on the other hand, was a staunch supporter of ‘Urabi and the 
nationalists – despite his ultra-conservative stance, fiercely defending the practice of 
taqlid-based learning and strict adherence to recognised and authoritative texts and 
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educational curricula at al-Azhar.30  In the legal sphere, he was an equally staunch 
adherent of the Maliki madhhab of legal interpretation; his fatawa31 demonstrate not 
only his adherence to the Maliki madhhab but also his conservatism in the 
interpretation of legal matters.  For ‘Illaish, “reform meant the purification of people’s 
understanding of religion from the corruptions of ignorant delusions and wishful 
thinking”,32 which proper interpretation of the law was meant to prevent.  Given the 
‘ulama’s possession of ‘ilm and training in the Islamic sciences, they had a 
fundamental responsibility in interpreting law in line with the recognised legal schools 
and the teachings of their founding Imams; deviation from this would, for ‘Illaish, lead 
to a “public lack of respect for Islam … and social decay”.33  His conservatism is 
displayed here in a fatwa he issued on obtaining a foreign education in a non-Muslim 
country: 
It is decreed in the Shari’a of Islam that travel to the land of the enemy for 
commerce is a discredit to the Testament of Faith, and improper conduct, to say 
nothing of settling down in it or seeking knowledge in it.  And it is decreed in the 
Shari’a of the Muslims that the branches of knowledge that are to be sought are 
those having to do with Shari’a and their tools, which are subjects related to 
Arabic language.  More than that should not be sought, but rather 
 should be avoided. It is known that the Christians learn nothing at all of the 
Shari’a subjects or their tools and that most of the sciences derive from weaving, 
weighing, and cupping, and these are among the lowest trades among the 
Muslims.34  
As previously discussed in Chapter 4, he had clashed with Muhammad ‘Abduh when 
‘Abduh had studied a text outside the prescribed curriculum: Sheikh ‘Illaish 
reprimanded him not only for this but also for criticising taqlid-based learning and 
stepping outside of what ‘Abduh claimed to be its narrow intellectual parameters.  In 
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matters of pedagogy and learning, the role of al-Azhar and the wider ‘ulama 
community, the two could not have been farther apart.  But, despite their opposition 
on particular issues and their entirely different perspectives on the fundamentals of 
Islam, reform, and the role of the ‘ulama – ‘Abduh being a staunch modernist and 
‘Illaish the opposite – both became senior figures supporting ‘Urabi and the nationalist 
movement.35  
Ironically, Sheikh ‘Illaish, the pro-nationalist, probably had more in common with the 
anti-nationalist Sheikh al-‘Abbasi concerning the Ottoman Empire, its role in Islamic 
civilisation and the moral authority of the Ottoman Sultan than he did with Sheikh 
Muhammad ‘Abduh, who was an unforgiving critic of the Ottoman phase of Islamic 
civilisation, blaming the Ottomans for the desperate state of Islam at the end of the 
nineteenth century.  Sheikh al-‘Abbasi, on the other hand, was a Hanafi scholar which 
was the dominant madhhab in Ottoman Turkey and the legal rite of its courts and of 
the Sultan.  The Hanafi madhhab in Egypt, while a throwback to the era of Ottoman–
Mamluk control,36 nevertheless continued to be important, being the basis of Shari’a 
court rulings, and served a significant role for Khedives in underlining their loyalty to 
the Ottoman Sultan and his authority.  On the basis of his Hanafi madhhab, al-‘Abbasi 
would have been favoured by the Ottoman religious authorities and indeed by the 
Sultan as upholding the Empire’s dominant madhhab in one of its territories.  ‘Illaish 
also enjoyed good relations with the Ottoman authorities through his senior rank and 
was in regular contact with Istanbul during the crisis.  In a letter to the Ottoman 
authorities during the crisis, he complains: 
Since we could be deprived of Sublime Porte citizenship because of foreign 
intervention stemming from Khedive Tawfiq’s incapacity and his violation of our 
law and order, the leaders of all the Egyptian people and myself have demanded 
the dismissal of the Khedive.  If the sultan permits Prince Halim to replace 
Khedive Tawfiq, this will bring happiness to the Egyptian people forever.  In 
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such a case, permanent security can be implemented and we can remain safely 
under the sultan’s patronage.37  
But, by July 1882, with the Khedive under the protection of the British in Alexandria, 
prominent ‘ulama, including Sheikh ‘Illaish and Sheikh Muhammad ‘Abduh were the 
leading figures in the Assembly of the Second National Congress that ordered the 
deposition of Khedive Tawfiq.  The deposition was legitimised by the 393 delegates 
present at the Assembly meeting and was based on a fatwa issued by Sheikh ‘Illaish, 
Sheikh al-‘Idwi and Sheikh Abu al-‘Ala al-Khalfawi.  With such a serious matter, it 
would have been proper to have had the Grand Mufti’s signature on the fatwa as well.  
However, Al-‘Abbasi refused to sign either the Assembly order or the fatwa.  Both 
Sheikh ‘Illaish and Sheikh al-‘Abbasi were pro-Ottoman in their views but diverged 
when it came to the question of authority and foreign intervention.  In the letter quoted 
above, Illaish illustrates clearly his views on the threat of foreign intervention and the 
Khedive’s responsibility on this issue.  In contrast, al-‘Abbasi’s view on the deposition 
and the fatwa was that “only the Ottoman Sultan had the right to depose the 
Khedive”.38  Being a senior Hanafi, Sheikh al-Khalfawi’s signature on the fatwa serves 
to give Hanafi legitimacy in the absence of al-‘Abbasi’s willingness to take part in it. 
How were the events of the ‘Abdin incident explained to the Ottoman delegation when 
they asked to know the reasons behind the confrontation?  According to the Sultan’s 
delegation, Khedive Tawfiq was the Sultan’s representative in Egypt and ruled on his 
authority.  In a speech to the army officers, ‘Ali Nizami Pasha underlined this 
relationship, asserting, “whoever obeys the Khedive obeys the Sultan at the same time 
and whoever opposes the Khedive opposes the Sultan and the precepts of the Quran”.39  
In response, Tulbah Ismat, Regimental Commander of the 2nd Infantry Regiment and 
close associate of ‘Urabi – and later to become ‘Urabi’s son-in-law – responded by 
explaining that the reason for the confrontation was not to question the authority of the 
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Sultan or of the Khedive but to bring to the attention of the Khedive, the failings of the 
incumbent Prime Minister Ryad Pasha whose Government had failed to protect the 
interests of the fatherland, the Sultan and the Khedive by refusing to increase the size 
of Egypt’s standing army.40 
At this point, the military officers, backed by some senior ‘ulama, were portraying the 
confrontation as one that sought only to restore the authority of the Khedive and by 
extension the Ottoman Sultan.  According to Tulbah Ismat, “the Imperial Egyptian 
Army (al-jaish al-misri al-shahani) had never questioned the authority and supremacy 
of our Lord and Imam, the Sultan of the Islamic Milla over Egypt”.  He continues with 
reference to the Khedive by stating “the army would likewise always protect the 
authority and sovereign privileges of his representative in Egypt, the Khedive”.41  The 
‘ulama also play down the confrontational aspect with the Khedive and highlight those 
aspects of the incident that they believe actually uphold and defend the authority of 
Khedive Tawfiq and the Ottoman Sultan.  Thus, in the meeting with the Ottoman 
delegation in October 1881, it is clearly the case that every attempt was being made to 
assure the delegation of Egypt’s loyalty to the Sultan and to connect Egypt’s political 
future to that of the Empire.  Although the incident at ‘Abdin Palace was a clear and 
successful attempt at undermining the rule and authority of the Khedive, this is not 
how it was portrayed to the Ottoman delegation by the ‘ulama.   
In the nationalist view, the incident opposed growing European dominance in Egypt, 
which by implication meant strengthening Egypt’s ties with the Ottoman Sultan.  
Second, the demands included increasing the powers of Parliament in order to 
scrutinise more closely the extent of Egypt’s debt payments to the European powers.  
This measure would mean paying the debt more quickly and ending a humiliating 
period of subservience to the European powers, which both Egypt and the Ottoman 
Sultan had had to endure.  Third, by demanding the overthrow of the pro-European 
Prime Minister Ryad Pasha and his Government, ‘Urabi and the nationalists were 
seeking to install a more pro-Ottoman Government with the prominent Turco-
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Circassian Sharif Pasha at its head as Prime Minister.  Finally, the demand to increase 
the size of Egypt’s standing army was a clear indication, as far as the ‘ulama were 
concerned, of ‘Urabi’s attempts to maintain Egypt’s territorial integrity and her ability 
to defend itself from European military encroachment.42  Conveying the ‘Abdin 
incident in this way, the ‘ulama’s support of ‘Urabi’s demands could be seen as acting 
consistently with the aims and goals of the Ottoman Sultan and furthermore, it in no 
way appears to be opposed to the rule of Khedive Tawfiq.43 
Satisfied with what they had seen and heard from the various groups they met, the 
Ottoman delegation duly reported back to the Ottoman Sultan that all relevant parties 
including the Khedive, the military officers and the ‘ulama displayed sufficient loyalty 
to the Sultan and expressed genuine desires to remain within the Ottoman Empire.  
Finally, as was customary, medals of loyalty to the Sultan were presented to members 
of all the groups and the delegation then left for Istanbul on 19th October 1881.44 
Although the next official delegation from the Ottoman Sultan did not come to Egypt 
until June 1882, there continued throughout this period (October 1881 to June 1882) 
constant communication, albeit secretly conducted, between the Ottoman Sultan and 
Khedive Tawfiq, on the one hand, and with ‘Urabi, on the other.  Much of the 
communication from Khedive Tawfiq appealed to the Ottoman Sultan to send troops 
to Egypt to uphold Khedival and Caliphal rule in Egypt and to overthrow the ‘Urabists, 
who by now had overwhelming control of the Egyptian army.  From ‘Urabi’s side, 
communication lines to the Sultan were channelled through a number of people close 
to the Ottoman Sultan, including his Private Secretary Ahmed Ratib and also the 
Sultan’s personal spiritual advisor Sheikh Muhammad Zafar; as mentioned previously, 
these mainly consisted of messages of mutual support.45  
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By the time of the second official Ottoman delegation to Egypt on 7th June 1882, the 
political situation had changed enormously and the tone of this delegation was 
altogether different.  The Joint Note of France and Britain addressed to the Khedive 
on 8th January 1882 made clear the European Powers’ commitment to upholding the 
Khedive’s authority and rule in Egypt.  Its purpose, according to the British Foreign 
Secretary at the time, Lord Granville, was to “give assurances to Tewfiq Pasha 
[Khedive Tawfiq] of the sympathy and support of France and England, and to 
encourage His Highness to maintain and assert his proper authority”.46   
‘Urabi was angered by the Joint Note, in which, despite continued assurances from 
him to the European Powers that he would secure their financial interests in Egypt, 
they had chosen to back the Khedive.  As well as a warning shot to the nationalists, 
the Note was also aimed at the Porte, giving notice against any unilateral Ottoman 
military campaign in Egypt.  From here, relations between the nationalists and the 
European powers, particularly Britain, began to break down.  Consequently, ‘Urabi’s 
need for protection from the Ottoman Sultan against the possibility of a European 
military intervention in Egypt greatly increased and, to this end, he began to emphasise 
the Islamic basis of Egyptian nationalism and its loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan.  In this 
period, he also turns increasingly towards the Egyptian ‘ulama, eliciting their support 
for these claims.  He writes in his diaries: 
I began spreading my ideas among the ‘ulama, the elites, and mayors of the 
villages asking for their help in demanding security for the people which must 
be a priority if we are to ensure that our country is rescued from the government 
that shows no regard for the nation’s rights.  I then informed them that those 
who continued to remain silent about the abuse of the nation’s rights were weak, 
cowards and would be participating in the crimes of the government.  I said, we 
must rely on God to help us prevent injustice in our country.47  
The second Ottoman delegation was headed by Darwish Pasha, a senior Ottoman 
General who was accompanied by Sheikh Ahmed Asad, an ‘alim from Medina and 
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somewhat of an expert on pan-Islamic affairs.  Although the political situation had 
changed, the Delegation’s approach was similar to that of the first Delegation, which 
was to deliver the same dual message assuring both the Khedive and ‘Urabi of the 
Sultan’s support.  However, on 10th June 1882, senior ‘ulama demanded to see 
Darwish Pasha and a meeting took place between the senior ‘ulama and Darwish Pasha 
where the ‘ulama expressed their support of ‘Urabi and the National Party and angrily 
informed the Delegation that ‘Urabi was defending the country from falling into the 
hands of infidels.48  The number of ‘ulama present was approximately 60 including 
the presence of Sheikh Muhammad ‘Illaish.49  Court conventions would also strongly 
suggest that such a high level Ottoman Delegation would only have met with those 
‘ulama holding the most senior rank.   
During this meeting, Sheikh ‘Illaish declared that the ‘ulama and the people of Egypt 
supported and backed ‘Urabi and the National Party50 – a clear break with the 
conventional format of such a meeting, which was to offer loyalty to the Sultan.   The 
statement delivered by Sheikh ‘Illaish must have been a radical departure from the 
traditional ‘ulama assertion of Egypt’s position within the Ottoman Empire and 
Egypt’s loyalty to the Sultan.  No sooner had Sheikh ‘Illaish uttered this statement than 
he was forcibly removed from the meeting, with Darwish Pasha angrily declaring that 
“he had come to issue orders and not listen to preaching”.51  Before the meeting ended, 
some of the ‘ulama who had not supported ‘Illaish’s position and had backed the 
Khedive were decorated by Darwish Pasha.  Among them was the former Sheikh al-
Azhar al-Abbasi, who had been deposed in December 1881 (more on his deposition 
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below), Sheikhs Bahrawi and Abyari and the Sheikh al-Sadat, head of the powerful 
sufi order.52 
Although ‘Urabi had clearly not secured the support of all the senior Egyptian ‘ulama 
as late as June 1882 when the meeting took place, the ‘ulama’s angry reaction to the 
Delegation of Darwish Pasha nevertheless shows a change in ‘ulama allegiances.  The 
statement of support for ‘Urabi and the National Party by pro-nationalist ‘ulama, 
indicates a movement away from the Ottoman Sultan and towards ‘Urabi.  This shift 
can be explained by the Porte’s approach to the crisis in Egypt in the first half of 1882 
and its lack of real support for ‘Urabi and the nationalists.  The Joint Note from Britain 
and France had underlined the European Powers’ position in confirming their support 
of the Khedive against both the nationalists and the Porte.  To counter this, ‘Urabi had 
hoped for outright support from the Ottoman Sultan, which would have restricted the 
dominance of the European Powers and that of the Khedive.  However, as Cole argues, 
“Turkey’s refusal to limit European domination in Egypt and increase its influence 
meant that the common element of Islam that existed between Egyptians and the 
Ottomans never became important as Egyptians viewed Ottoman acquiescence as a 
sign of apostasy”.53 
However, there is also evidence that points towards another explanation, suggesting 
that ‘Urabi and the pro-nationalist ‘ulama may have misread the purpose of Darwish 
Pasha’s mission and perhaps have mistimed their declaration of support for ‘Urabi and 
the nationalists.  As mentioned previously, during the first half of 1882, ‘Urabi 
regularly communicated with the Sultan via the Sultan’s personal spiritual advisor 
Sheikh Muhammad Zafir and his private secretary Ahmed Ratib.  The letters reveal 
explicitly ‘Urabi’s proclamation of loyalty to the Sultan and his guarantees that, under 
him, Egypt would remain within the Ottoman Empire.  More important, they also 
contain overt statements of the Sultan’s support of ‘Urabi, with the letters declaring: 
the Sultan has no confidence in Ismail, Halim or Tewfik [Tawfiq]; but the man 
who thinks of the future of Egypt and consolidates the ties which bind him to the 
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Caliphate, who pays due respect to His Majesty and gives free course to His 
Majesty’s firmans, who assures his independent authority in Constantinople and 
elsewhere, who does not give bribes to a swarm of treacherous sub-officials, who 
does not deviate one hair’s breadth from his line of duty, who is versed in the 
intrigues and machinations of our European enemies, who will watch against 
them and ever preserve his country and his faith intact – a man who does this 
will be pleasing, agreeable to, and accepted by our great lord, the Sultan. … His 
Majesty has expressed his full confidence in you.54 
The Sultan also decorated ‘Urabi with two firmans of rank, on 14th March and 24th 
June 1882, for his loyal service to the Sultan and Egypt’s relationship to the 
Caliphate.55  Could it be that these explicit signals of support from the Sultan gave 
‘Urabi and the nationalists the impression that when the opportunity arose, the Porte 
would surely limit European dominance and would involve itself in support of ‘Urabi 
and the nationalists?  Certainly, the messages of support would have been reassuring 
to ‘Urabi and he may have even assured those around him that, in the end, with the 
Joint Note supporting the Khedive, tactically the Sultan had no option but to support 
‘Urabi to counter European dominance.  It is from this perspective that it may have 
been that the pro-nationalist ‘ulama demonstrated their support of ‘Urabi too soon, 
without giving Darwish Pasha the opportunity to assess properly whether it was the 
right time for the Sultan to publicly declare his support for ‘Urabi and the National 
Party.   Nevertheless, the pro-nationalist ‘ulama clearly came out in support of ‘Urabi 
during their meeting with the Ottoman Delegation on 10th June, which clearly surprised 
and shocked the Delegation. 
If the declaration by the pro-nationalist ‘ulama shocked the Delegation, its aftermath 
provided an unmistakable impression of the strength of feeling underpinning their 
views.  After Darwish Pasha’s rejection of Sheikh ‘Illaish’s statement supporting 
‘Urabi, Darwish Pasha ordered that ‘Illaish be forcibly removed from the meeting.  It 
appears that an Ottoman guard manhandled the elderly Sheikh out of the room and, 
soon after, the rest of the ‘ulama were unceremoniously dispersed.56  When the 60 or 
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so ‘ulama informed the other more junior ranked ‘ulama around al-Azhar, who had not 
been present at the meeting, of these events, anger quickly spread amongst them and 
furious meetings were held throughout the night, disapproving of the behaviour and 
lack of respect shown by the Ottoman Delegation and specifically Darwish Pasha.  By 
the next morning, large numbers of ‘ulama had gathered around al-Azhar mosque and 
heated demonstrations were once more held protesting at the Ottoman Delegation.  
Describing these protests with an apparent reference to the demonstrations headed by 
the ‘ulama opposing the French Occupation of Egypt nearly 100 years earlier, Berque 
remarks that “the Great Mosque seemed to have recovered an authority which had 
already been much impaired by time”.57 
The news of the demonstrations by the ‘ulama shocked Darwish Pasha, who soon 
afterwards met with ‘Urabi.58  The meeting between the two included a series of empty 
promises of loyalty by ‘Urabi in response to ineffectual statements of authority by 
Darwish Pasha, underlining the Sultan’s authority over Egypt and the duty of his 
subjects to obey his rule.  Darwish Pasha requested ‘Urabi’s resignation and that he 
relinquish control over the Egyptian army.  While ‘Urabi agreed to do this, his 
condition for compliance was that he receive a full written discharge exonerating him 
from all the charges and complaints that had been attributed to him and that were still 
outstanding.   In other words, Darwish had attempted to test the resolve of ‘Urabi and 
use Caliphal influence to get him to comply with the wishes and desires of “our 
master”, namely to abandoned his nationalist cause and surrender his native Egyptian 
support to the control of the Sultan.  By now, it had become clear that European, and 
specifically British, military involvement, which the Sultan had wanted to prevent at 
all costs because of the Empire’s own weakness, was inevitable so long as ‘Urabi and 
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the nationalists appeared capable of compromising the Khedive’s authority in Egypt.  
‘Urabi, already aware of his control over the army, had become increasingly aware 
also of his popular support amongst the population of Egypt, in no small part linked to 
the backing he had received from the pro-nationalist ‘ulama.  Egypt’s relations with 
the Ottoman Empire, its loyalty to the Sultan and its Islamic connections to Caliphal 
rule and the wider ‘umma from this point became strained and severely compromised 
and were never able to recover from such a painful fracture. 
If the Sultan’s endorsement of the nationalist movement was important for their 
Islamic credentials and their ability to appeal to the Egyptian population, how 
significant was the indigenous Egyptian ‘ulama in serving this purpose?  Moreover, 
were the Egyptian ‘ulama able to act independently of the Ottoman Sultan in matters 
relating to Egyptian politics or were the Egyptian ‘ulama constrained by the idea of 
Islamic universalism and, within this, loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan? Finally, what 
were the points of tension? 
Pro-nationalist ‘Ulama and the decline in Khedival authority 
After dismantling many of the ‘ulama’s privileges during the nineteenth century,59 the 
relationship between the Khedive and the ‘ulama rested on three fundamental 
premises.  The first premise was that the Khedive controlled and greatly influenced 
many of the key political and religious appointments, including that of the Prime 
Minister and government as well as the most powerful religious authority in Egypt, 
which was the post of the Sheikh al-Azhar.  Tied to this important lever of influence 
was the Khedive’s control of many of the financial benefits, salary increases and bonus 
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land allocations that ministers and ‘ulama received from time to time directly from the 
Khedive in return for loyalty and service to the Khedive.60  
Second, the relationship between the Khedive and the ‘ulama must be seen within the 
context of the idea that Khedival rule was the local extension or manifestation of 
Caliphal rule emanating from Constantinople and the heart of the ‘umma.  While the 
Ottoman Sultan was the ultimate Islamic ruling authority, his local representative was 
the Khedive, whose authority and legitimacy derived from the Sultan and Caliph of 
Islam himself.   
Third, it is also important to see the relationship as one that was historically typical of 
Islamic societies in that it draws a clear distinction between the temporal and the 
sacred. So, for instance, the Caliph’s temporal authority drew its legitimacy from 
control of the army and coercive forces while the ‘ulama’s religious authority rested 
on their knowledge (‘ilm) of religious practice and rituals, pedagogy, and the 
development and application of Shari’a.  For their part, widely recognised and 
accepted in the religious, ‘sacred’ sphere, the ‘ulama had always rejected the 
opportunity to govern, most recently during the French Occupation, and by rejecting 
the opportunity to govern Egypt and instead elevating Muhammad ‘Ali to his position.  
At the same time, Caliphs, throughout Islamic history, had always stayed clear of the 
religious domain, including teaching, preaching and the interpretation of the Quran 
and Sunna leaving these tasks, by and large, to the ‘ulama.61  
During the course of 1881 and 1882, these three key premises became compromised. 
Events in the Revolutionary period demonstrated Khedive Tawfiq’s loss of control 
over the government and the army and he was seriously compromised by the Ottoman 
Sultan.  In the eyes of the ‘ulama, by losing control of the coercive elements of his 
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rule, notably the army itself, the Khedive had lost the fundamental basis of his power 
and ability to rule, which in turn enabled the ‘ulama to shift their loyalty to the new 
power centre in Egypt, which was rapidly filled by ‘Urabi and the nationalists.  
Khedive Tawfiq had always been seen as relatively weak compared to his father 
Khedive Ismail, whom he replaced in 1879, but he was nevertheless appointed and 
confirmed as Khedive by the Ottoman Sultan himself, which was sufficient 
endowment of authority in order to rule Egypt.  However, his authority was continually 
questioned in the years 1879 and 1880 through parliamentary scrutiny and then rapidly 
disintegrated in the years 1881 and 1882.   
The first major incident that raised doubts about his authority to rule occurred in 
February 1881.  ‘Urabi, and two fellow Egyptian Colonels, ‘Abd al-‘Al Hilmi and ‘Ali 
Fahmy, who were later to play a major part in the nationalist movement, were suddenly 
dismissed by the Minister of War ‘Uthman Rifki for discriminatory reasons.  Rifki was 
a Turco-Circassian and had a history of favouring Turco-Circassians in the army over 
native Egyptian officers.62  When ‘Urabi and the Egyptian officers refused to be 
dismissed and countered with a petition to Prime Minister Ryad Pasha for the Minister 
of War to be dismissed instead, a Government and Khedive-backed plan was 
formulated to arrest ‘Urabi, Hilmi and Fahmy.  The episode is known as the Qasr al-
Nile incident because, after their arrests, the Egyptian officers were taken to prison 
cells at Qasr al-Nile from where they escaped with the help of army officers loyal to 
‘Urabi.  Addressing a letter explaining the incident to the French Consul M. de Ring, 
the Egyptian officers again requested ‘Uthman Rifki be dismissed – which the Khedive 
finally agreed to.  The incident was a very public display of the Khedive’s weakness 
and brought ‘Urabi “into immediate notoriety, and at once his name was in all men’s 
mouths as that of a man who had been able successfully to defy the Government and 
bring about a change of Ministers”.63 
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Even more damaging to the Khedive’s authority was the ‘Abdin Palace confrontation 
itself.  Here, ‘Urabi managed to successfully defy the Khedive’s power to appoint the 
most high ranking officials by forcing the Khedive to dismiss his entire Government 
and install one selected by ‘Urabi and the nationalists.  Selecting a new Prime Minister, 
the Khedive’s choice was yet again vetoed by ‘Urabi: the Khedive’s choice of Haidar 
Pasha was refused by ‘Urabi because he was a relative of the Khedive’s.  Instead, 
‘Urabi was able to install his own choice of Sharif Pasha as Prime Minister.64 
Both incidents also confirmed the Khedive’s lack of control over the Egyptian army.  
As the Amir al-Mo’minoun or, in the Khedive’s case, his representative ruler in another 
part of the ‘umma, Khedive Tawfiq was expected to have complete control of the 
coercive elements of the state that could be mobilised to protect the community and its 
territory.  Losing the ability to command the loyalty of the army meant that the ruler 
no longer had the ability to protect the people and territory of the dar al-Islam (abode 
of Islam).  During the ‘Abdin incident, not a single shot was fired despite the Palace 
grounds being full of soldiers, many of whom were there to protect the Khedive.  In 
fact, even the soldiers there for that purpose refused to defend him when they were 
ordered to.  The Khedive’s humiliation was complete when the officers accompanying 
‘Urabi refused to lower their swords and place them back in their sheaths.65  
As well as a lack of power in political and military circles, the Khedive also began to 
lose authority in the religious sphere.  The incumbent Sheikh al-Azhar at the time, 
Sheikh Muhammad al-Abassi, had been appointed by Khedive Ismail and had held 
this office since 1871.66  Al-‘Abbasi’s grandfather was a Coptic convert to Islam who 
came close to assuming the post of Sheikh al-Azhar before Muhammad ‘Ali chose 
Sheikh Muhammad al-Shanawani (1812–1818)67 just three years before al-‘Abbasi’s 
grandfather’s death.  As well as al-‘Abbasi’s grandfather being a prominent ‘alim, his 
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father had also served as Cairo’s Grand Mufti until his death in 1831.  But it was al-
‘Abbasi the son and grandson who rose to the very height of the formal Islamic 
structure in Egypt with his appointment first as Grand Mufti when he was only twenty 
one years old in 1848 and then later as Sheikh al-Azhar in 1871 by appointment of 
Khedive Isma’il.68  The office of Sheikh al-Azhar and its appointment had remained a 
Khedival prerogative since the time of Muhammad ‘Ali in order to ensure control over 
this highly powerful position and to reduce its political importance.  Being an 
appointee of the Khedive, the Sheikh al-Azhar came under the Khedive’s influence 
and nearly always acted in line with and in favour of the Khedive.    The appointment 
of al-‘Abassi was significant because it was the first time in al-Azhar’s history that a 
member of the Hanafi legal school of interpretation (madhhab) had been appointed 
Sheikh al-Azhar.  At the same time, it also demonstrated the considerable extent of 
Khedive Isma’il’s authority to appoint a Hanafi rather than a Shafi’i as Sheikh al-
Azhar, imposing his choice on the ‘ulama as well as the whole of Egypt.  From Sunni 
Islam’s four dominant legal schools of interpretation, the Hanafi madhhab was the 
dominant legal school within Turkey and the Ottoman Empire (as explained above).  
In Egypt, while the highest legal authority, that of the Grand Mufti of Egypt was 
normally a Hanafi and the Shari’a courts applied the Hanafi legal rite, the Sheikh al-
Azhar, the highest religious authority, always came from the dominant madhhab in 
Egypt, the Shafi’i.  Khedive Isma’il, in appointing the Hanafi Sheikh al-‘Abassi had 
wanted to strengthen Egypt’s links to the Ottoman Empire and, more precisely, 
Ottoman Islam.  Rudolph Peters suggests that Sheikh al-‘Abassi’s appointment by 
Khedive Isma’il was also because the Khedive “wanted to introduce reforms and 
regarded al-‘Abassi as the most suitable person for carrying out this task”.69 
As Sheikh al-Azhar, al-‘Abassi was generally well respected because he was 
responsible for raising the profile of al-Azhar as well as securing greater financial 
benefits for its students and teachers.  For instance, as Sheikh al-Azhar, he successfully 
increased the levels and amounts of government-funded student grants.  He also 
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increased the overall provision and standard of riwaqs (dormitories) for its students 
and the daily state-funded food and bread rations for teachers and students of all 
ranks.70  If these were positive achievements, which carried much favour amongst the 
students and other ‘ulama, he was also responsible for attempting to break an old 
tradition of al-Azhar by introducing an examination system, seeking to formalise 
teaching practices at al-Azhar and stamp out the widespread ‘unofficial’ teaching and 
instruction taking place at the time.71 
The examination (al-‘Alameyah) was aimed at those students within al-Azhar who 
wished to take up teaching roles.  Up until then, senior students, having studied with 
various ‘ulama of al-Azhar over a period of time, were invited to teach in the form of 
leading discussion groups or classes.  Depending on the success of these classes, which 
was judged by the trainee ‘alim’s ability to deal satisfactorily with questions arising 
during the course of the class, he would be able to hold classes by himself.  As well as 
lacking any formal examination or the establishment of standards, the system also 
allowed for many to claim the title of ‘alim and thus reap financial benefits from 
teaching and other associated jobs reserved for ‘ulama.   The new system introduced 
by al-‘Abassi as Sheikh al-Azhar abolished this practice and established a strict and 
comprehensive examination system, which would include rigorous study of standard 
texts and subjects, numerous examinations and extensive refereeing of the student’s 
academic achievements.72 The new system was successfully introduced and although 
some resistance was put forward by Azharites, the benefits, raised standards and 
increased funding that al-‘Abassi’s was able to bring in, likely had the effect of 
tempering the anger of other Azharites.  Up until the ‘Abdin incident, al-‘Abassi 
remained a popular Sheikh al-Azhar and appeared to have been popular amongst 
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Azharites because of his successful efforts to increase their wellbeing and conditions.73  
The increased financial benefits to ‘ulama and students through increased salaries, 
food rations and improved conditions in al-Azhar and the riwaqs made up for years of 
neglect.74 
Al-‘Abbasi relationship with the nationalist movement is a good example of the 
complexity of opinion and views of the ‘ulama at the time.  On issues like educational 
reform and the need to increase standards in al-Azhar and the professionalism of the 
‘ulama, he can clearly be seen as a moderniser and reformer.  But politically, this senior 
‘alim was one of ‘Urabi’s greatest critics and opponents, and in this respect, can be 
seen as a political conservative.  His political views were clearly influenced by his 
relationship with the Khedival court although even here, he had exercised 
independence from Khedival influence on two previous occasions.  He refused to give 
accommodating fatawa to both ‘Abbas I, when he wanted to “confiscate all properties 
of the descendants of Muhammad ‘Ali, and to Isma’il I when he was acting Prince-
Regent for Sa’id I and wanted to assimilate the family endowments (waqf ahli) to 
public endowments (waqf khayri) in order to gain control over them”.75  On the whole, 
however, he was close to the rulers, having been appointed to his posts by them and 
hence he did not support ‘Urabi’s nationalist movement.  During Sheikh al-Abassi’s 
time as Sheikh al-Azhar, Al-‘Abbasi was “counted as a follower of (Khedive) 
Tawfiq”76 and generally seen as politically conservative.   
For ‘Urabi and the nationalists, al-Abassi’s opposition to their movement was a 
constant thorn in their side and ‘Urabi, together with pro-nationalist ‘ulama, made a 
very public attempt to eliminate this threat by removing him from office. When this 
did not return the precise desired result and al-‘Abassi was relinquished of the post of 
Sheikh al-Azhar but remained in his position of Grand Mufti, they tried to compromise 
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his position here.  These two events show how the elite ‘ulama and control of al-Azhar 
became key battlegrounds for the Khedive and the opposition nationalist movement in 
terms of lending their cause Islamic legitimacy and being able to count on the ‘ulama’s 
support to influence popular opinion in their favour.   
Soon after the ‘Abdin confrontation, rumours began to circulate that Khedive Tawfiq 
had asked Sheikh al-Abassi to issue a fatwa denouncing ‘Urabi and declaring his 
insubordinate behaviour a capital crime.  It was also rumoured that Sheikh al-Abassi 
had agreed to oblige the Khedive.  The issuing of this fatwa would have been highly 
damaging to ‘Urabi and might have compromised many of the gains and successes 
‘Urabi and the nationalists had made in the preceding months.  In particular, it was 
thought that Khedive Tawfiq had requested the fatwa because he wanted to reverse 
some of the concessions he had made to ‘Urabi during the ‘Abdin incident.  Declaring 
‘Urabi’s insubordination to the Khedive would open the way to question the behaviour 
of ‘Urabi and all of his demands.77  Even though the fatwa from al-‘Abbasi never 
materialized, ‘Urabi always felt threatened by this possibility and continued to try to 
silence al-‘Abbasi right up until his military defeat at the hands of the British forces in 
September 1882.78 In fact, according to Muhammad ‘Abduh, one of ‘Urabi’s demands 
as early as the ‘Abdin confrontation was the dismissal of al-Abassi as Sheikh al-Azhar, 
which clearly shows ‘Urabi’s intentions.79 
In seeking to remove al-‘Abassi from office, ‘Urabi encouraged pro-nationalist ‘ulama 
within al-Azhar, most notably Sheikh ‘Illaish and his followers, to agitate for al-
Abassi’s dismissal.  The strength of ‘ulama opposition to al-‘Abassi forced the 
Government to set up a committee to determine al-Abassi’s appropriateness as Sheikh 
al-Azhar.80  The committee could find nothing wrong with al-Abassi’s tenure as 
Sheikh al-Azhar but by this time the strength of feeling and opposition to al-Abassi 
was so strong amongst Azharites that the Khedive was forced to dismiss the Sheikh 
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al-Azhar on 5th December 1881.  In the election for al-‘Abbasi’s successor as Sheikh 
al-Azhar that followed, over 4,000 Azharites are said to have taken part with only 25 
dissenters and, while Sheikh ‘Illaish’s nomination to the post of Sheikh al-Azhar was 
vetoed by the Khedive, he was promoted to the position of Deputy Sheikh al-Azhar on 
11th December, with Sheikh Muhammad al-Imbabi (1824–1896) assigned the position 
of Sheikh al-Azhar as a compromise.81  Because al-Imbabi lacked popular support 
amongst Azharites, his compromise appointment suited ‘Urabi and the pro-nationalist 
‘ulama, who must have felt that ‘Illaish’s greater authority amongst the ‘ulama of al-
Azhar would be able to counter al-Imbabi’s appointment.82  
Alexander Schölch defies the dominant view that Sheikh al-‘Abassi’s dismissal was 
linked to ‘Urabi when he argues that “the deposition of the Shaikh [Sheikh] al-Azhar 
was not, as has been claimed repeatedly, the work of ‘Urabi but the result of disputes 
within Azhar itself which were triggered off by the changed political situation”.83  
However, the events leading up to and including the deposition of Sheikh al-‘Abassi 
overwhelmingly support the notion that ‘Urabi stood to gain from the deposition of al-
Abassi and the two were in fact connected.  ‘Urabi’s mistrust of al-‘Abassi stemmed 
from the fact that he was a Khedival appointment, which, according to ‘Urabi, would 
ultimately determine al-‘Abassi’s loyalty.  To have Egypt’s Sheikh al-Azhar publicly 
reject ‘Urabi and the nationalists by issuing a fatwa to this effect would have been 
highly damaging and would surely have led to a decline in his popular support.  Clearly 
then it would have been advantageous to ‘Urabi to have a friendly, even pro-
nationalist, Sheikh al-Azhar. 
The Qasr al-Nile incident in February 1881 and the ‘Abdin confrontation in September 
1881 show the extent to which the Khedive had become politically weak and had lost 
much of his authority.  By September 1881, he had lost control of the Government 
with ‘Urabi and the nationalists first removing the Minister of War and then forcing 
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the dismissal of the entire Government.  Similarly, these incidents show that the 
Khedive had also lost control of the army as the army had during this time come out 
in support of ‘Urabi and the nationalists.  The dismissal of Sheikh al-Abassi in 
December 1881 demonstrates that the Khedive had also lost his authority in the 
religious sphere.   
Both the ‘Urabists and the Khedive competed fiercely for the support of the ‘ulama of 
al-Azhar, demonstrating that the religious sphere had become an important 
constituency for the contending political forces.  By and large, it was the support of 
the senior or ‘elite’ ‘ulama whom ‘Urabi and the nationalists and the Khedive were 
vying for, as it was the senior ‘ulama who were able to encourage and enlist wider 
support from other junior ‘ulama and the population.  However, the ‘ulama themselves 
appear divided during this period and can in no way be seen to have wholly supported 
either camp.  Rather, the concerns of the ‘ulama seem to have been complex and 
varied, sometimes overlapping.  Where points of convergence seemed likely, these 
often became points at which the opinions of senior ‘ulama in fact diverged, as in the 
case of Sheikh Muhammad ‘Abduh, Sheikh Muhammad ‘Illaish and Sheikh al-
‘Abbasi.   
Categorizing the ‘ulama depending on their stance towards the Ottoman Empire, the 
Khedive or ‘Urabi and the nationalists, while important, is still not adequate in 
analysing their views, as their stance was frequently intertwined with other more 
complex concerns, such as foreign intervention, contested Islamic principles of 
authority and equally divided opinions on community and loyalty to the notion of the 
‘umma and the role of the nation.  In the same way, categorizing ‘ulama as “official” 
or “unofficial” in the state- or al-Azhar-appointed ‘ulama hierarchy or in the sufi 
orders, as de Jong does, seems also to throw up more problems than answers.  De Jong 
argues that: 
[s]ince none of the heads of the officially recognised orders is known to have 
played a role either in the events leading up to the insurrection or in the 
insurrection itself, it seems reasonable to explain their apparent political 
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aloofness as being the consequence of this aspect of the structure of [Sheikh 
‘Abd] al-Bakri’s power position.84 
The structure of the ‘ulama in the nineteenth century is indeed intimately linked to the 
structure of the sufi orders but, where Sheikh al-Bakri may have been “performing an 
umbrella function”85 for the heads of the official sufi orders, there were unofficial 
orders that had official senior ‘ulama as their heads.  Sheikh Muhammad ‘Illaish, for 
instance, “held supreme leadership of a Shahdiliyya order, al-‘Arabiyya”,86 which 
appears to have been an ‘unofficial’ order in de Jong’s categorization, but it is also 
well known that he was one of the highest ‘alims in the country through his official 
posts as Maliki Mufti and then later as Deputy Sheikh a-Azhar.  This example shows 
that the status of ‘official’ or ‘unofficial’ needs to be properly explored and may not 
give an accurate picture of the views and opinions of ‘ulama in either of these 
categories. 
As for ‘Urabi and the nationalists, by the end of 1881 they had emerged as the 
dominant political force within Egypt.  After the ‘Abdin incident, and particularly in 
the first half of 1882, Khedive Tawfiq and the ‘Urabists struggled and competed with 
each other for the support of the Ottoman Sultan.  For the nationalists, the Sultan’s 
endorsement of their movement would demonstrate to the population of Egypt, still 
largely loyal to the Caliph, that, by supporting ‘Urabi and the nationalists, they were 
also supporting the Caliph and the wider Islamic ‘umma.  Conversely, Khedive Tawfiq 
hoped that persuading the Sultan to back his rule in Egypt would undermine ‘Urabi 
and the nationalists and bolster his own Islamic credentials in the eyes of the 
population as the legitimate ruler of Egypt.  The ‘ulama became integral to this 
struggle.  Both the nationalists and the Khedive sought to co-opt the ‘ulama in order 
to strengthen their domestic support as well as to underline their Islamic authority and 
credentials to the Ottoman Sultan.  While pro- and anti-Ottoman tendencies existed 
among the ‘ulama, for both the Khedive and ‘Urabi, ‘ulama support conferred on their 
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movements Islamic legitimacy and a clear sign to the Ottoman Sultan that their rule – 
either Khedival or nationalist – would be Islamic and that they possessed the support 
of their local ‘ulama, ensuring Egypt’s continued position within the Islamic ‘umma.
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Chapter 7 
In Defence of Islam and the Nation: ‘Ulama, Fatawa and  
the Popular Press 
‘Urabi and the nationalist movement included a strong pro-nationalist element of the 
‘ulama which became increasingly important and influential to ‘Urabi and the 
nationalist movement as shown in the previous chapter.  Chapter 6 of this thesis also 
argued that the ‘ulama – both within conservative and reformist and official and 
unofficial circles – found themselves between a number of contending loyalties in the 
years 1879 to the early part of 1882.  The rise of a native nationalist movement in 
Egypt raised questions about their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan as 
well as forcing the ‘ulama to re-examine their relationship with the Khedive and his 
rule in Egypt.  The events of these years and the way ‘ulama reacted show that ‘ulama 
responses to the emerging crisis were varied, complex and depended on numerous 
contending factors. 
Many ‘ulama remained loyal to the Khedive and rejected ‘Urabi and the nationalist 
movement on the grounds that it did not have the authority to challenge Khedival rule 
given its direct link to the authority of the Ottoman Sultan.  Moreover, anti-nationalist 
‘ulama saw opposition to the Khedive as also jeopardising both Egypt’s position within 
the Ottoman Empire and by extension its position within the Muslim ‘umma.  Indeed, 
with the Ottoman Empire already in crisis and in a weak position, many ‘ulama saw 
‘Urabi’s efforts to gain national independence for Egypt as significantly contributing 
to the crisis of Empire and a further weakening of the ‘umma.  These ‘ulama also saw 
an emergent nationalist movement defying Khedival authority which the European 
powers would not tolerate, thereby increasing the likelihood and extent of European 
involvement in Egypt.    
On the other hand, there were members of the ‘ulama who constituted a strong support 
constituency for ‘Urabi and the nationalist cause.  Pro-nationalist ‘ulama argued that 
the Khedive had lost authority to rule Egypt because of his subservience to the 
European powers in particular Britain, and had failed to limit European influence in 
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Egypt resulting in prolonging Egypt’s economic decline and hardship because of the 
Dual Control and the injustice of its debt payments.  But if they saw Egypt’s debt crisis 
as a reflection of the desire of the European powers to keep Egypt subjugated and 
weak, they also viewed European involvement as having a strong anti-Islamic 
dimension.  ‘Ulama support of ‘Urabi was, in contradiction to their anti-nationalist 
colleagues, based on establishing a government in Egypt able to limit the influence of 
the European powers and re-build ties with the Ottoman Empire reasserting Egypt’s 
Islamic identity at the heart of the ‘umma.  There were also those pro-nationalist 
‘ulama who cared little for the Ottoman Empire and the authority of the Sultan but 
who came to see the nationalist movement as an opportunity for Egypt to embark on a 
new process of modernisation incorporating an authentic Islam as part of the national 
vision.   
Britain’s military involvement and subsequent invasion of Egypt in the second half of 
1882 represents the final and in many ways decisive phase of the ‘Urabi Revolt.  
‘Urabi’s emergence as a strong oppositional political force within Egypt by the end of 
1881, was seen by Britain as a major threat to their interests despite assurances from 
the nationalists to honour the debt repayments and retain the Dual Control.  In 
protecting these interests, the British Government sought to counter the emergence of 
the nationalist movement by bolstering support for Khedive Tawfiq and reinforcing 
Khedival authority.  When this policy failed, and the Khedive was unable to re-assert 
his authority and rule in Egypt, British policy transformed into seeking a military 
solution.  The British position towards the emergence of a local nationalist movement 
was both hostile and rejectionist. 
The British invasion of Egypt was largely as a result of Khedive Tawfiq being unable 
to rule Egypt from May 1882.  This chapter will explore the ‘ulama’s role in relation 
to the Khedive’s loss of power and legitimacy during this period and their role in 
mounting opposition to the British invasion.  In both circumstances the ‘ulama were 
crucial actors where they used their moral and Islamic legal authority to de-legitimise 
the Khedive’s rule and their vast networks around the country to implore ordinary 
Egyptians to join an armed struggle to defend Islam and the Egyptian nation against 
British invasion.  Up until then, the ‘ulama had been crucial in efforts to oppose the 
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Khedive’s rule in cooperation with ‘Urabi and the nationalists, but events from May 
1882 led the nationalists to believe the only way Egypt was to emerge from its crisis 
was to bring about the Khedive’s deposition if necessary, in opposition to the Ottoman 
Sultan.  Having secured the ‘ulama’s support on this issue and obtained a fatwa from 
senior ‘ulama permitting the Khedive’s deposition, ‘Urabi and the nationalists 
continued to run the country in defiance of the Khedive, the European powers and the 
Ottoman Sultan.  Britain countered this move by invading Egypt in an attempt to re-
impose the Khedive’s rule, and once again, the ‘ulama and the nationalists found 
common ground on which to oppose the invasion with ‘ulama as part of the efforts to 
dispel the invasion.  However, by late September 1882 British forces had overwhelmed 
the resistance and had captured Cairo and ‘Urabi and many of his nationalist 
collaborators including a number of ‘ulama were arrested and put on trial with the 
Khedive restored to power.   
‘Ulama and the Fatwa of Deposition 
When Khedive Tawfiq dismissed the nationalist government on 26 May 1882, the 
response from ‘Urabi and the nationalists was to call for the Khedive’s deposition.  On 
the evening of 27 May, a meeting took place at the house of Sultan Pasha, the wealthy 
landowner and leader of Parliament.  During this meeting, ‘Urabi addressed those 
present and spoke of the injustices of the dynasty of Muhammad ‘Ali and at the end 
accused Khedive Tawfiq for being responsible for allowing the British and French 
fleets to intimidate the government and people of Egypt.  Present at the meeting were 
a number of army officers, parliamentarians, and numerous notables and ‘ulama 
including the prominent al-Azhar Sheikhs Abd al-Rahman Nafez and Abd al-Hadi al-
Ibiary and in a comment directed specifically, but not entirely at the pro-nationalist 
‘ulama that were present, ‘Urabi insisted that Khedive Tawfiq’s actions were “against 
the precepts of religion”.1  After ending his speech with the judgement that Khedive 
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Tawfiq deserved to be deposed, the audience became excited by this prospect and 
loudly began repeating ‘Urabi’s words demanding the Khedive’s deposition.  2 
Although ‘Urabi had already requested the Khedive’s deposition in a letter to the 
Sultan on 25 May 1882,3 the Sultan did not oblige fearing that such a move may have 
provoked a military reaction from the British and French fleets who would see this as 
an attempt to sideline their interests in Egypt.  When ‘Urabi realised that the Sultan 
would not issue a firman of deposition, he decided to consult the Egyptian pro-
nationalist ‘ulama on the matter, who had already shown their desire to depose 
Khedive Tawfiq in the meeting at the house of Sultan Pasha.  After consulting with 
them and being sure of a favourable response, ‘Urabi took the unprecedented step of 
formally requesting a fatwa from members of the ‘ulama on the legality, according to 
Islamic law of Khedive Tawfiq’s right to continue to rule Egypt.  The fatwa and the 
request was found by ‘Urabi’s lawyer in his personal papers after ‘Urabi was arrested 
and is reproduced in full here: 
Oh ye Notables and most learned Ulemas, who give wise counsel to the Moslems, 
who keep the Mussulman law spotless and pure, and who watch over the 
execution of its precepts, incline your ear and answer to the questions put by the 
Egyptian Nation in the following lines.  Give sound advice, and may you be 
guided aright, and may God work well through you and point out the straight 
path! 
What say you of a Sovereign who, being named by the Prince of the Faithful to 
govern his subjects with justice, and to act according to the rules of God, has 
violated the compact and sown dissensions among the Moslems, and has broken 
their staff of unity?  This so-called sovereign has even gone so far as to prefer 
the government of the Infidels to that of the Faithful, and has asked nations who 
are straying from the path of the true religion to establish their power in the 
Mussulman country over which he rules. 
He has been the cause of making his subjects bend before the force of the 
stranger, and has even gone so far as to use every effort to defend that force. 
                                                 
2
 Alexander Schölch, Egypt for the Egyptians! The Socio-Political Crisis in Egypt, 1878–1882, London 
Ithaca Press, 1981, p.241 
3
 Hasan Adali, Documents Pertaining to the Egyptian Question in the Yildiz Collection of the 
Basbakanlik Arsivi, Istanbul, in P.M.  Holt (ed.), Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt:  
Historical Studies from the Ottoman Conquest to the United Arab Republic, London, Oxford University 
Press, 1968, p.55. 
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And when the Faithful counselled him to change his conduct, he refused, and 
stubbornly continued in his disobedience to the Sultan, and the Holy Law.  
Knowing this, can this sovereign legally continue to reign, to enable strangers 
to strengthen themselves in the country of Islam, or must he not be deposed, and 
another appointed in his place, who will watch over and keep the law?4 
In the istifta (question or request) above, the nationalists clearly try and represent the 
grievances of all sections of Egyptian society.  So, the istifta is broad and general in 
its scope in an attempt to give voice to the disparate grievances of the ‘ulama and the 
notables as well as the ordinary Egyptians.  Therefore, in order to represent the 
grievances of all groups, the istifta comes from the ‘Egyptian Nation’ and not from a 
lone group or individual such as ‘Urabi or even the army officers.  By evoking the 
‘Egyptian Nation’ the istifta asserts that it is in fact the entire ‘Egyptian Nation’ that 
has grievances with the Khedive and not merely a single group.  In this respect, ‘Urabi 
and the nationalists were aware of the necessity of building alliances with other social 
groups and were able to do this “on the grounds that they held common grievances 
against the Khedive”.5 
More specifically, the istifta accuses the Khedive of ‘making his subjects bend before 
the force of the stranger’.  This sentence makes reference to the injustices the various 
different social groups were to have felt as a result of Khedive Tawfiq’s collaboration 
with the European Powers.  So, it is meant to appeal not only to the sense of injustice 
felt by the fellahin as a result of their increased tax burden in order to service the 
European debt, but equally to the injustice felt by Egyptian army officers at their lack 
of promotions, pro-nationalist notables whose land had been confiscated by the state 
in order to service European debt and the ‘ulama who under the Muhammad ‘Ali 
dynasty had progressively lost many of their political and economic privileges (see 
                                                 
4
 Alexander Meyrick Broadley, How We Defended Arabi [‘Urabi] and his Friends: A Story of Egypt 
and the Egyptians, London, Chapman & Hall, 1884; reprint: Cairo, Arab Research and Publishing 
Center, 1980, pp. 175–76.   
5
 Juan R.  I.  Cole, Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of 
Egypt’s ‘Urabi Movement, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1993, p.  241.  Cole rightly argues 
that the strength of the alliance of different segments of the intelligentsia was due to their spiritual and 
material resources with the notables possessing enormous financial resources while the ‘ulama 
exercised considerable moral influence over Egyptian Muslims.   
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chapter 3).6  But as well as reminding people of the injustices they suffered under 
Khedive Tawfiq, this sentence also points towards the humiliating presence of 
Europeans in Egypt and the privileged status they enjoyed. They occupied many of the 
senior positions within the ministries and commercial sector and were paid vastly 
inflated salaries.  These privileges as well as their overwhelming political influence in 
Egypt heightened the overwhelming sense of European domination felt by ordinary 
Egyptians which ‘Urabi was quick to utilise when appealing to the masses.7 
Finally, the language of the istifta while pointing towards the grievances of the 
‘Egyptian Nation’ and the injustices suffered by its people under Khedive Tawfiq is 
couched in language, which places Islam and the decline of Islamic unity at the heart 
of the request to depose the Khedive.  According to the istifta, the first violation of 
Islamic unity occurs when the ‘Sovereign’ (Khedive Tawfiq), who occupies his 
position only by command of the ‘Prince of the Faithful’ (the Sultan), fails to govern 
his subjects with justice and in accordance with God, which is the basis of his compact 
with the Sultan.  By demonstrating the Khedive’s violation of this element of Islamic 
unity, ‘Urabi no doubt had in mind two important constituents.  First, he still hoped to 
receive the formal backing of the Sultan but second, and more close to home, he was 
conscious not to alienate those pro-nationalist ‘ulama who sought closer Islamic ties 
to the Ottoman Sultan and still sought to win over the powerful anti-nationalist but 
pro-Ottoman Egyptian ‘ulama.   
The second of Khedive Tawfiq’s ‘violations’ of Islamic unity relates to Egypt’s 
position as part of the wider Islamic ‘umma and accuses the Khedive of ‘preferring the 
government of the Infidels to that of the Faithful’.  ‘Urabi and the nationalists make a 
clear reference to the widespread concern in Egypt and amongst the ‘ulama that a 
greater European presence in Egypt will in fact lead to Egypt’s eventual divorce from 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., pp.106–07.  Here Cole argues that Tawfiq was responsible, not only for cutting the size of the 
Egyptian army to 12,000 but also of “restricting the years an indigenous Egyptian could serve, thus 
making it impossible for sons of village headman to rise through the ranks into the officer corps”.  
Regarding the ‘ulama, Cole insists that “the state slashed seminary enrolments and kept their (the 
‘ulama) salaries and stipends much lower than those paid to translators and other members of the secular 
intelligentsia”.   
7
  Ibid., pp.21–34 
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the Ottoman Empire and by extension the wider Muslim ‘umma.  Britain and to a lesser 
degree France were already largely in control of many aspects of Egypt’s affairs 
through their Consul Generals who were the Khedive’s chief advisors, the European 
Financial Controllers who effectively managed the Egyptian Treasury and the scores 
of European advisors in many of the Egyptian ministries.  The istifta made clear 
reference to this and couched this in explicitly Islamic terms.  Allowing non-Muslim 
powers to further establish ‘their power in the Mussulman country’ would lead to those 
powers pulling Egypt further away from its position at the heart of the Islamic ‘umma. 
Lastly, the istifta accuses the Khedive of defying the Holy Law.  In a direct reference 
to the most important sources of Islamic law, being the Quran and the Prophet’s Sunna, 
the accusation suggests the Khedive’s departure from these fundamental sources of 
Islamic law.  But more than being merely a departure from an abstract legal system, 
the Khedive is being accused of acting in contradiction to the Quran, which Muslims 
believe to be the very word of God and the first ‘sacred’ source of Islamic law.  
Moreover, in mentioning the ‘Holy Law’, the istifta also accuses the Khedive of 
defying the example of the Prophet contained in the Sunna another important source 
of Islamic law.  Lastly, the development and formulation of Islamic law could not have 
been complete without the formation of the four madhaahib (legal schools) named 
after their founding fathers.  These schools were named after the great Fuqaha (Jurists) 
because these men were believed to possess unique intellectual qualities and religious 
knowledge able, not only to understand the nature and meaning of the sacred texts of 
the Quran and the Prophet’s Sunna (traditions), but also to formulate an entire doctrinal 
tradition of legal interpretation around which the sacred texts could be interpreted and 
applied to peoples everyday lives.  By accusing the Khedive of defying ‘Holy Law’ 
meant the defiance of God, the Prophet and the great Fuqaha Imams. 
The response to the istifta was the issuing of a fatwa by senior ‘ulama from al-Azhar 
and which could not have expressed the opinion that the Sovereign could and should 
be deposed in more direct or unambiguous terms.  The full text of the fatwa is as 
follows: 
Thanks to God and prayers and peace to our Lord Muhammed, the Messenger 
of God, and to his relations, friends and those who love him! 
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In this case he shall be cast out, and in his place shall be named one who will 
watch over the law and defend it, and respect the rights of the Prince of the 
Faithful, our Lord the Caliph, Successor of the Messenger of the Master of all 
men.   
The Most High has said “Ye who believe, take not the Jews and the Christians 
as Masters one over the other, and he among you who makes one of these his 
master shall be considered like to them.”  He hath also said (Praise and honour 
to him!) -Do not this for then will there be troubles on the earth, and great 
disorders.”  Again he hath said, (may He be praised and exalted!) “He who does 
not govern in accordance with that which God has shown by revelation he is 
truly an infidel.”  Also he hath said (praise and glory to Him!) “He who does 
not govern according to the revealed will of God, is a sinner.”  And again, “He 
who does not govern according to the revealed Will of God, that man is an 
oppressor.”  Again, “Tell the deceitful that they shall have a terrible 
punishment, those who take to themselves friends among the unbelievers instead 
of among the faithful.  Do they seek after power?  Know that all power belongs 
to God alone. 
He hath said (praise and glory be to Him!) “Ye who have believed, take not my 
enemy and yours to show kindness to him.”  And again, “He who doeth this, 
shall be considered as erring from the right way.”  And again, “Ye have a fair 
example before you in Abraham and those who were with him.  They said in truth 
to those among whom they lived, ‘We retire from you, and purify ourselves from 
you, and from all that you worship in the place of God.  We will know you no 
more, and henceforth enmity and hatred shall reign between us for ever, until 
you shall worship the One God.’”  He hath said (praise and glory be to him!), 
“In Abraham and his companions you have a good example, for those who trust 
in God and believe in the last day.  He who rules is God, the Almighty to whom 
praise is due.  He who makes friends of the Infidels is a tyrant. 
The prophet of God hath said (God’s blessing and peace be upon him!), “He 
who honours the power of God on earth, God will honour him on the day of 
Resurrection, and he who despises the sovereignty of the Lord upon earth, God 
shall despise him on the last day.   
God, praise be to His name, is Omnipotent and Omniscient.  May God bless our 
Lord the Prophet Muhamed, the most Noble, and his family and friends, great 
and powerful!8 
The text follows the traditional structure of the fatwa,9 which in the first instance opens 
and closes with salutations to God and the Prophet Muhammad.  The fatwa then goes 
on to deal with the substantive question posed in the istifta of whether or not the 
                                                 
8
 Broadley, op. cit. How we Defended Arabi, pp.176–77.   
9
 Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, Defining Islam for the Egyptian State, Leiden, Brill, 1997 gives an account 
of the formal structures and rules of presenting a fatwa. 
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sovereign, who has behaved in a certain manner, should be deposed. Again, following 
the traditional structure of a fatwa, the opinion is given in clear and precise language 
without deviating from the question posed in the istifta and is then supported by 
passages and verses from the Quran and examples from the Prophet’s Sunna to give 
the fatwa additional authority.   
In many cases where the istifta was sensitive or was likely to have a widespread 
impact, it was preferable to have broad agreement amongst the ‘ulama of different 
legal schools to further underpin the authority and applicability of the fatwa.  So, in 
the case of this fatwa, it ends with the signatures of eight senior ‘ulama from al-Azhar 
including the Muftis of the Maliki and Hanbali orders which is likely to have been 
requested either by the questioner or the Sheikh who issued the fatwa who in this case 
was the Mufti of the Maliki order and pro-nationalist ‘alim Sheikh Muhammad 
‘Illaish.10 
But although the fatwa is signed by eight senior ‘ulama from al-Azhar, there are some 
conspicuous absences from the list of signatories.  With a fatwa of this importance, it 
would have been normal for the highest religious authority – that of the Sheikh al-
Azhar – to have sanctioned the fatwa or given his approval of the fatwa in some way.  
But in this instance, even though the previous Sheikh al-Azhar Muhammad al-Abassi 
al-Mahdi (1827-1897) had been replaced in December 1881 as a result of protests by 
the pro-nationalist ‘ulama of al-Azhar most likely led by Sheikh ‘Illaish and instigated 
by ‘Urabi and the nationalists (see chapter 6), his replacement, Sheikh Muhammad al-
Imbabi (1824-1896) refused to sign the fatwa.  Sheikh al-Imbabi’s appointment as 
Sheikh al-Azhar had been a compromise between ‘Urabi’s choice of Sheikh ‘Illaish 
and the Khedive loyalist Sheikh al-Abassi and therefore Sheikh al-Imbabi found 
himself torn between the two and as a consequence severely weakened by his divided 
                                                 
10
 Broadley  op. cit. How we Defended Arabi, p177.  Here, Broadley states “eight great religious chiefs 
of the El Azhar” signed the fatwa but only names two of them being Sheikh ‘Illaish and his close Maliki 
disciple Sheikh Hassan al-‘Idwi.  No reason is given for not mentioning the other six signatories.   
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loyalties.  At the time, and in order to stay clear of the political crisis, he claimed ill 
health as an excuse for his absence from political involvement.11 
But there were other senior ‘ulama absent from the list of signatories, raising questions 
about the strength of the pro-nationalist ‘ulama.  Sheikh al-Abassi was one of those 
prominent ‘ulama that refused to sign the fatwa and although he no longer held the 
post of Sheikh al-Azhar he was nevertheless one of the most senior ‘ulama in the 
country and remained the highest legal authority in Egypt as Grand Mufti and head of 
the Hanafi order.12  Likewise, both Sheikh al-Sadat and Sheikh al-Bakri, heads of the 
largest Sufi orders refused to sign the fatwa.  Clearly, these were very senior ‘ulama 
who refused to sign the fatwa and opposed ‘Urabi and the nationalists in their attempts 
to depose the Khedive.  Of course, ‘Urabi would have preferred to have the support of 
these senior ‘ulama and during this time, he made various attempts to diminish their 
reputation and authority.13  One reason for their lack of support for the nationalist 
movement was that many of these senior ‘ulama were appointed by the Khedive and 
as a result had clear and widely accepted political loyalties.  In the case of the ‘ulama 
that did not sign the fatwa of deposition, these political loyalties are likely to have been 
a major factor in deciding to resist signing the fatwa.   
But much of the analysis of the ‘Urabi Revolt suggests ‘Urabi was in fact supported 
by a strong portion of ‘ulama.  For instance, while Blunt was in England at the time 
trying to persuade Prime Minister Gladstone to resist a military intervention in Egypt, 
Sabunji, his aide in Cairo kept him informed of events through almost daily telegrams 
and letters.  In them, he refers to the ‘ulama on numerous occasions and announces, 
“all the Azhar Sheykhs [Sheikhs] except Embabeh [Imbabi], el Abbasi, and the Sheykh 
                                                 
11
 Wilfred Scawen Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt: Being a Personal 
Narrative of Events, London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1907, pp.  326–30.  Telegram from Blunt’s aide in Cairo 
Sabunji dated 11 June 1882 
12
 Ahmed Atif Ahmed, Islam, Modernity, Violence and Everyday Life, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 
2009; see especially the chapter on al-Abbasi’s fatawa entitled “Egyptian Society in the Writings of 
Muhammad al-‘Abassi al-Mahdi (1827-1897)”.   
13
 Chapter 5 of this thesis discusses ‘Urabi’s role in the deposition of Sheikh al-Abbasi from the position 
of Sheikh al-Azhar. 
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el Saadat are supporting Arabi”.14  Sabunji’s first-hand account of the support from 
the ‘ulama, is further confirmed when he reports his attendance at a number of 
meetings that take place at al-Azhar attended by “Ulema and other persons … [where] 
the Koran and the Hadith were freely quoted, showing the unfitness of Tewfik to rule 
over a Mussulman community”.15  The apparent openness of the discussion to depose 
Khedive Tawfiq coupled with the discussion and meetings being carried out in an 
openly public place (Sabunji details in his account that the discussion took place in the 
Azhar Mosque where prayers are offered), points towards the fact that this may have 
been the dominant view amongst the ‘ulama and that rather than keep the discussions 
secret, the ‘ulama appear to discuss this highly sensitive issue fearlessly and in the 
public domain. 
Finally, while the ‘ulama who did not sign the fatwa may have been senior figures in 
the formal religious sphere, their authority and indeed their support base had 
dramatically declined. Firstly, under Sheikh al-Imbabi, the office of Sheikh al-Azhar 
underwent a crisis of authority because of the way al-Inbabi had been appointed. 
Imbabi’s elevation to this post was not a popular choice and his appointment, as 
mentioned previously was a compromise which weakened his position and resulted in 
him not being able to command adequate moral authority associated with previous 
incumbents of the Rectorate.16  Similarly, in the case of Sheikh al-Abbasi, his moral 
authority had declined considerably since he was forced out from the position of 
Sheikh al-Azhar.  Never before had a previous Sheikh al-Azhar been forced to leave 
this post with the custom being that all new Sheikh al-Azhars were only ever appointed 
                                                 
14
 Blunt, op. cit. Secret History, pp.326–30.  In this telegram, he also talks of a meeting between the 
‘ulama and Darwish Pasha, the Ottoman envoy sent by the Sultan to Egypt to settle the Egyptian crisis 
where all the ‘ulama except two (Sheikhs Bahrawi and Abyari) come out in support of ‘Urabi and the 
nationalists.  Both Blunt and by extension Sabunji, were close to and highly trusted by the nationalists 
and while they were no doubt being fed information in the hope that it would reach the relevant people 
in the British Government and have the desired effects on their political actions, the extent of local 
support for ‘Urabi which Sabunji describes in his telegrams is nevertheless corroborated by other first 
hand accounts of the events of the time including those contained in the accounts by Broadley, Shafique, 
‘Urabi, al-Nadim, ‘Abduh and ‘Ali Mubarak to name only a few. 
15
 Blunt, op. cit. Secret History, p.330. 
16
 Abd al-Muta’al al-Sa’idi, Taarikh al-Islah fi al-Azhar (History of Reform in al-Azhar), Egypt, al-
Itimad, 1943; see also Sa’od, Muhammad Abd al-Azeem, al-Azhar w’al-Shayukh (al-Azhar and the 
Sheikhs) Egypt, al-Jumhuriyya Press, 2001, pp.17–38 
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on the death or severe ill health of previous ones.  Abbasi had been removed because 
of internal dissension among the ‘ulama of al-Azhar which in all likelihood was 
triggered by the pro-nationalist ‘ulama.  Finally, the political and moral stock of the 
two most powerful Sheikhs of the Sufi orders – Sheikhs al-Sadat and al-Bakri – had 
been in decline for many years.17  Both of these positions were hereditary positions 
passed from Father to son and both of these Sheikh hoods were largely responsible for 
the elevation of Muhammad ‘Ali to the governorship and ultimately to rule Egypt in 
1805.  With ‘Urabi and the nationalists turning against Khedive Tawfiq and 
Muhammad ‘Ali’s dynasty increasingly discredited with the endless crises engulfing 
Egypt, these Sheikhs found their moral authority had declined by the middle of 1882. 
Fatawa and the Politics of Legitimacy 
The fatwa secured by ‘Urabi on the Khedive’s permissibility to continue to reign in 
Egypt was one example of where religion, faith and politics merged and in particular, 
where the fatwa was used as a tool to de-legitimise the Khedive and to confer greater 
legitimacy on opposition to his rule.  In Chapter 6, I discussed the role of Sheikh al-
‘Abbasi al-Mahdi and his opposition to ‘Urabi and the nationalist cause where the pro-
nationalist ‘ulama were prominent agitators in his dismissal from the office of Sheikh 
al-Azhar in December 1881.  But as mentioned in chapter 6, after his dismissal, he 
retained the position of Grand Mufti, the highest legal office in Egypt and because of 
his continued prominence as a vociferous opponent of the nationalists he remained a 
constant thorn in the side of ‘Urabi’s movement.  The efforts that brought about his 
dismissal as Sheikh al-Azhar were politically motivated by ‘Urabi in order to 
monopolise as much as he could the support of the ‘ulama and to discredit those who 
opposed the nationalist cause.  Hatina rightly points out that the “micro-struggle over 
the religious leadership at al-Azhar was intertwined with the macro-struggle over 
Egypt’s political hegemony”.18 
                                                 
17 Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i, Asr Ismail (Ismail’s Era), Cairo, 1932, 3 vols. 
18
 Meir Hatina, ‘Ulama’, Politics and the Public Sphere: An Egyptian Perspective, Salt Lake City, 
University of Utah Press, 2010, p.45 
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Having secured the fatwa of deposition against the Khedive and with Egypt at war 
with Britain, ‘Urabi felt his own Islamic credentials as protector of the homeland and 
its Islamic identity needed bolstering in an effort to attract greater numbers to take up 
arms against the British.  Once again, ‘Urabi turned his attention to al-‘Abbasi as 
Grand Mufti and requested a fatwa on what appears to be an Islamic matter but that 
had unmistakable political undertones which ‘Urabi hoped would have significant 
political implications.  Previously, his successful efforts to oust al-‘Abbasi as Sheikh 
al-Azhar resulted from rumours circulating that al-‘Abbasi was to give a fatwa 
denouncing ‘Urabi and the nationalists as rebels in order that the Khedive could 
reverse some of the concessions he was forced to give from the ‘Abdin Palace incident 
in September 1881.19  The fatwa was never given but the rumours suggest that the 
boundaries between religion and politics were becoming increasingly blurred with 
both sides recognising the importance of the ‘ulama in providing Islamic legitimacy 
and a religious base to their political causes.   
In late August 1882, as the invasion was looking increasingly unstoppable with British 
forces advancing through Egypt’s Delta region, ‘Urabi, through the Sheikh al-Azhar 
al-Inbabi made a request for a fatwa from Sheikh al-‘Abbasi on “the obligation to 
remove images of human beings and animals”.20 The fatwa sought the Islamic 
justification to remove the statue of Ibrahim Pasha in the centre of the Azbakiyya 
district near the minaret of the Azbakiyya mosque and the statues of lions, erected 
around the same time during the reign of Khedive Isma’il at both ends of the Qasr al-
Nil bridge.  When the statues were initially erected, in particular the statue of Ibrahim 
Pasha, the public reacted angrily as indeed they offended the Islamic traditions 
associated with the public display of images and statues.21 Couched in Islamic terms, 
the request makes clear the statues were contrary to Islam  
                                                 
19
 Rudolph Peters, ‘The Lions of Qasr al-Nil Bridge: The Islamic Prohibition of Images as an Issue in 
the ‘Urabi Revolt’ in Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, David S.  Powers (eds) Islamic 
Legal Interpretation: Muftis and their Fatwas, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1996, p.216. 
20
 Ibid., p.214. 
21
 Gabriel Baer, Islamic Political Activity in Modern Egyptian History: A Comparative Analysis, in G.R 
Warburg and U.  Kupferschmidt (eds.), Islam, Nationalism and Radicalism in Egypt and the Sudan, 
New York, Praeger, 1983, p.262. 
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for the religion of Islam forbids us to erect idols such as the ones that the 
Companions of the Prophet destroyed when they entered Mecca the Honourable, 
so as to comply with the obligations of the religion.  22   
Although on the surface, the request appears to be a religious matter, seen within the 
context of the ‘Urabi Revolt, the political nature of the request and the political effects 
‘Urabi hoped to achieve are clear.  The areas of Cairo in which the statues stood were 
well populated and in removing them, ‘Urabi wished to make this act as public an act 
as possible to demonstrate his adherence to orthodox Islamic principles.  Removing 
the statues would demonstrate the nationalists Islamic credentials in a very public way 
and promote the perception that rule by the nationalists meant a greater link to and 
retention of Islam within Egypt.  This was synonymous and consistent with the 
nationalist strategy from the outset of associating their nationalism with protection of 
the nation and to safeguard Islam’s position with it.  In this key aspect of the nationalist 
struggle, the ‘ulama became a vital constituency as the interpreters of Islam and Shari’a 
and the guardians of the faith.  And as politics converged with the emergence of 
nationalism, ‘ulama found they possessed greater political importance which they used 
in both supporting and rejecting the nationalist movement.   
The removal of the statues was meant as a clear sign to Egyptians that the nationalists 
considered the Muhammad ‘Ali dynasty’s reign and the European influence in Egypt 
as illegitimate.  The removal of the statues was an attack on the whole dynasty and in 
many respects what it had done to Egypt over the course of the nineteenth century.  
The statue itself was of Ibrahim Pasha, son of the founder of the dynasty and a brilliant 
commander and army general.  Under Ibrahim Pasha’s command, Egyptian forces had 
brought the Ottoman Empire’s eastern territory under Muhammad ‘Ali’s control and 
it was only when Muhammad ‘Ali planned to attack territory in Ottoman heartland 
was he restrained mainly by the European powers.  If Muhammad ‘Ali symbolised the 
reformist and modernising aspect of the dynasty, Ibrahim Pasha was the symbol of its 
military strength.  The symbolism of demolishing the statue of Ibrahim Pasha was also 
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linked to him being the “father and grandfather, respectively, of ‘Urabi’s adversaries, 
the Khedives Isma’il and Tawfiq”.23 
The impact of the fatwa on al-‘Abbasi himself and his loyalty to the Khedive should 
also not be ignored or overlooked. Al-‘Abbasi’s opinion of the nationalist movement 
was well-known consistently supporting the Khedive throughout the crisis arguing that 
his authority could only be challenged by the Ottoman Sultan.  But grounds for the 
destruction of the statues was quite clear in Islamic law based on the prohibition of 
making images or copying God’s creation and on the basis that idolatry was a practice 
of the unbelievers in the period of jahiliyya in pre-Islamic times.24   
‘Urabi recognised that by asking al-‘Abbasi for the fatwa, he would be putting the 
Grand Mufti in a very difficult position.  Either al-‘Abbasi would have to give the 
fatwa thereby compromising his position with the Khedive and at the same time giving 
‘Urabi and the nationalists permission to destroy the statues which would no doubt 
have a positive effect for the movement’s popular appeal.  Or, in the event that al-
‘Abbasi denied the charge in the fatwa request and failed to agree on such a 
fundamental and clear issue in Islamic law, he would have left himself open to 
criticism from other ‘ulama, accusations of favouritism towards the Khedive or worse 
still being under the influence of the Khedive.  Al-‘Abbasi obliged and issued the fatwa 
on 31 August 1882 knowing well that failing to give his opinion in the affirmative on 
such a clear case would probably have led to widespread demands for his removal 
from  office or that his position as Grand Mufti would have been severely 
compromised resulting in a significant decline in his authority.     
‘Urabi clearly consulted with other ‘ulama on the matter including Sheikh ‘Illaish who 
had given a fatwa on the matter already.  The request was put through the office of 
Sheikh al-Azhar Inbabi whose name appears at the beginning of the request and would 
have advised ‘Urabi of the legal grounds of the issue.  As a reflection of al-‘Abbasi’s 
growing isolation, the fatwa is not signed by other ‘ulama which is unusual in a fatwa 
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of this significance.  Indeed, the fatwa is contained in al-‘Abbasi’s seven volume 
collection of over 13,500 of his fatawa and it is often the case with other fatawa in this 
collection that those considered important are signed by leading scholars from the 
other main madhaahib in Egypt.25  The second striking feature of the fatwa given by 
al-‘Abbasi that is relevant to the political context of the revolt is the inclusion of a 
supplement to the fatwa.  After giving the fatwa, al-‘Abbasi attached a supplement at 
the bottom of the fatwa – a highly irregular practice which is not replicated in any of 
the other fatawa in his collection – where al-‘Abbasi draws attention to issues outside 
the scope of the request.  The supplement reads as follows: 
The rulers of the Muslims must remove everything in their countries that is 
objectionable [munkar], such as practicing usury [riba], the opening of places 
known as brothels [karakhanat] and bars [khammarat], and other offences 
[mubiqat].  [They also must] prevent God’s servants from suffering wrongs 
contrary to the Shari’a and forbid injustice and [the application of] rules other 
than those revealed by God.  This is more urgent.26 
The supplement serves to caution ‘Urabi and divert attention from the main issues to 
what al-‘Abbasi calls ‘more urgent’ issues.  Here, al-‘Abbasi is referring to the moral 
corruption of society which constitutes a veiled challenge to ‘Urabi to address as one 
of the leaders of society.  But also importantly al-‘Abbasi reiterates the need to remain 
within the rules revealed by God and it is on this point that al-‘Abbasi had previously 
criticised ‘Urabi for his efforts to depose the Khedive.  Just as al-‘Abbasi was probably 
aware of the political nature of the request on the statues, his supplement steps outside 
the legal domain and can be seen as constituting a political message to ‘Urabi and 
others regarding the grounds on which they had deposed the Khedive as being outside 
Islamic tradition.  Peters rightly argues that the supplement implies “that ‘Urabi had in 
fact been slack in enforcing the religious commands and did not deserve to be regarded 
as a defender of Islam”.27  
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Majlis al-‘Urfi and the Formal Deposition 
The absence of support from the pro-Khedival ‘ulama in response to ‘Urabi’s istifta 
illustrates the contending political loyalties being played out at the time and the lines 
of internal debate and conflict within elite ‘ulama circles.  However, by the middle of 
1882, pro-nationalist ‘ulama were dominating both the internal debates within ‘ulama 
circles and the political environment and as a result, popular support for the nationalist 
movement was high.  Pro-nationalist ‘ulama had managed to compromise much of the 
authority of the pro-Khedival ‘ulama and with the Khedive morally discredited and 
lacking popular support, he appealed more desperately to the Ottoman Sultan and the 
European Powers to intervene on his behalf.  By the middle of June 1882, the Khedive 
considered his life was under threat and “placed himself under the direct protection of 
the fleet”.28  The bombardment of Alexandria took place on 11th and 12th July and with 
this, the Khedive now left Cairo and retired to Alexandria to the heavily fortified Ra’as 
al-Tin palace where he remained under the protection of British troops.29 For ‘Urabi 
and the nationalists, this offered the chance to finally execute the formal deposition of 
the Khedive. 
The fatwa of deposition was requested by ‘Urabi sometime at the end of May 1882 
before the Khedive had put himself under British protection which raises questions 
over whether this act was behind the request for the fatwa which in the end was issued 
in the first week of June 1882.30  But, even though the fatwa had been issued, the 
formal deposition of the Khedive did not occur until 29 July 1882.  The delay between 
the issuing of the fatwa in early June and the formal enactment of the deposition at the 
end of July occurs for two reasons.  First after the resignation of the Mahmud Sami 
government on 26 May 1882, Egypt effectively remained without a government until 
the Khedive appointed the Raghib Pasha government on 18 June 1882.  So although 
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the fatwa had been issued, there existed no formal political authority that could execute 
the ruling of the fatwa.  The second reason for the delay was because even though a 
government had been established after 18 June, attempts were made at reconciliation 
with ‘Urabi himself going to Alexandria to meet Khedive Tawfiq in order to accept 
the new government and show his willingness to work with it.31 
But any chance of reconciliation was ruined by British determination to invade Egypt 
in order to destroy ‘Urabi and the nationalists which they had thus far failed to do.  
First, Britain had failed to enable Khedive Tawfiq to limit the power of the nationalist 
movement in Egypt and ‘Urabi had emerged from that confrontation in a much 
stronger position.  Equally, Britain failed in persuading the Ottoman Sultan to send his 
troops to Egypt to restore order and the authority of the Khedive.  Finally, when 
Darwish Pasha’s mission to Egypt in June 1882 also failed to bring about the downfall 
of ‘Urabi and the nationalists, Britain decided to take direct action.  Britain’s bombing 
of Alexandria devastated the city and reduced it to rubble from its gunships in the 
harbour.32  When the Khedive arrived in Alexandria on 13 July followed by his 
ministers, the opportunity presented itself to ‘Urabi and the nationalists to clarify and 
ask questions once again about whether the Khedive, by placing himself under the 
protection of British troops and having left the capital at a time of high crisis “could 
still be regarded as the ruler of Egypt and whether the country still had a government 
capable of action, authorised to make binding decisions”.33 
Soon after, on 17 July a meeting was convened by Yaqoub Sami, the Deputy War 
Minister on ‘Urabi’s request to discuss the running of the country, war preparations 
and the deposition of the Khedive.  This was to be the first meeting of the Majlis al-
‘Urfi (Customary Parliament) which was to effectively run the country during the war 
                                                 
31
 ‘Urabi, op. cit. Mudhakiraat.  p516; see also Schölch, op. cit. Egypt for the Egyptians, p.254. 
32
 ‘Urabi, op. cit. Mudhakiraat, pp.578–87; see also Schölch, op.cit. Egypt for the Egyptians, pp.257–
58.  Both accounts mention that Britain’s ‘excuse’ for firing on Alexandria was that it accused the 
Egyptian military of fortifying the forts at Alexandria for war.  In fact, ‘Urabi states no fortifications 
were taking place and Schölch claims that Admiral Seymour, commander of the British fleet confessed 
on 6 July “that in fact no work was being done”. 
33
 Schölch, op. cit. Egypt for the Egyptians, p.260.   
Chapter 7/ In Defence of Islam and the Nation: ‘Ulama, Fatawa and the Popular Press 
248 
 
months.  The meeting heard cases for, and against the Khedive’s deposition with the 
Khedive’s supporters claiming only an imperial firman from the Sultan could depose 
the Khedive.  Those speaking for his deposition were Sheikh ‘Abduh, Sheikh ‘Illaish 
and Sheikh ‘Idwi and as expected they claimed the Khedive had betrayed Islam and 
the Egyptian nation.34  Without coming to a conclusion on the matter, a six man 
commission was set-up and asked to visit the Khedive in Alexandria to establish 
whether he was there as a captive of the British forces who had landed in Alexandria 
or on his own will.  When, on the 29 July, the Majlis al-‘Urfi met again the decision 
was taken to depose the Khedive and establish a substitute government with the deputy 
ministers now taking full responsibility for the ministries and their workings. 
The ‘ulama’s arguments at the meeting and indeed their fatwa appear to have been 
crucial in obtaining the support needed for the deposition.  Again attendees disagreed 
but the main pro-nationalist ‘ulama at the meeting are again Sheikh ‘Illaish, Sheikh 
‘Abdu, Sheikh ‘Idwi and it is significant that the. arguments contained in the fatwa 
issued by Sheikh ‘Illaish continued to be the way in which the deposition of the 
Khedive was framed and finally achieved.35  Without the support of the pro-nationalist 
‘ulama, the Islamic justification for deposition would not have been possible and 
perhaps with it the deposition itself.   
Nation and Religion: Debating Islam in the Popular Press 
The analysis of the fatawa above illustrates two important points in the role of ‘ulama 
in the nationalist movement.  The first is that the religious sphere became increasingly 
important in debates about the nation and the politics of nationalism.  Issues such as 
Islam’s role in society, the authority of ‘ulama as leaders of the faith, the role of Shari’a 
and its legitimate interpretation were mirrored in the political debates about the model 
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of community Egypt was to adopt.  The deposition of the Khedive and the preceding 
fatwa shows that religion and politics were intimately connected and furthermore, the 
‘ulama were integral to the relationship.  Muhammad ‘Ali’s attempts to banish the 
‘ulama from having any political influence in Egypt had either been reversed or had 
failed.  
The second important point that emerges is the debates draw attention to a range of 
issues and concerns upon which ‘ulama took a variety of positions.  Debating Islam’s 
role in society and its relationship to politics, the ‘ulama were not a homogenous group 
with similar opinions governed by the dogma of orthodoxy or Islamic prescription.  On 
the contrary, ‘ulama held a variety of views openly debated in the mosques, 
universities, and political spheres and which political leaders were influenced by and 
sought to incorporate into their conflicting views of Egypt’s challenges and its political 
future.   
But although the ‘ulama were intensively engaged in the political debates of the time 
and were central to the contending political factions and their efforts to gain legitimacy 
and popular support, Cole asserts, that the ‘ulama were slow to “make use of the new 
media such as the emerging printing press”.36  How then were ‘ulama ideas about 
community, religion and politics disseminated throughout Egypt to a wider audience 
and what mediums did the ‘ulama use to appeal to ordinary Egyptians the need to either 
support or reject the nationalist movement? 
The development of the Egyptian press had begun in the reign of Muhammad ‘Ali with 
the launch of a modest number of newspapers such as al-Jurnal (The Newspaper) 
1813, al-Waqa’i al-Misriyya (Egyptian Events) 1828 and Al-Jarida al-‘Askariyya (The 
Journal of the Military) 1833.37  These newspapers were mainly established as 
government mouthpieces in order to inform people of government policies and the 
reform measures being undertaken.  Their purpose was solely to act as a government 
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information service and they carried news and information on issues such as education, 
agriculture, building and infrastructure development and military affairs in a manner 
which promoted government policy and reform.38 This narrow purpose of the press as 
a government information service was to remain the case up until the reign of Khedive 
Isma’il with ‘Abbas I and Said I taking “no interest in the press”.39  
Under Khedive Isma’il, the popular press expanded rapidly driven both by demand 
and supply.  An increasingly literate population had developed through the process of 
modernisation and an expanding state bureaucracy, which fostered a growing demand 
for printed material including books, periodicals and newspapers.  Isma’il’s desire to 
expand the press was fuelled by political concerns and his greater vision of 
“modernising the social and cultural life of his people so as to make Egypt a corner of 
Europe”.40  Aside from his cultural vision for Egypt, there were also political concerns 
and he recognised the importance of the press for gaining popular support for his 
policies, countering negative publicity and to act as a symbol of his progressive rule 
mainly for the benefit of his European patrons.   In line with his promotion of the press 
which was relatively free compared to other Ottoman territories, on the supply side, 
he encouraged a growing number of journalists from Syria and Lebanon, to settle in 
Egypt and help establish and develop Egypt’s press.   Ziad Fahmy asserts that between 
1828 and the 1860’s “there were no new newspapers in Egypt”41 but in the table he 
provides, 16 new newspapers were established between 1828 and 187942 suggesting 
that most of these were likely set-up during the reign of Isma’il. 
Having fostered a relatively free and independent press in Egypt compared to other 
territories of the Empire by the 1870s, Isma’il had created the conditions for this same 
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press to criticise his policies as his rule became increasingly troubled by European debt 
and Egypt’s economic crisis.  The expanding press in the 1860s and 1870s had helped 
create; 
an increasingly politicised Egyptian public sphere with unprecedented large 
scale access to new forms of printed cultural material [which] began instilling 
a growing sense of civic consciousness among literate and semiliterate Egyptian 
urbanites.43 
Even amongst the non-literate public, the ideas and reports contained in the popular 
press were disseminated by public readings in coffee houses and other public spaces 
ensuring that despite low literacy rates in Egypt, non-literates were nevertheless kept 
informed of news and events.  The language used in the newspapers and periodicals 
was often of a colloquial nature especially within the growing range of satirical 
magazines and periodicals which avoided the abstract language and complex 
grammatical structures of the printed classical Arabic and its derivative fusha 
(pronounced fus ha).  The satirical form of journalism became increasingly popular 
and was initially established to veil direct criticism of the rulers which would have 
resulted in heavy censorship or being altogether banned with hefty punishments vetted 
out to its editors which often included long periods of exile.  But the use of colloquial 
Egyptian Arabic was also meant to ensure sketches, dialogues, news and reports 
remained easily and more readily accessible to ordinary Egyptians.  Fahmy’s 
pioneering work in analysing Egyptian popular culture and its role in the nation-
building process in Egypt from the 1870s highlights the importance of this popular 
medium in bridging class and linguistic divides.44  
In the latter period of Isma’il’s rule as it became increasingly troubled, the press voiced 
greater criticism against him.  Despite Isma’il’s efforts to muzzle the press by shutting 
down publications or sending their editors into exile, the mushrooming of printing 
houses allowed those not exiled to establish other publications under different titles 
and names.  Those less fortunate like Yaqub Sannua who was exiled to Paris in 1878 
because of the open criticism he displayed of the Khedive in his satirical newspaper 
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Abu-Naddara Zarqa (The Man with Blue Glasses), found ways of continuing their 
journalistic activities abroad and were able to smuggle printed material back into Egypt 
or continue to publish their comments and opinions in other Egyptian newspapers, 
journals and periodicals.45  The circulation of these newspapers and periodicals is hard 
to quantify with accuracy.  Some editors would announce their print-runs in their 
newspapers (see chapter 5 and section on Abdallah al-Nadim and his comments on the 
print run of his al-Tankit wa’l Tabkit which he said was 3000 copies) but given the 
tendency to exaggerate, these figures should be viewed cautiously.  For instance, 
Fahmy informs us that Sannua’ boasted of printing 15,000 copies of every edition but 
the Times correspondent in Paris estimated a more realistic figure of 7000 copies were 
being sent to Egypt with many being intercepted by the authorities before reaching 
their audience.46 
As the crisis continued to unfold in Egypt with Khedive Isma’il’s troubled reign giving 
way to Tawfiq’s, the press remained intensely involved in the political debate and in 
the dissemination of these debates to a wider public audience.  Newspapers and 
periodicals criticised ‘Urabi and the nationalists and the Khedive in equal measure.  
Editors and writers like Hasan al-Shamsi and Abdallah al-Nadim spearheaded the 
nationalist perspective in publications such as al-Mufid (The Informer); al-Safir (The 
Ambassador); al-Tankit wa’l Tabkit (Witticisms and Criticisms) and al-Taif (The Scout 
pronounced Taa if), all established in 1881.  The critical social commentary in al-
Nadim’s al-Tankit wa’l Tabkit (see Chapter 5) was to become one of the most popular 
periodicals of the time and after eighteen issues, al-Nadim changed its name to al-Taif.  
Under its new name, the journal became much more explicitly outspoken probably as 
result of it being adopted as the nationalist movement’s main mouthpiece and perhaps 
also to reflect the growing reality of confrontation with the Khedive and the British.  
Hasan al-Shamsi’s al-Fustat was outspoken from the outset and in an article titled 
“The Military Rulings” on the front page, he makes clear his political stance and that 
of his newspaper al-Fustat: 
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The Khedive has disobeyed God and instead he obeys the English and the 
French.  God’s rules must not be discarded and some faithful people have tried 
to advise the Khedive and his government to return to the path of God and of the 
Muslims but they have refused to do so.  Their false convictions have overthrown 
them from their seat of power and they have been replaced by other honourable 
people who are managing the affairs of the country.  As soon as ‘Urabi left the 
Khedive in Alexandria, the city became a battle field because of the curse of the 
Khedive.  It is clear he does not care for the suffering Muslims.47 
Al-Nadim’s al-Taif was equally pro-nationalist but appears to focus more on the 
external threat to Egypt and also to view Egypt as an integral part of a larger 
community.  In an article in his al-Taif he writes: 
These are the days of struggle [jihad] these are difficult days, days when we 
defend our country and when Egyptians fight the enemy of Egypt, the enemy of 
the Arabs and the enemy of Islam – The English state.  This country [England] 
is used to taking over Islamic countries like it has done in India and its intentions 
are to control another country which is the passage to India.  They [the English] 
know that access to India would be made easier by controlling the Arab world 
given their proximity.48 
As the conflict escalated with British forces who were by August advancing rapidly 
through the Delta region, the pro-nationalist press and pro-nationalist ‘ulama urged 
Egyptians to take up arms and to contribute to the war effort.  The war was increasingly 
seen as a jihad, a holy war to protect Egypt and Islam.  The Arabic word ‘jihad’ has 
become synonymous in western literature with the concept of violent ‘holy war.’  
Strictly speaking, this connection is only partly true and explains ‘jihad’ in limited 
terms.  The three-letter root of the word – j (jeem in Arabic) h (ha) and d (daal) actually 
denotes the Arabic verb ‘to struggle.’49  It follows from this that ‘to struggle’ for 
something could take a host of forms, one of which may in fact be warfare in the sense 
that enemies ‘struggle’ against one and another.  In Islamic terms, the Arabic verb ‘to 
struggle’ is often, but not solely used to denote a personal struggle to gain Islamic 
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knowledge, or to remain within the bounds of orthodoxy, to struggle against worldly 
temptations or to struggle in debate over a matter of theology or law with adherents of 
a rival theological or legal school.  But while the word jihad is often attached to a wide 
variety of usages in the Arabic language, it can also mean a struggle to defend the dar 
al-Islam (abode of Islam).  And, just as the word has many ways in which it applies to 
certain circumstances, so does the struggle to defend the dar al-Islam and to sanction 
and participate in jihad have many justifications in Islamic law.50  
One aspect of jihad consistently appearing in the speeches and sermons of ‘ulama was 
the idea that years of religious neglect had led to the current crisis.  According to many 
‘ulama, religious neglect could be seen to have pervaded Egyptian society in two main 
ways.  First, the rulers – which made reference to the Khedival dynasty – were 
responsible for the misapplication of Islam and its rules,51 which was brought about 
by lessening the Islamic influence on rulers that ‘ulama had had prior to the nineteenth 
century.  Having lost their prominence and proximity to Egypt’s political rulers since 
the era of Muhammad ‘Ali, it became increasingly difficult to influence the decisions 
and judgements of the rulers argued Sheikh ‘Ali Miligy, a senior Sheikh from Asiut.52   
He argued that “they (the rulers) became more interested in their worldly lives than 
they were in their religion”.53  Secondly, religious neglect afflicted not only the rulers 
but also the people who had diverged from Islamic practices and instead became 
caught up in practices, which were alien to Islam and were inherited from western 
influences.  So for example, in a poem written by Sheikh Ahmad Abd al-Gany, a 
teacher at al-Azhar University, he urges people that they must abandon “listening to 
songs or playing music, getting drunk and sitting idly in cafes and instead execute the 
orders of ‘Urabi and Allah’s will”.54  For the ‘ulama, conservative and reformist alike, 
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religious neglect was at the heart of Egypt’s troubles and by calling for jihad, pro-
nationalist ‘ulama could use the language of moral and religious regeneration in order 
to urge people to contribute to the war effort.   
The pro-nationalist press as well as calling Egyptians to jihad and forcefully using the 
rhetoric of jihad, also made attempts to justify it in Islamic terms.  Thus al-Shamsi in 
his periodical al-Fustat cites the Quranic verse (60:10): 
God says: Ye who believe, shall I lead you to a pact that will save you from 
penalty.  That ye believe in God and His Apostle and that ye strive in your utmost 
in the cause of God, with your property and your persons: that will be best for 
you, if ye but knew.55 
Using the rhetoric of jihad and the emotive power of holy way, al-Nadim illustrates 
well how the nationalist movement took a broad view of jihad and recognised that 
while people were needed in the armed conflict, people could also contribute other 
much-needed resources to ensure the call to jihad did not exclude anybody except 
perhaps the religious minorities.  Al Nadim writes: 
Infidels everywhere take over the lands of the believers, steal their property, rape 
their women, mock their religion and use mosques as stables for their horses.  
We thank God that we have the noble hero Ahmed ‘Urabi with his men who are 
like lions to rescue us from the real danger that surrounds us.  Help him with 
your prayers and the wealthy among you should contribute money to the army 
in order that they may face the evil English enemy.  Those fit to fight, go to the 
battlefield and others can make other kinds of contribution – all will be 
rewarded.56 
If the pro-nationalist press were making vocal demands to oppose the Khedive, fight 
jihad against the British and support ‘Urabi, the anti-nationalist press was also putting 
forward an equally strong point of view which sought to counter the pro-nationalist 
narrative.  Prominent anti-nationalist editors and writers included Mikha’il Abd al-
Sayyid, editor of al-Watan (The Nation) est. 1877; Hasan Hosni, editor of al-Zaman 
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(The Time) est.  1882 and Hamza Fathallah, editor of two newspapers published out of 
Alexandria including al-Burhan (The Proof) est. 1879 and al-I’tidal (The Moderate) 
est.  1882.  The counter-narratives these and other pro-Khedival newspapers put 
forward reflected the views and opinions of those anti-nationalist ‘ulama like Sheikh 
al-‘Abbasi who argued that ‘Urabi did not have the authority to depose a ruler who 
was the representative of the Sultan.  Mikha’il Abd al-Sayyid wrote, just after the 
Revolt was put down, that: 
Ahmed ‘Urabi and his people disobeyed Gods orders, His prophet, the Prince of 
the believers and the greatest Khedive and he angered his God and prophet when 
he disobeyed the Khedive’s orders and ignored him.   
That ‘Urabi came to represent the people of Egypt was also questioned in the anti-
nationalist press.  ‘Urabi and his fellow army officers were portrayed as political 
opportunists whose selfish acts had come to harm the country and its people by 
bringing a destructive and pointless war to Egypt which had caused wide-scale 
suffering.  Hamza Fathallah was an al-Azhar educated Sheikh who had taken up a 
career in journalism and was one of the most forceful critics of ‘Urabi and the 
nationalists and their role in destabilising Egypt.  He wrote in his al-I’tidal newspaper;  
Some people make their own lives miserable which is a matter for themselves 
but these people are easily guided back to good.  Another kind make the lives of 
others miserable and these are the worst kind of people.  In my opinion, the 
evilness of ‘Urabi cannot be rehabilitated. The people and the country has 
suffered from their evil deeds – even birds, animals and non-living objects like 
trees and rocks have suffered due to ‘Urabi’s acts.  Shame on you ‘Urabists, you 
have brought shame upon Muslims and Egyptians and made a black mark in our 
history.57 
The military under ‘Urabi came under attack and its role as defenders of the nation as 
well as its ability to win a war against the force of the British army.  Women were 
frequently portrayed in the press and although these portrayals were as ‘property of 
the nation’, both sides put themselves forward as the defenders of women’s honour, or 
argued that the other side was incapable of defending the honour of women who were 
the property of the nation.  The editor of Al-Zaman Hasan Hosni wrote about an alleged 
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incident he had heard which to him showed how the military and indeed ‘Urabi could 
not be trusted to protect the honour of the women of the nation: 
[someone] was walking along the street and found two murdered women on the 
street and saw soldiers trying to rape a 14 year old girl.  The man asked the 
soldiers to leave the girl and the soldiers replied that they had killed the two 
murdered women and would do the same to the girl after they took their pleasure 
from her but the man, with the help of some officers persuaded the soldiers to let 
the girl go.  The men took the girl to a nearby tent where ‘Urabi ordered them 
to leave her in his protection.  Returning after a few hours to check whether the 
girl was recovering, he found her raped and bleeding.58  
Of course, the accuracy of the story cannot be verified but its publication illustrates 
the ways in which the press became an important part of the efforts to delegitimise the 
opposing political camp.  The hostility shown towards ‘Urabi or the Khedive by the 
nationalist or pro-Khedival press often spilled over into hostility between editors and 
writers themselves and these debates were often equally vicious and aimed at religious 
belief and morality.  Al-Nadim was well known for his sharp wit and intelligence but 
his vicious attacks on political opponents were also well-renowned. In an article in his 
al-Taif, he attacked the religious credentials of Hamza Fathallah as well as his intellect 
and his faith.  Al-Nadim wrote: 
We have seen a newspaper called Al-I’tidal published from Alexandria.  Its 
editor is the apostate and heretic Hamza Fathallah, the former editor of al-
Burhan.  This heretic knows nothing about civilization or humanity.  He slanders 
the Egyptians and praises the English and their deeds.  He wrote an article 
slandering the Egyptian soldiers and Egyptian notables and at the end of his 
newspaper, published a statement from General Seymour [the British Military 
General in Egypt] calling for the surrender of all Egyptians and Muslims to the 
English.  He encouraged people by claiming he was a member of the ‘ulama who 
have since denied his claim.  We warn our Egyptian people against reading this 
publication…we are surprised to see an Arabic newspaper with English opinions 
edited by a man who used to visit and sit within ‘ulama circles claiming piety.59 
Egypt’s relationship with the Sublime Porte was also often discussed in the press 
drawing on ideas associated to ‘umma and community but at the same time to political 
independence and sovereignty.  The pro-Ottoman title Al-Ahwal (The Affairs) est. 
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1882, edited by the brothers Bishara Taqla and Salim Taqla promoted a pro-Caliphal 
and pro-Ottoman stance and often featured news of the Ottoman delegations to Egypt 
and how members of the Egyptian ‘ulama were warmly treated ignoring the 
mistreatment of the ‘ulama by the hands of Darwish Pasha in June 1882.  In an article 
reporting a meeting between Bishara Taqla and Ahmed Asad, a senior member of 
Darwish Pasha’s Delegation, Taqla writes to reiterate the close ties between Egypt and 
the Ottoman Empire that: 
The Sultan is determined to protect Egypt and will not allow another country to 
take it over and has sent the Delegation to Egypt to make all the necessary 
arrangements and plans to ensure its security and stability…he [Ahmad Asad] 
has met the Sheikhs and other ‘ulama and members of the public who all 
expressed their loyalty to the Caliph and assurances to obey his [the Caliphs] 
orders.60    
On the question of whether ‘ulama used the press to disseminate their own views, two 
broad observations can be made.  The first is that while ‘ulama themselves appear to 
be absent as writers and journalists contributing articles and reports, or publicising 
their own sermons in the press, the issues being debated in the popular press were a 
reflection of the debates taking place within ‘ulama circles in the mosques and 
seminaries.  Islamic justifications for ‘Urabi’s opposition to and deposition of the 
Khedive appear frequently in the press as do the counter arguments insisting that only 
the Sultan has this authority.  Egypt’s relationship with the Ottoman Empire was also 
frequently questioned as well as Europe’s role in Egypt and in particular the debt crisis, 
economic decline and the prospect of a greater erosion of ties with the ‘umma and the 
Caliph.  Debates at the political level were being disseminated at the popular level 
through the press and ‘ulama were playing an important role at the political level in 
many cases shaping and defining the major issues of contention and debate.  
Furthermore, the popular press had in fact developed out of the political crisis in Egypt 
during the 1870s and so the relationship between politics and the press was one that 
was well developed despite its recent emergence.  ‘Ulama may not have used the press 
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directly but their ideas and political positions were being discussed and disseminated 
on a broad range of political and religious issues. 
Secondly, there is evidence to suggest that editors and journalists became more 
interested in reporting the political positions that various ‘ulama took in relation to the 
political issues and ‘ulama became more visible in the press and newspapers with 
reports detailing their support or pronouncements.  As the war moved closer to its 
conclusion and the nationalists became more aware of their military weakness and 
inevitable downfall, the nationalist press increasingly carried exaggerated reports of 
victories against the British forces.  Often, these exaggerated reports were 
accompanied by news that particular ‘ulama had visited soldiers on the frontline before 
battles ensuring religious sentiment remained central to the war effort.  For instance, 
al-Nadim wrote in his al-Taif that: 
Sheikh Hasan al-‘Idwy [one of the Sheikhs central to the deposition of the 
Khedive] visited Kafr al-Dawar camp with some other ‘ulama to read al-
Bukhary [an authoritative collection of Hadith] and with this blessing, God 
gifted the fighters a great victory that same day.  Later, the Sheikhs went to the 
eastern front and read al-Bukhary once again and passages from another book 
written by Sheikh al-‘Idwy entitled Mashariq al-Anwar (Blossoms of the East) 
and they were rewarded once again with victory due to the blessings of the 
prophet Muhammad Peace and Blessings be Upon Him.61 
The anti-nationalist press also published reports of senior ‘ulama who disagreed with 
the deposition orders and opposed the emergence of ‘Urabi and the nationalist 
movement.   All the political forces recognised the benefits of disseminating religious 
ideas as well as the moral and political judgements of the ‘ulama through the popular 
press.  The ‘ulama were themselves actively engaged in this and allowed their views 
to be used for political purposes to further a particular political cause or to put forward 
a moral stance on an issue.  In this way, the perception that they did not make use of 
the popular press needs to be reassessed.    
In the brief analysis of the content of some of the newspapers and periodicals being 
published at the time, the evidence suggests clearly that the ideas of the ‘ulama were 
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being reported and disseminated through the popular press.  More difficult is the task 
of quantifying the impact of the press on public opinion.  Further research is needed in 
this area but it is clear that as the ‘ulama became more involved in the political issues 
concerning the emergence of nationalism and as opposition mounted to the Khedive, 
the debates in the popular press became a reflection of those being carried at the 
political level within which the ‘ulama were increasingly prominent.  The issues about 
Islam, authority and legitimacy that arose and were at the heart of the deposition and 
the fatwa on the statues analysed above were intimately connected to the political 
debates within the popular press. 
Both the Khedive and the nationalists placed great importance on the press for 
promoting their respective political causes even though the press was still in its 
infancy.  Extracts from the press above show that the debates were fierce and the issues 
wide-ranging but intensely focused on the political issues of day.  Issues such as the 
deposition, political and religious legitimacy and the emergence of nationalism and its 
confrontation with the prevailing hegemonic political forces were frequently in the 
popular press.  Articles and reports centred on the intentions of the British and foreign 
involvement in Egypt and the effects of this involvement continued to be a highly 
contentious issue.   The press were actively engaged in these debates with some taking 
a tough stance by calling for jihad, others calling for calm and restrain pointing towards 
how for instance the European powers had assisted Egypt in managing its financial 
affairs.  Publications also came out in support of the contending political factions 
supporting the achievements of the Khedive or the importance of ‘Urabi’s nationalist 
movement for the protection of Islam and of the nation.  Ideas about the nation and its 
relationship to Islam were increasingly portrayed in the press with the use of Islamic 
symbolism, prayers, invocations and language replete with historical references to a 
‘glorious past’ or past battles which served as models for the war against the British.  
The defence of the nation became synonymous with the defence of Islam and the 
‘ulama found themselves occupying a central position within the political arena once 
again.   
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Conclusion 
This thesis makes a contribution to the ongoing debate about the nature of Islam’s role 
in the emergence of nationalism in the Muslim world in general and in particular in 
Egypt in the years 1879-1882.  In particular, I have chosen to focus my analysis on the 
‘ulama, their internal debates, writings, fatawa and memoirs through which to try and 
understand their views and opinions on some of the pressing and most urgent socio-
political concerns of those years.  Those years, I have suggested, were years where a 
local nationalist movement emerged and sought to reappraise and reformulate the 
dominant notions of community, which Egypt was a part of since its absorption into 
the Muslim ‘umma in the middle of the seventh century.   
The emergence of nationalism in Egypt began in the early nineteenth century and was 
linked to a combination of processes from both outside and from within Egypt.  
External semi-autonomous rule by the Ottoman Empire, the threat of European 
imperial encroachment, and the inclusion within an emerging global economy set in 
motion unrelenting internal transformation including centralized state formation, 
economic expansion, demographic change and social upheaval.  These elements of the 
emergence of nationalism are, to a greater or lesser degree, recognized by scholars of 
the subject.  Where this thesis seeks to make a contribution to the theoretical debate 
on nationalism is to offer religion and in particular Islam as a main character in the 
story of the rise of nations and nationalism.   
I concur with other theorists of nationalism who argue that merely emphasizing the 
sociological conditions under which nationalism emerges, reveals too little about the 
nature, character and underlying features that help us to identify the origins of nations 
and the relationship between nations and nationalism.  What are the characteristics and 
traits around which nations are formed and how are these important to nationalist 
movements?  In exploring these issues, history becomes important in defining the 
nation in that it reveals the elements of continuity with a past which often become 
important characteristics of emergent modern nations.   
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Religion is one of these historical characteristics of the nation and it is noticeable in 
the theoretical literature on nations and nationalism that scholars have generally, in 
recent years, relegated the importance of religion in their analysis of modern nations.  
Of specific concern to this thesis, has been the conspicuous absence in the theoretical 
literature of Islam’s role in the emergence of nations and nationalism.  In this respect, 
scholars have tended to see Islam as having a universalizing effect on communities 
because of its ideal of the ‘umma, the community of Muslims that transcends the nation 
– and other categories of communal identity and attachment – and asserts the ideal of 
common Islamic belief as the primary focus of community.  Deriving from the ideal 
of the ‘umma, other factors such as the existence of a common Arabic language and 
Islam’s insistence on the centrality of Arabic to orthodox practice, are seen by scholars 
as having universalizing effects and which tend to be antithetical to the emergence of 
nations and nationalism across the Muslim world. 
Seeing Islam and its assertion of the primary importance of the ‘umma to Muslims as 
impediments to the idea of the nation, some theorists of nations and nationalism have 
tended to posit a theoretical tension between the particular characteristics of 
community the ‘umma and the nation separately embrace.  I have argued that this has 
happened largely because theorists have paid inadequate attention to the numerous 
empirical studies and historiographical accounts of the emergence of nationalism in 
the Middle East and the wider Muslim world.  Indeed, the historiography on the Middle 
East shows that scholars of the region have long since explored and accepted the ways 
in which Islam made an important contribution to nationalism. Some of the literature 
in this respect has been highlighted in chapter 1 and 2.  This thesis has highlighted the 
divergence between theories of nationalism and the actual historiography of 
nationalism in the Middle East and by employing the case study of Egypt in the years 
1879-1882, this thesis has attempted to make a contribution to the theoretical debate 
on Islam’s relationship to nationalism.  In chapters 4 and 5, I explored some of the 
views held by Islamic thinkers on the subject of nation, ‘umma and other associated 
concepts of community and some of the terms, criteria and defining features that they 
articulated and debated.  My purpose here was to illustrate that according to these 
Islamic thinkers, Islamic conceptions of community rather than being antithetical to 
nationalism were in fact similar.  For instance, the ‘umma’s emphasis on territory, 
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religion, history, language and historical group attachment, are all criteria and shared 
understandings with historical conceptions of the nation which point towards the 
necessity to revise and re-think some of the theoretical assumptions to the rise of 
nations and nationalism in the Islamic world.  I conclude that while theoretical 
differences point towards incompatibility, conceptual analysis reveals similarities in 
definitions, meanings and normative understandings of the characteristics and 
elements of community for both the nation and ‘umma. 
Middle East scholars have paid considerable attention to the rise of nationalism in the 
region and as mentioned above, found that Islam contributed in various ways to the 
emergence of this phenomenon.  But in doing this, they have generally applied the 
assumption, across the whole of the region, that the rise of nationalism dates from the 
Ottoman defeat in 1918.  This assumption rests on two prevailing ideas widespread 
within the historiography of the Middle East.  The first is that the nineteenth century 
was an incubating period of nationalism where the ideas made their way into the region 
through greater contact with Europe through the Ottoman Empire and were embraced 
by a new educated class.  Secondly, the incubation of nationalism came in the form of 
greater appreciation and indeed heightened consciousness around national identity and 
the particular characteristics and indeed uniqueness of their own particular ‘national’ 
group bonds, attachments and national sentiments.  Despite the increased sense of 
national consciousness of many Ottoman Muslim ‘national’ groups, the imperial state 
remained the structure within which these groups expressed and articulated their own 
unique national identities, with the Empire representing the best form of protection for 
its populations from European encroachment and retaining a strong cohesive element 
due to the Sultan’s standing as the de-facto Caliph and head of the Islamic ‘umma. 
While these perspectives are true to a large extent, this thesis has argued that the ‘Urabi 
Revolt of 1879-1882 was an exception to the pattern of the emergence of nationalism 
in the region.  I have suggested that the ‘Urabi Revolt was an attempt by a local 
nationalist movement to assert its political independence from the Ottoman Empire, 
an important aspect of political nationalism.  While asserting the right and desire for 
national political independence, Egyptian nationalists I note, drew the important 
distinction between their national political aspirations and their Islamic loyalty and 
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attachment to the Empire, the Ottoman Sultan and the Islamic ‘umma.    
Historiographical studies of Egypt have tended to view the ‘Urabi movement’s desire 
to remain within the Empire and the repeated assurances of loyalty it sent to the Sultan 
during the period where the movement was challenging and opposing the authority of 
the Khedive, as sufficient grounds to categorize the ‘Urabi Revolt in a similar way to 
other Muslim anti-Ottoman national protest movements during the nineteenth century.   
In the case of Arab nationalism, scholars have viewed this movement as emerging 
during the course of the nineteenth century through a heightened sense of Arabism 
culminating in “full-blown” nationalism in the aftermath of the Empire’s collapse in 
the early twentieth century.  Arabism, the sense in which Arabs are a unique national 
group was bound to ideas of Arab superiority and uniqueness, ideas associated with a 
sacred dimension as chosen people which placed their link to Islam above those of 
Muslims of non-Arab origin.  This heightened sense of Arabism developed during the 
nineteenth century but scholars generally agree that Arabs for the overwhelming part 
remained loyal subjects of the Ottoman Empire.   
In broadly similar ways to Arabism, the ‘Urabi Revolt is seen by scholars as the phase 
of Egyptian nationalism where Egyptian national consciousness was raised to the 
political level, without making the ‘leap’ to political nationalism seeking its own state.  
According to Eric Hobsbawm, as I have pointed out in Chapter 2, political nationalism 
is the phase he terms “protonationalism”.  I have questioned the conceptual usefulness 
of the term “protonationalism” and suggested that Hobsbawn’s creation of the category 
is meant to reconcile his modernist outlook on nationalism, where the premodern 
historical attachments of ethnicity are assigned a political dimension without, at this 
stage, adopting a statist agenda.   In chapter 6 of this thesis, I offer the statement of the 
National Party as illustrating clearly a desire, albeit carefully worded and ordered, 
setting down the opposition’s desire for political independence from the Ottoman 
Empire.  In chapter 7, I offer an equally clear political and ‘statist agenda’ where the 
Majlis al-‘Urfi assumes the role of the parliament, votes to depose the Khedive in 
defiance of the Ottoman Sultan and in the process undertakes to govern the country 
through the existing state apparatus which includes ministries, commissions, and a 
makeshift parliament.   
Conclusion 
265 
 
The final set of conclusions I make here pertain to the Islamic dimension of the ‘Urabi 
movement and the importance of ‘ulama to the movement.  It is widely accepted by 
Middle East scholars that Islam has made important contributions to the emergence of 
nationalism across the region.  My thesis argues that ‘ulama – seen in a broad sense as 
Islamic clerics, thinkers and scholars in a variety of professions – played an important 
role in the nationalist movement led by Ahmed ‘Urabi.  When beginning my research, 
the assumption that ‘ulama would play an important role in political movements of the 
late nineteenth century appeared to me to be rather an obvious assumption to make.  
But surprisingly, I found very little literature on this issue.  Scholarly interest in the 
‘Urabi Revolt had not explored in detail the role of the ‘ulama in this movement and 
key texts on the ‘ulama in the nineteenth century by Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot and 
Daniel Crecelius suggested that ‘ulama political influence had steadily declined.  On 
the ‘Urabi Revolt, again two key texts stood out – those by Juan Cole and Alexander 
Schölch, both excellent texts with meticulous detail on the political and sociological 
background to the events of 1879-1882 but both not focusing attention on the ‘ulama 
and as a result, inconclusive as to the ‘ulama’s role in the movement. 
Scholars who had put forward the idea that ‘ulama had been marginalized over the 
nineteenth century seemed to exaggerate their claims and scholars writing on the 
‘Urabi Revolt seemed somehow convinced by this line of argument hence, what 
appeared to me to be disinterest in the fate and role of the ‘ulama.  My interest in the 
‘ulama stems from these initial observations and my thesis aims to make a contribution 
to the efforts by recent scholarship in the field, to revise the ways in which we see the 
continuing importance of ‘ulama in Muslim society. 
In chapter 3, I look closely at the argument claiming ‘ulama marginalization but 
mainly, I show how ‘ulama retained important realms of power and authority despite 
the obvious impact on areas where reforms were successful.  I concur with scholars 
who demonstrate the marginalization of the ‘ulama on two points.  The first is that 
many of their economic privileges were removed which impacted on their ability to 
act independently becoming increasingly dependent on the state and rulers for their 
economic wellbeing.  The second point is that the new political rulers of Egypt, 
Muhammad ‘Ali and his successors, were on the whole, dismissive of the ‘ulama’s 
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political importance that they had amassed during the Mamluk era.  The House of 
Muhammad ‘Ali, was able over the nineteenth century, to a large extent, to restrict 
their access, remove them from politically influential positions and generally limit 
their direct political potency due to the distance they created between political 
institutions and processes and the ‘ulama’s ability to be included in those institutions 
and be influential in the processes. 
But my analysis in chapter 3 looks at other important and influential realms in which 
‘ulama were able to either insulate themselves from reforms or where reforms did not 
penetrate to the extent that we are sometimes led to believe.  In particular I look at the 
religious realm where the evidence is far from convincing that ‘ulama were even 
fractionally displaced and the educational realm where I make a similar argument but 
accept that minor challenges to their monopoly on education provision were 
experienced.  More difficult to judge and where the evidence is weaker is the matter 
of judicial reform and the ‘ulama’s role here.  Given the lack of clear cut evidence, the 
only claim I make here is that in some respects of judicial reform, key ‘ulama may still 
have retained influential posts in some courts due to a continued reliance of the court 
system to be dispensing justice in line with Islamic norms. 
Having suggested in chapter 3 the continued existence of ‘ulama influence in society 
through a variety of key functions, in chapter 4, I focus on three important Islamic 
thinkers and reformers and explore the intellectual content of their contributions to 
debates about nations and nationalism.  The three ‘ulama together represent an 
important intellectual backdrop for the ‘Urabi Revolt and the analysis in this chapter 
illustrates some of the key debates that these ‘ulama were involved in, the influence 
they might have had on other ‘ulama and how the themes they tackle related to a desire 
to see educational reform.  Tahtawi’s impact on Egyptian nationalism is hard to 
overestimate and it is equally hard not to concur with other scholars such as Albert 
Hourani who have already made this point.  But it was important for this study to say 
something about Tahtawi’s thoughts and opinions on Egyptian nationalism and in 
particular the characteristics of the Egyptian nation not only because of his huge 
influence but also in light of my discussion of theories of nationalism in chapter 2.  My 
argument with Tahtawi is simply that measured against even the most recent theories 
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of nations and nationalism, Tahtawi’s views on the subject would fit very neatly within 
ethno-symbolist and other historically grounded theories of nationalism.  My argument 
with ‘Abduh in chapter 4 is not only to show the importance of his views and opinions 
which again other scholars have done, but also to show some of the underlying debates 
about modernization, progress, Islamic unity and authenticity which fed into his views 
on nationalism and his ultimate support of the ‘Urabi movement.  Finally, my 
treatment of Marsafi’s work in this chapter is once again to be taken in light of my 
discussion on theories of nationalism in chapter 2.  Most important though is my 
exploration of some of Marsafi’s definitions and explanations against a theoretical 
background and how some of the terms Marsafi uses have striking similarities and lie 
within the conceptual boundaries of modern theories of nations and nationalism.  My 
overall purpose in this chapter was to show how the ideas, definitions, prescriptions, 
problems and solutions to many of the problems these three thinkers identified, were 
similar to those found within the nationalist theories discussed in chapter 2 and which 
tell us how nations and nationalism emerge.  The importance of Islamic scholars 
putting forward these ideas within the conceptual framework of Islamic notions of 
community is also significant given that many scholars of nationalism are convinced 
that Islam impedes the nation with its universalizing drive. 
While chapter 4 looked at the Islamic intellectual background and treatment of 
nationalism in relation to Egypt, chapter 5 focused on ‘Abduh once again and Abdallah 
al-Nadim.  Their work, views and opinions, I argued are intellectual contributions not 
only to Egyptian nationalism, as with the work in chapter 4, but specifically served the 
purpose of providing the intellectual contribution to ‘Urabi and the nationalist 
movement.  Their journalistic writings in this crucial period were significant 
contributions to the nationalist movement.  Chapters 6 explores some of the political 
positioning of the nationalist movement in relation to the Khedive, the British and the 
Ottoman Empire and situates ‘ulama in these key political events and communications.  
In this chapter, I include some discussion of other ‘ulama who either supported or 
rejected the nationalist movement and argue that in the nationalist political struggle 
against the Ottoman Empire, the Khedive and the European powers, ‘ulama became a 
crucial constituency for the nationalist movement with ‘Urabi often relying on the 
‘ulama to fulfill important political or politically motivated functions.  My argument 
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here is to illustrate that the ‘ulama were a heterogeneous group with mixed and varied 
views and opinions and which the nationalist movement wished to coopt for its own 
political purpose.  Through this view of the ‘ulama, I conclude that far from being 
politically marginal, the ‘ulama were a crucial political ally for ‘Urabi and the 
nationalists.  Continuing in a chronological sense but also trying to illustrate ‘ulama 
involvement in the nationalist events, chapter 7 highlighted ‘ulama involvement in 
terms of support and rejection of the deposition of the Khedive.  Again this was a 
crucial event in the nationalist movement and I concluded that ‘ulama involvement 
was high but importantly on both sides where elite ‘ulama both supported and rejected 
the moves.  Chapters 6 and 7 argued two main points.  First that ‘ulama involvement 
in the political events from 1880 to the collapse of the nationalist movement in 1882 
was high but importantly, I tried to illustrate a broad view of ‘ulama opinion taking 
into account those that supported and also those who rejected the movement.  The 
debates between contending ‘ulama about Egypt’s relationship with the Ottoman 
Empire, their views on European encroachment and British invasion, with the rule and 
authority of the Khedive and ‘ulama views of their own national past and future 
aspirations were important aspects of the nationalist and anti-nationalist perspectives. 
Their views at the time reveal how some ‘ulama embraced the idea of an Islamic 
Egyptian nation at ease with its political and national independence, seeing this as a 
vital feature of a stronger more ‘authentically Islamic’ ‘umma, while others, found in 
nationalism and an assertion of Egyptian national sentiment, the beginnings of the 
destruction of Islamic unity.  This thesis has sought to engage with these rich and 
powerful debates which remain relevant today.   
It is not uncommon among my peer group of researchers that in the process of carrying 
out our research, many more questions than we initially envisaged are unearthed and 
by the end of our projects, remain unanswered.  Here I offer some areas of future 
research which require the attention of scholars to undertake further research. 
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In the first instance, on the ‘Urabi Revolt, there exists two main authoritative accounts 
of the event.  Juan Cole, in his Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East1, has 
examined in depth the social dimensions of the Revolution but in doing so, his analysis 
looked more at the reasons for the emergence of the Revolt at the expense of providing 
a detailed picture of what role groups like the ‘ulama played in the actual events and 
political trajectory of the movement.  Similarly, in Alexander Schölch’s Egypt for the 
Egyptians!2, the attention of the book is weighted towards analyzing the micro-
political dimensions of the years 1878 to 1882 without paying adequate attention to 
the socio-cultural aspects of the revolt itself.  Both works make a major contribution 
to the understanding of the ‘Urabi Revolt illustrating the importance of the event and 
paving the way for other scholars to take up a variety themes and issues which deserve 
more attention.  But so far, this has not been done and with these books having been 
published over 20 years ago, the ‘Urabi Revolt and the events surrounding it remain 
vastly under-researched. 
The sparse literature on the Revolt is all the more surprising as the archives for this 
period of Egyptian history remain vast and largely untapped.  Cole and Schölch both 
make use of the archives but in conducting my own fieldwork, it was evident that much 
more material was available for researchers who want to focus on particular class or 
social groups of the period to ascertain their particular roles in the ‘Urabi Revolt or to 
conduct research on the social history of the period.  In chapter 1 of this thesis, I 
explained my reasons for focusing on elite ‘ulama and the ways in which my initial 
research planned to take a much broader geographical and class cross-section of 
‘ulama opinion and views on the emergence of Egyptian nationalism.  Because of a 
number of practical and time constraints this was not possible but the need remains not 
only to explore more the opinions and views of ‘elite’ ‘ulama but also to find ways in 
which to better understand the ‘ulama networks outside of Cairo and the main urban 
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centers.  Meir Hatina’s3 recent study on the ‘ulama and their political role while 
contributing significantly to our understanding of their active participation in the 
‘Urabi Revolt is at the same time, more longitudinal and stretches into the middle of 
the twentieth century and points towards the need for further research in this area and 
also to bring to bear more comparative studies of the ‘ulama in other Muslim states.   
Another important area for further research is to look at the sufi networks, which were 
vast, powerful and which incorporated urban guilds and were equally connected to 
rural communities.  In Chapter 3, I pointed towards the rural networks of the elite 
‘ulama which were deeply entrenched but far more research is needed in discovering 
and uncovering the extent of these.  F. De Jong’s4 in-depth study of the sufi orders of 
the nineteenth century has been unsurpassed in the 35 years since it was published 
which points towards the need to reassess his findings in light of new research and 
increased accessibility of the archives.   
Chapter 3 in this thesis broadly looked at the process of modernization in Egypt during 
the nineteenth century and focused mainly on education reform efforts.  My argument 
in this chapter was that nineteenth century reform may not have had the effect of 
marginalization on the ‘ulama that modernization theorists looking at the Egyptian 
‘ulama in the nineteenth century have previously suggested.  The insulation of the 
traditional spheres of ‘ulama authority from state encroachment and the reluctance of 
the political authorities to attempt comprehensive and universal reform policies, I 
argued left the ‘ulama largely intact in the mosques, religious schools and to a lesser 
extent in the courts.  The impact and extent of educational reform in this period and 
the position of the ‘ulama in society remains dependent on a number of authoritative 
works including J. Heyworth-Dunne’s5 History of Education in the Nineteenth 
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Century and to a lesser extent, Edward Lane’s6 account of his time in Egypt between 
1825 and 1849.  While these works remain invaluable, scholars such as Indira Falk 
Gesink7 have begun to look at educational reform in al-Azhar over the nineteenth 
century through the prism of conservative clerics such as Sheikh Muhammad ‘Illaish 
to better understand the conservative view of reform.  Gesink’s work is important for 
my own work as it shows that the support shown to ‘Urabi and the nationalist 
movement was not just forthcoming from reformist or modernist ‘ulama but that 
conservative ‘ulama were equally supportive of nationalism while at the same time 
they opposed education reform.  This reassessment of the conservative view to show 
the complexity of debate on such an emotive and important issue is necessary. 
If there are significant opportunities for future empirical research, the need to develop 
a more comprehensive body of theoretical literature on religion and nationalism and 
particularly on Islam and nationalism is also required.  As noted in the introduction of 
this thesis, John Hutchinson8 and Montserrat Guibernau pointed towards the necessity 
for scholars of nations and nationalism to explore in greater detail the relationship 
between religion and nationalism which they noted was greatly under-researched.  
Peter van der Veer9 and Rogers Brubaker10, two scholars cited in this thesis have made 
significant contributions in addressing this deficiency in the theoretical literature on 
religion and nationalism but while their interventions are timely and important, more 
research in this area is required. 
Finally, the tumultuous events around the Arab world over the last three years under 
the hugely optimistic title of the “Arab Spring” has brought into sharp focus Islam’s 
relationship to politics and its continued importance to Muslim societies in the Middle 
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East and the wider Muslim world.  ‘Urabi’s nationalist revolution attempted to arrest 
control of Egypt from rulers that they claimed were unjust and illegitimate.  These 
same calls were heard recently on the streets of Tunis, Cairo and Tripoli and continue 
to be heard in Damascus and many other capitals and towns and cities across the region 
over one hundred and thirty years after the ‘Urabi Revolt.  It is striking that in the same 
way that ‘Urabi’s nationalist movement claimed to be the true defenders of the nation 
and of Islam, Arab regimes have, and continue to make very similar claims.  
Interestingly, both moderate Islamists and Arab and Islamic regimes show no 
eagerness for a united ‘umma under a single Caliph in much the same way as ‘Urabi 
and his nationalists rejected the Ottoman Sultan in the end.  The feature that remains 
consistent in the politics of 1882 and of 2014 around the Muslim world, is the same 
desire to ‘nationalize’ Islam, to monopolize its appeal and to link it to national 
regeneration and renewal.  Such a robust and enduring combination of ideology and 
religion requires greater comprehension. 
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